Proposals for the regulation of the South African precious metals industries in the light of domestic and global developments by Damarupurshad, Ashok Kumar
PROPOSALS FOR THE REGULATION OF 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRECIOUS METALS 
INDUSTRIES IN THE LIGHT OF DOMESTIC 
AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS
Ashok Kumar Damarupurshad
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built 
Environment, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy.
Johannesburg, 2016
DECLARATION
I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or 
examination to any other University.
SIGNATURE: 
…….. day of ……………….., ………………..
ii
ABSTRACT
The Precious Metals Industry in South Africa is highly-regulated compared with other 
mining and trading countries in the western world which have either deregulated their 
precious metals industries, have only partial controls or have never seen the need to 
regulate gold and platinum-group metals specifically. South Africa has a specific Act 
of parliament, the Precious Metals Act, 2005 (a modification of Chapter 16 of the 
Mining Rights Act, 1967), that regulates possession, trading and manufacture of 
precious metals. Apart from the Russian Federation, no other country in the world 
regulates gold and platinum-group metals possession, trading and fabrication to the 
extent still done in South Africa. The requirement for such stringent controls was 
based on the country’s pre-eminence in the production of gold and platinum over the 
past fifty years, exchange controls (in the case of gold) and the contribution of gold 
and platinum-group metals to foreign exchange earnings and to the country’s 
economy as a whole. 
However, much has changed in South Africa, in the world and indeed in the precious 
metals industries domestically and globally and this work is the first attempt to 
discuss and analyse developments and proposals that are impacting on the 
regulation of the precious metals industries in South Africa.  Of these, the World 
Gold Council’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard provides a case for industry self-
regulation to complement, or substitute for government regulation in future. The 
hypothesis at the Proposal Stage of this study was that the precious metals industry 
in South Africa is over-regulated and should be deregulated. In this study, this
hypothesis is explored and debated. 
The Resource Nationalism -motivated proposals, including Producer-Country Price 
for Platinum, OPEC-type trade bloc for platinum, precious metal exchange and 
single-channel marketing of platinum, were analysed in this study. It was concluded 
that these are wanting in terms of cost/benefit or problematic in terms of international 
agreements and trade and competition laws. 
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The Precious Metals Act, 2005 itself was also critically analysed with a view to 
evaluating what could be regulated better or deregulated in the light of recent 
developments and proposals. It was found, ironically, that the old problem of illegal 
mining and trading needs to be brought under control before deregulation of the 
precious metals industry can begin. Nevertheless, in the run-up to deregulation (in 
an estimated 10 to 15 years), industry self-regulation, co-regulation (with industry) 
hallmarking, and a re-examination of how beneficiation is promoted should be 
considered.
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5CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Over the past few years, significant developments and influential proposals from 
high-ranking officials and organisations have impacted (or will impact if implemented, 
in the case of proposals) on the precious metals industries in South Africa and 
worldwide. Resurgence in resource nationalism (including calls for greater control 
over supply, trading and pricing of precious metals) and the push for greater 
beneficiation in African producer countries are amongst the most significant. A close 
third is a recent development – the World Gold Council’s (WGC) Responsible Gold 
initiative and complementary Responsible Gold initiatives. 
The Kimberley Process has given the diamond industry a clean, moral facelift1, but 
can the same ever happen for the notoriously complex gold industry asks the Rand 
Refinery (2011), a South African member of the WGC implementing the Responsible 
Gold Standards in South Africa. In early 2011, the World Gold Council and its 
partners developed the “Conflict Minerals” and “Chain of Custody”, standards that 
were being implemented by WGC members since 2012. 
“Conflict Gold” is gold that contributes to or fuels conflicts in conflict zones including 
the DRC and its nine surrounding countries. While this issue is not a new one, it has 
been given legal force through the Dodd Frank Act in the USA – the home country of 
the US dollar – the currency in which gold is traded worldwide.  As with the conflict 
diamond saga, the promulgation of the Dodd Frank Act by the USA and campaigning 
by NGO’s carries with it the threat of stigmatising African gold in general (Horsley, 
2011).
1 NB: “Clean, moral facelift” because Conflict Diamonds have been reduced from 4% of market in 
2000 to less than 0.5% in 2015 & threats of consumer boycott of the industry have subsided since -
in fact virtually non-existent at present. Moreover, the UN continues to back the initiative each year. 
6The World Gold Council’s scheme covers the chain from mine to refinery, while the 
Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) and the Electronics Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) have initiatives to manage the chain downstream from the refinery 
to the end consumer. These have also been implemented since the second half of 
2012. 
The issue of sustainability and materiality has also become a topical issue recently. 
The negative impact of mining on local communities both socially and 
environmentally, receives much media coverage. Sustainability becomes a 
materiality issue for mining companies when there is a significant risk to water, 
energy and other resources; and where climate shifts can disrupt the availability of 
raw materials and threaten the well-being of employees and customers (Makower, 
2012). Materiality has also become topical of late in the context of integrated 
reporting for companies, including mining and mineral processing companies. In this 
study, the question of whether regulation of sustainability and materiality is 
necessary in the South African context is looked into. 
The upward trend in the precious metal prices from 2002 to 2012 has also had an 
impact, inter alia prompting new frontiers to be to be explored, viz., Urban Mining 
and the Ocean.  Urban mining is essentially the process of reclaiming compounds 
and elements from products, buildings and waste. It is a new global industry which
encompasses any metal or material that is recyclable. E-waste (electronics waste 
material) recycling is relevant to this study, as it involves the recovery of precious 
metals contained in consumer electronics and electrical contacts in buildings. This 
study looks at the current status of urban mining and new policies and technologies 
that are making it viable and concludes on whether additional regulation is required. 
As the gold grades of the larger land deposits mined for many years continue to 
decline to low levels, the seas have also become the object of exploration and 
research into gold reserves. In 2006, Nautilus Minerals Inc. became the first 
company to commercially exploit the ocean floor for gold and copper sulphide in 
waters off Papua New Guinea.  In this study, gold exploration in the oceans is 
7reviewed and analysed and an assessment is made as to whether current regulation 
in South Africa suffices. 
In the period, prior to the start of this study there were also calls from prominent 
politicians in the United States, during the run-up to elections in that country, for a 
gold-backed currency in the light of the US debt crisis. Such a proposal and its 
potential impact on the precious metals industry are analysed in this study.
Although the focus in this study is on the recent developments, the old problem of 
illegal mining and theft of gold from refineries is still a major consideration in this 
study as far its impact on regulation, deregulation, self-regulation or co-regulation of 
the precious metals industries are concerned. 
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 (Act 37 of 2005) and associated legislation are 
analysed in detail in this study with a view to proposing and rationalising what can be 
deregulated, better regulated or regulated differently. Most industry participants view 
the legislation as draconian and not fitting with the 21st century. Many have 
expressed the opinion that through the Act, the precious metals industries in South 
Africa are over-regulated. This view is tested in this study. 
HYPOTHESIS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The hypothesis at the Proposal Stage of this study was that the precious metals 
industry in South Africa is over-regulated and should be deregulated. In the central 
chapters to follow this hypothesis is debated. One of the research questions in this 
regard was: can deregulation of the precious metal industry, which was the trend in 
most major mining and trading countries over the past 60 years, begin now in South 
Africa? If so, would hallmarking on its own, be an adequate replacement for the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005. Or, would nascent self-regulation initiatives such as the 
World Gold Councils’ Conflict-Free Gold Standard and Responsible Gold initiatives, 
either substitute for or complement statutory controls. The major objective, from the 
investigation of this hypothesis and these research questions is to at the end 
propose when deregulation of the precious metals industry can begin and why. The 
8study also delves into the “how”, but is cognizant of the fact that deregulation is a 
process, which in some respects must go in reverse before it can go forward with 
momentum. 
Another research question of importance was: do the Precious Metals Act, 2005 and 
the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 prevent or deter illegal 
mining and trade of precious metals in South Africa? Can these pieces of legislation 
be improved to tackle this problem, or are they through capacity constraints, poor 
drafting and ineffective implementation be worsening the problem in certain 
respects?
The second most important objective of this study was to analyse the various 
resource nationalism –related proposals by looking at the pros and cons of each with 
a view to proposing if any are worthy of pursuing, and if so, how will this impact on 
regulation of the precious metal industry in South Africa. An important recent global 
development, viz., calls for a gold-backed currency especially in certain States in the 
US (during the run-up to recent elections) is also debated with the same objective: if 
it materialises, how will this affect regulation of precious metals in South Africa and 
globally. Another global development, the opening up of new frontiers, in particular 
Urban Mining and Mining the Sea are also analysed with the objective of proposing 
how this will affect regulation of the precious metals industry in South Africa, if at all.
METHODOLOGY
The author, who is employed as the Precious Metals & Beneficiation Manager at the 
South African Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator made use of his knowledge, 
experience and contacts in industry and relevant organisations during the course of 
the study. Due to the unique nature of the study, there was not much in the literature 
on certain aspects of this study, and therefore views of experts and industry players
and the author’s own knowledge and analysis form a major part of this study. 
Not all organisations and industry experts approached agreed to interviews, but a 
significant number of the relevant organisations and individuals did. These included 
9the Rand Refinery, Metal Concentrators, Johnson Matthey (Africa), AngloGold 
Ashanti, Mintek, Department of Mineral Resources, South African Police Services 
(SAPS), Directorate Priority Crime Investigations (the Hawks) and the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS). 
The Table below gives more detail on the methodology used in the study for the 
different chapters.
Table 1.1: Methodology used in this study by chapter
CHAPTER METHODS AND TECHNIQUES RESOURCE
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
Literature survey: Extensive use was 
made of data and information from 
Thomson Reuters GFMS, the World 
Gold Council, Johnson Matthey, 
Department of Mineral Resources 
and Virtual Metals. 
Internet and hard copy 
publications
Chapter 2: World 
Gold Council’s 
Conflict-free Gold 
Standard
Use was made of literature from the 
World Gold Council and other 
organisations. Various organisations 
including World Gold Council, Rand 
Refinery, AngloGold Ashanti, were 
also interviewed. 
Survey Questionnaires
Internet publications
Literature: journals and 
papers
Chapter 3: Resource 
Nationalism in the 
context  of the South 
African Precious 
Metals Industry
Use is made of literature relevant to 
resource nationalism in general and 
South Africa and precious metals in 
particular. 
Organisations and individuals 
including platinum and gold mining 
companies; refining companies, 
precious metal fabricators, jeweller’s 
permit holders, diamond cutters, 
Department of Mineral Resources; 
Jewellery Council; Johnson Matthey, 
Mineral Resources Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee members and 
JSE representatives were 
interviewed and/or surveyed. 
Survey Questionnaires
Internet publications
Literature: Books, journals 
and papers
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CHAPTER METHODS AND TECHNIQUES RESOURCE
Chapter 4: Analysis 
of the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005 and 
comparison to 
Hallmarking 
legislation
The author makes use of his 
knowledge and experience as 
Precious Metals Manager to analyse 
the Precious Metals Act, 2005. 
Industry participants such as Rand 
Refinery, AngloGold Ashanti, other 
refiners, the SABS and the Jewellery 
Council were interviewed. 
Survey Questionnaires
Internet publications
Legislation: including the 
Precious Metals Act, 
2005, Mineral & 
Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 2002, 
Exchange Control 
Regulations and 
Consumer Protection Act, 
2009
Chapter 5: 
Sustainability and 
Materiality
Various organisations including: 
NGOs (such as Global Witness), 
relevant mining companies and 
certain African government 
department representatives were 
interviewed. 
Use was made of literature covering 
various aspects such as King III, 
sustainability, materiality and 
corporate social responsibility
Survey Questionnaires
Internet publications
Literature: Books, journals 
and papers
Chapter 6: Calls for a 
gold-backed currency
Use was made extensively of 
literature on the subject. Newspaper 
and Internet reports of relevant 
developments in certain States in 
the USA were also used. 
Certain economists and financial 
gurus were also interviewed.
Survey Questionnaire
Internet publications
Books, journals and 
papers
Chapter 7: New 
mining frontiers: 
Urban Mining & 
Mining the Sea
Use was made of the literature. 
A few exploration companies such 
as De Beers Marine and Debmar 
were also interviewed. 
Survey Questionnaire
Internet publications
Literature: Books, journals 
and papers
Chapter 8 
(Conclusions)
The main findings and lessons of the 
previous six chapters were used to 
compile this chapter
-
LIMITATIONS
The biggest limitation this study suffers is the fact that there is no real literature on
regulation of precious metal industries in South Africa and globally. This is both a 
limitation, as there was nothing to build on in this area, but also a good reason for 
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the study in the first place. It should also be noted that Regulatory Impact 
Assessments (RIAs) were not, and are still not, conducted in South Africa. Hence, in 
this study impact of legislation relies on comments from industry players and the 
author’s own cost/benefit analysis which includes estimates. 
While there is substantial information on resource nationalism in the literature; the 
areas discussed in the study are specific to platinum and gold in South Africa and
hence this study relies on views of industry players and relevant organisations and 
analysis by the author of the pros and cons of the resource nationalism -related 
proposals.
Much of the work on the Precious Metals Act, 2005 draws on the knowledge and 
analysis by the author, with only some views from other organisations and 
individuals. The discussion of the use of gold as money is superficial at best and 
heavily reliant on internet-based reports (some of them biased) due to the lack of 
information in the literature. 
In addition, while there is precious mineral -related legislation in some countries like 
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Zimbabwe and the Russian Federation, this is either not 
dedicated to platinum and gold as in South Africa, not as comprehensive as South 
African legislation, or not discussed in the public domain and in the literature. 
Lastly but most importantly, since most of the resource-based proposals made by 
individuals and organisations discussed in this study were dismissed in this study, 
the recommendations made are limited to explaining why they are not worth 
pursuing. In this regard, there is room for future work, which is suggested at the end 
of the study. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PRECIOUS METALS AND HOW THE 
GLOBAL PRECIOUS METALS MARKETS WORK
Before one can discuss regulation of the precious metals industries in South Africa 
and globally, one has to understand precious metals, the market for precious metals 
and how global trading of precious metals works. This will set the context for the 
discussions to follow on South Africa’s ranking as a gold and platinum-group 
producer, the Gold Standard, hallmarking, pricing of precious metals, trading 
platforms for precious metals, the size of the precious metals markets, precious 
metals trading products (bullion); precious metals investment products (coin, bars, 
ETFs etc.), precious metals consumer products (jewellery, decorative products etc.), 
and precious metal industrial products (autocatalysts, chemicals; alloys etc.). 
So, what follows are the facts and an explanation of the above-mentioned technical 
issues relating to precious metals. Their relevance to the study is mentioned, 
although there are a few short sections included for completeness and reference. 
PRECIOUS METALS: DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION
The term “precious metal” refers to the metals gold, silver, platinum and the other 
platinum-group metals (PGMs), namely: palladium, rhodium, iridium, ruthenium and 
osmium. They are noble metals, in that they resist attack by acids and other 
reagents and do not corrode easily (although silver does tarnish). 
It is important to note that although silver is a precious metal; it has been excluded 
from the definition of “precious metals” in the Precious Metals Act, 2005, which is the 
principal legislation governing the precious metals industry in South Africa.  The 
deletion of silver from the definition of “precious metal” in the Precious Metals Act is 
a legislative way of deregulating silver. .For the purposes of this study, it is important 
to note that discussions will focus on platinum, gold and palladium in particular due 
to the size and importance of these metals’ markets and relevance to the South 
African situation. 
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The word “precious” derives from the Latin pretium, meaning price, through French 
word “précieux” (O’Connell, 2005). The term “precious” implies that they are by 
definition, high unit-value and rare. They tend to be attractive, durable and workable 
(malleable and ductile) metals. 
Precious metals (except for the PGMs: rhodium, iridium, ruthenium and osmium) are 
best known for their use in jewellery. In 2014, about 9 000 tons of gold, platinum,
palladium and silver valued at an estimated $98 billion were used in this application 
(see Table 1.1 below). This Table is an important backdrop to the discussion on the 
promotion of beneficiation by regulation in Chapter 3. 
Table 1.2: Use of gold and PGMs in jewellery
PRECIOUS 
METAL
USE IN JEWELLERY
MASS (tons)
(% OF TOTAL 
FABRICATION)
USE IN JEWELLERY
VALUEe
($ billion)
TOTAL 
FABRICATION
(tons)
Gold 2 213.0 (53) $89.90 4 158
Platinum 79.9 (35) $3.56 227
Silver 6 693.0 (20) 4.11 33 178
Palladium 15.0 (5 ) $0.38 298
TOTAL 9 001 (24) $98.15 37 860
Sources: Gold Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.
Platinum & Palladium Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.
PRECIOUS METALS VALUE CHAIN
To understand the production and supply, trading and fabrication of precious metals 
one needs to understand the value chain. The precious metals value chain (see 
Figure 1.1) refers to the successive processes of metallurgical processing or value 
addition from mining through to the retail of the final product. 
14
This includes ore beneficiation (discussed later), the manufacture of bullion bars, 
bullion trading, fabrication of semis (semi-fabricated precious metal products), 
fabrication of final products (like jewellery, coins and industrial goods), 
distribution/wholesale of final products and finally the retail of manufactured articles. 
In this study, the value chain is referred to in Chapter 3 mainly but it also has 
relevance to the discussions in Chapter 4, 6, 7 and 8. 
Figure 1.1: Schematic representation of the generic precious metals value 
chain
NATURE OF THE PRODUCT: GOLD
For this study, it is important to be reminded of the appeal gold has and why. Gold is 
a unique precious metal. Its rich yellow – “golden” colour and its mental-imagery 
association with the Sun is an integral part of its beauty and mystique. Possessing a 
density of 19.3g/cm3, it is one of the densest metals known to man. As the World 
Gold Council (WGC) illustrates: if the estimated 183 600 tons of gold mined over 
history were melted into an equilateral cube, the length of a side of that cube would 
be a mere 21 metres (WGC, 2003). 
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Gold is, for all practical purposes, virtually indestructible. At 1 064C, its melting point 
is also notably high. It does not corrode (except when treated with aqua regia), and 
besides some minimal industrial and other losses, almost all the gold that has ever 
been mined is still in existence in some form or other (World Gold Council, 2010).  It 
is ranked third behind silver and copper in terms of its electrical conductivity, and 
amongst the metals it is the most resistant to tarnishing (World Gold Council, 2010). 
Gold is the most malleable metal (it can be hammered into very thin sheets without 
structural damage). 
GOLD’S INCORPOREAL CHARACTERISTICS
For the discussions that follow on trading and fabrication of precious metals, it is 
important to bear the incorporeal characteristics of gold in mind. Gold ─
(i) is a monetary asset (can be monetised);
(ii) is a store of value (a hedge against inflation).
(iii) is a commodity and a fungible2 one at that (interchangeable, exchangeable 
and standardised). 
(iv) displays counter-cyclical behaviour (zero correlated with stock markets and 
negatively correlated with the most powerful financial instrument, the US 
dollar). 
GOLD MINE PRODUCTION
For the discussion on pricing and trading of gold in Chapter 3 and other resource 
nationalism –related proposals in that Chapter, it is important to note the history of 
gold mining, South Africa’s historical and current role and other African countries’ 
roles. It is believed that the Egyptians mined gold, as long ago as pre-2000 BC. As 
stated above, over history some 183 600 tons of gold have been mined. Currently, 
World production of gold is around 3 000 tons and as supply is moderately price 
elastic fluctuates somewhat with average annual prices. Gold is mined in over 70 
countries, the largest producing countries in 2014, according to Gold Survey 2015
compiled by GFMS Ltd., are given in the chart below. 
2 Allocated gold is regarded as non-fungible
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Gold mining grades are generally very low. In South Africa, gold grades range 
between 4 and 10 grams per ton, i.e., gold occurs in a concentration of 4 to 10 parts 
per million. At a grade of 4 grams per ton, it would take about 8 tons of ore to 
produce one ounce of gold. 
In South Africa, gold grades have been declining as the richer gold reefs of the 
Witwatersrand gold deposit have been mined out over the past 120 years. It is 
argued in Chapter 7, that declining gold grades in the older deposits prompted
exploration in the sea. 
Figure 1.2: Top 10 gold producing countries, 2014 
(Source: Gold Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
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GOLD ORE BENEFICIATION3 AND THE PROCESSES OF SMELTING AND 
REFINING
Processing of gold ore, smelting and refining must be understood as a background 
to the discussion on the Precious Metals Act, 2005 in Chapter 4. The processes are 
described below.
After gold-bearing ore has been extracted from surface or underground operations it 
undergoes beneficiation. Beneficiation involves the following processes in sequence: 
1. Crushing and milling (Comminuition),
2. Concentration of crushed ore by gravity techniques and flotation, 
3. Extraction of gold from the ore concentrates.
After beneficiation of the ore, the processes of smelting and refining follow:
4. Smelting to a gold-rich doré (containing typically about 60-70% gold, and 
silver),
5. Casting of bars, and
6. Refining of doré into gold bars containing 99.5% gold or more. 
3 Ore Beneficiationmeans the various processes that involve upgrading, improvement, processing or treatment of a 
primary ore by the removal or separation of impurities from the economic mineral/s or metal/s. Strictly speaking, 
beneficiation means the treatment of ore to improve physical and chemical properties in preparation for further 
processing, especially smelting. 
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Figure 1.3: Gold ore beneficiation processes
GOLD VALUE CHAIN
These refined bars or bullion4 bars are then usually sold to bullion dealers, although 
direct marketing by mining companies does occur. The bullion dealers trade with 
jewellery or electronics manufacturers, who fabricate5 final consumer goods. In some 
countries, bullion dealers will also lease gold out to manufacturers. As mentioned 
above, the Gold Value Chain is of relevance to the discussions in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 6 
especially. 
CONSUMPTION OF GOLD
The demand for gold is obviously what drives the market. As far as the study is 
concerned, the jewellery demand sector is worth noting for the discussion in Chapter 
3 especially. The physical demand for gold (Gold Survey 2015) is made up of three 
main sectors, namely:
1. Jewellery (about 2 213 tons or 60%), 
2. Industrial (about 400 tons or 11%) and 
3. Investment (about 1 079 tons or 29 %). 
4 Bullion refers to gold, silver and platinum in bulk trading form, e.g., bars, ingots & plate, rather than in grain or 
sponge
5 Fabrication refers to the manufacturing of semi-finished or final products
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Figure 1.4: Gold: three main demand/fabrication sectors, 2014
Jewellery Sector
Gold jewellery fabrication demand is dominated by India (771 tons or 27%), China 
(732 tons or 26%), Turkey (156 tons or 5.4%), United States (150 or 5.2%) and Italy 
(96 tons or 3.4%). 
Figure 1.5: Top jewellery fabricating countries, 2014
(Source: Gold Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
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The largest gold jewellery consuming countries in 2014 were: India (662 tons), China 
(633 tons), United States (131 tons) Russia (71 tons) and Turkey (68 tons). 
Figure 1.6: Top jewellery consuming countries, 2014
(Source: Gold Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
It is interesting to note for this study that most of the major jewellery fabricating 
countries are also the major jewellery consuming countries, with the exception of
Italy which country’s jewellery consumption has dropped in recent years – a sign of a 
weakening economy. It can be deduced from this that domestic demand drives 
beneficiation. This is important to note for those involved with promoting 
beneficiation in South Africa. Growing the domestic market for fine jewellery is key to 
expanding beneficiation in South Africa. Currently domestic demand for fine jewellery 
is between 0.5 to 1 ton (Jewellery Council, 2012). This is discussed further in 
Chapter 3 and 8. 
Industrial Sector
The industrial uses of gold (GFMS Ltd., 2015) are accounted for by Electronics (279
tons or 69.5%), Dentistry (34 tons or 8.5%) and Other Industrial uses (87 tons or 
22%). Gold’s physical and chemical properties, including high electrical conductivity, 
high thermal conductivity and resistance to corrosion, make it indispensable in 
industrial applications. Gold can be found in computer keyboard circuits, electrical 
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contacts and mobile phones. Catalytic applications are also attracting increasing 
interest.  Gold’s non-allergenic properties see it being used widely in dentistry. In 
medical applications, its biocompatibility is becoming increasingly important. 
Retail physical investment 
Retail physical investment is made up of demand for coins, bars, gold ETFs 
(exchange traded funds) and to a lesser extent, medallions. In most countries 
(including to a certain extent, South Africa) this represents an avenue for private 
individuals to buy gold (Chapter 3 and 4 elaborate on this further). In 2014,
investment amounted to 1 079 tons worth $44 billion, down from the record $63 
billion recorded in 2010. 
GOLD AS A FORM OF MONEY
Chapter 6 of this study discusses the gold as a form of money concept in detail. The 
information that follows sets the backdrop for that chapter. 
Gold is unique in that it is both a monetary asset and a commodity. As a commodity 
it is also fungible, i.e., it is exchangeable, interchangeable, standardised and with a
unit price set by the market. 
Central Bank reserve asset
Central banks have been substantial holders of gold for more than a century and are 
still expected to maintain significant stocks in the foreseeable future. They account 
for about 20% of aboveground stocks (WGC, 2003). 
Over the last decade, the rebalancing of reserve portfolios and diversification has led 
to a reduction in the amount of gold held by some central banks. This trend is 
expected to continue for many years, but central banks have indicated that gold will 
remain an important reserve asset. 
Central banks began building up their stocks of gold from the 1880s, during the era 
of the Gold Standard. Under this monetary system, in countries on the Gold 
Standard, the amount of money in circulation was linked to the country’s gold stock, 
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and paper money was convertible into gold at a fixed price (see Chapter 6 for a 
detailed discussion). This is different from the modern Fiat Money (such as the 
Rand), which is inconvertible paper money established by government fiat 
(authorisation). 
The World Gold Council (2003) outlined the following main reasons as to why central 
banks still hold gold (at least on their books):
 Economic security: The value of currencies held in reserve, depend on the 
economic policies of the issuing government. Gold does not suffer from 
defects in policy in centres where it is held as a reserve.
 Physical security: If gold is located appropriately, it is much less vulnerable 
to exchange controls affecting free transfer of currencies or total asset 
freezes.
 Unexpected needs: Gold provides a form of insurance against some 
unexpected events such as war, surge in inflation, trade blocks and 
international isolation. 
 Confidence: Gold affords some measure of comfort because it is an 
indestructible, “hard” asset. It is something solid and valuable, although now 
not directly convertible, that underlies the paper money used for everyday 
transactions. 
 Diversification: The fact that returns on gold tend to be negatively correlated 
with other financial assets provides gold-containing portfolios with significant 
benefits. 
 Income: Gold lending allows central banks to earn a return on gold.
 Store of value: Historically, gold has maintained its purchasing power in real 
terms. 
 Reserve mobilisation: Gold plays a role in central bank reserve mobilisation 
in times of need, usually by lending and swapping. It is estimated that about 
2 000 tonnes was out on loan in 2014. Gold is often used as collateral for 
external borrowing. Central Banks conduct many of their gold transactions 
discreetly and even secretly.
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THE GOLD STANDARD
The Gold Standard is a monetary system in which a country's government allows its 
currency unit to be freely converted into fixed amounts of gold and vice versa
(Investopedia, 2012). The exchange rate under the gold standard monetary system 
is determined by the economic difference for an ounce of gold between two 
currencies. The gold standard was mainly used from 1875 to 1914.
The use of the gold standard marked the first use of formalized exchange rates in 
history. However, the system was flawed because countries needed to hold large 
gold reserves in order to keep up with the volatile nature of supply and demand for 
currency (Investopedia, 2012).. After World War II, a modified version of the gold 
standard monetary system, the Bretton Woods monetary system was created as its 
successor. This system was initially successful, but because it also depended 
heavily on gold reserves, it was abandoned in 1971 when US President Nixon 
"closed the gold window." 
The benefit of a gold standard is that money is backed by a fixed asset. This 
provides a self-regulating and stabilizing effect on the economy.  The government 
can only print as much money as its country has in gold. This discourages inflation, 
which is too much money chasing too few goods. It also discourages government 
budget deficits and debt, which can't exceed the supply of gold.  In addition, more 
productive nations are directly rewarded. As they export more goods, they can 
accumulate more gold. They can then print more money, which can be used for 
investing in and increasing these profitable businesses.
One disadvantage of a gold standard is that the size and health of a country's 
economy is dependent upon its supply of gold, not the resourcefulness of its people 
and businesses. Countries without any gold are at a competitive disadvantage. 
However, this is an advantage to South Africa which is a significant gold producer. 
There have been calls recently by politicians, some economists and other 
commentators for a return to the Gold Standard. This study examines the rationale 
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for those calls and an assessment is made of its viability in the modern day (Chapter 
6). 
GOLD TRADING AND HOW THE MARKET WORKS
Mine production of gold currently amounts to about 3 130 tons per year (GFMS Ltd., 
2015). At an average price of $1 266/ozt in 2014, primary refined production was 
valued at $127 billion. This makes gold the second largest physical (primary) metal 
market after copper ($150 billion). If recycled scrap is added, then conventional gold 
supply was worth some $173 billion in 2014. 
The global trade in gold consists of over the counter (OTC) trades, which are direct, 
principal-to-principal transactions in spot, forward, options and other derivative 
products, and exchange-traded futures and options (defined and discussed below). 
The OTC market is flexible in contrast to the rigidity of exchange transactions, hence 
OTC trading accounts for a much greater share of the global trade in gold. 
Over the Counter (OTC)
The OTC market operates 24 hours a day around the World. The main centres for 
OTC dealings are London, New York, and Zurich. Generally, mining companies and 
central banks tend to transact their business through London and New York. The 
New York market also services fabricators of jewellery and industrial products, and 
investment and speculative business. Zurich specialises in supplying physical gold to 
fabricators of jewellery and industrial products. However, bullion dealers tend to have 
offices around the World. The major bullion dealers around the World are members 
of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). 
Most of the OTC trades are cleared through London, although the physical market 
itself is distributed worldwide. “Loco London”, a term often used, refers to gold 
physically held in London. The LBMA makes stringent specification for “good
delivery” bars, especially in terms of mass, fineness (gold content in parts per 1000) 
and mark (stamp of the official melter or assayer).  The gold spot price always refers 
to the price of a London Good Delivery bar. 
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Price discovery: the London Fix6
The price of gold is 'fixed' twice daily at 10.30 am and 3.00 pm (BST) in London. As 
of 5 May 2004, the morning and afternoon gold price fixing no longer takes place at 
the office of NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd., and is now conducted over the telephone5. 
The current members of the fix are Deutsche Bank AG, Barclay’s Capital, HSBC, 
Sociẻtẻ Gẻnẻrale Corporate & Investment Banking and ScotiaMocatta which now 
head the gold price-fixing committee. Any other market participant wishing to trade 
must do so through one of these five dealers. The fix is based on the original 1919 
principle: "The principle to be maintained with regard to the sale of gold in the free 
market in London is that everyone attending the gold fixing is entitled to buy or sell 
gold on equal terms with everyone else present… It is also agreed that only one 
price shall be quoted and shall represent the price at which all supplies can be 
absorbed" (Goldfixing.com, 2006).
Clients place orders with their counter-parties, who are either the fixing members, or 
another bullion dealer who will be in touch with a fixing member and the client 
himself while the fixing proceeds. The fixing members net-off all orders before 
communicating their individual net interest at the fixing. The fix begins with a 
suggested “trying price”, reflecting the market price prevailing at the opening of the 
fix. This price is relayed by the fixing members to their dealing rooms who are 
themselves in touch with all interested parties who instruct their representatives to 
declare themselves as buyers or sellers at that price. Any market participant may 
enter the fixing process at any time, or adjust or withdraw his order according to 
his/her view of the price relayed. Provided that there are both buyers and sellers at 
the price, members are asked to state the number of bars they wish to trade. If at the 
opening price there are only buyers or only sellers, or if the numbers of bars to be 
bought or sold does not balance, the price is moved and the same procedure is 
followed until a balance is achieved (Goldfixing.com, 2006). The Chairman then 
declares that the price is fixed. However, it should be noted that the Fix is said to 
balance if the buy amount and the sell amount are within 25 bars of each other. 
6 NB: At the time of writing, the LBMA Gold Price (fixing by electronic auctions platform) replaced the historic London 
Gold Fix.
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Sometimes, if it is impossible to strike a balance, the price will be fixed at the 
discretion of the Chairman, an event called “fixing on discretion”. 
All fixing orders are transacted on the basis of this fixed price. These fixing prices are 
quoted immediately through the various news and business information wires or 
channels as well as the many gold information websites. The fix is therefore 
regarded as a full and fair representation of all market interest at the time.
In South Africa, one of the questions asked by the Mineral Resources Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee (PPC) to the author (an employee of the South African Diamond 
& Precious Metals Regulator) recently was: What influence does South Africa have 
on the setting of the price of gold and platinum? This apparently stems from the 
resurgence of resource nationalism – a philosophy being pushed by some members 
of the PPC, who see the setting of a Producer Price for gold and platinum as 
beneficial to the country and almost as a sovereign right.
Producers like South Africa, are in fact, price takers, and the price is “discovered” 
through the market mechanism described above.  This study will look at the pros and 
cons of the hypothetical case where South Africa sets the price for gold and platinum 
produced in the country. Whether there are any benefits to South Africa, and what 
effect such a pricing model could have on the global gold market are the questions 
that will be answered in this work.
Settlement
The basis of settlement is delivery of a standard London Good Delivery bar, at the 
London vault nominated by the dealer that made the sale. Currency settlement for 
gold transactions will usually be in US dollars over a US dollar account held in New 
York. 
Delivery of Physical Gold
Delivery may be made in several ways, including delivery to the dealer’s vault, or a 
credit to an allocated account, or through the London Bullion Clearing to an 
unallocated account of the third party. In addition to delivery at its own vault, a dealer 
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may, by prior agreement, arrange delivery to any destination around the world and in 
any form or any fineness. To enable this service, most bullion dealers have 
consignment stocks in strategic centres around the world.
An allocated account refers to an account held in a client’s name, where gold is 
exclusively held separately from other gold in a vault. This gold does not form part of 
the bullion bank’s assets, but is titled over to the allocated holder. The gold in an 
allocated account cannot be lent out or used by the vault owner. 
An unallocated account is basically a debit and credit arrangement, which is backed 
by the general stock of the bullion dealer where the account is held. If the client 
wishes to receive physical metal by allocating specific bars or equivalent bullion 
product, the fine metal content of this is debited from the unallocated account. The 
physical delivery period is normally two business days after the trade is transacted. 
The Clearing process
The clearing process is simply a system of paper transfers whereby members 
offering clearing services use the unallocated gold accounts that they maintain 
between each other, not only for settlement of mutually agreed trades but also for 
third party transfers. 
Available OTC Statistics (LBMA, 2014) show that volume cleared through London 
itself was about 240 million ounces valued at $300 billion in 2010 (aggregate of daily 
averages from LBMA, 2010). Worldwide OTC trades are much greater. 
Futures Exchanges
The most important exchanges are the COMEX division of the New York Mercantile 
Exchange and the Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM). Trading on these 
exchanges is less flexible than the OTC market, and much more rigid in terms of 
delivery dates and transaction size for the futures and options contracts traded. In 
addition, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) requires that a large-
scale trader on COMEX declare himself and the nature of his business (hedging, 
speculative, etc.). These markets are more geared to the speculator than the 
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physical market and, a case in point is COMEX where usually less than 1% of the 
market turnover actually results in eventual physical delivery.
HALLMARKING
A hallmark is a mark or number of marks, made on precious metal (gold, silver or 
platinum) jewellery or plate to confirm that its quality is up to the correct legal or 
specified standard (GoldAvenue, 2012). When backed by consumer protection laws, 
a hallmark (or assay or standard mark) is a guarantee that an article contains the 
specified minimum purity of precious metal. 
This study (Chapter 4) will look at the pros and cons of hallmarking legislation as 
stand-alone legislation versus comprehensive precious metal trade legislation. 
NATURE OF THE PRODUCT: PLATINUM
As with gold above, the section below, gives the background to the discussions in 
the central chapters below with regard to production, pricing trading and 
beneficiation of the platinum-group metals. The section focuses mainly on platinum, 
but the market for palladium is similar. It is worth noting, however, that a smaller but 
significant amount of palladium (some 15 tons) is used in jewellery compared with 
the 80 tons consumed in platinum jewellery fabrication (GFMS Ltd., 2015). 
Palladium is often alloyed with gold to produce white gold jewellery. However, 
because of high platinum prices and the higher margins of palladium jewellery, there 
has been a rapid development of palladium jewellery manufacturing in China 
recently. 
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Figure 1.7: Palladium demand/fabrication sectors, 2014
(Source: Platinum & Palladium Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
Palladium jewellery is expected to grow in popularity because the platinum price is 
expected to stay at high levels in the short-term. Nevertheless, it suffices for the 
purposes of this study to mention that according to GFMS Ltd. (2015), world mine 
supply of palladium amounted to about 188 tons, which at an average price of 
$803/ozt, was valued at $4.85 billion in 2014 and total supply (includes scrap 
recycling) at 249 tons was valued at $6.4 billion. Palladium is used mainly in 
autocatalysts (205 tons in 2015 according to GFMS Ltd.). 
The other PGMs are not discussed in detail (as they are not as relevant to the 
study), but brief comments are made towards the end of the section. 
PLATINUM’S UNIQUE PROPERTIES7
1. Platinum is rare (about 35 times more rare than gold). About 10 tons of ore 
must be mined to produce an ounce of platinum.
2. It is the densest known metal (at 21.45 g/cm3 it is 11% more dense than 
gold).
3. It has a silvery-grey white colour (which makes it popular for so called “white-
metal” jewellery). This white lustre complements diamonds and other 
7 Sourced from Platinuminfo.net, 2010 and Johnson Matthey, 2010
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precious stones while its neutral colour enhances a stone’s brilliance and 
depth (Professional Jeweller, 2003). 
4. Its melting point (1 769ºC) is higher than that of gold, and it has high 
temperature stability. 
5. Its main advantage for use in platinum jewellery fabrication is its strength and 
resistance to tarnish. Platinum can be repeatedly heated and cooled without 
hardening and oxidation effects. Platinum is a favoured choice for holding 
diamonds, because of its density and strength. 
6. It is malleable and extremely ductile. The latter is illustrated by the fact that 
one gram of platinum can be drawn out into a fine wire thread over a mile 
long (Professional Jeweller, 2003). 
7. It is an efficient catalyst, and thus finds use as an autocatalyst in motorcars to 
reduce air pollution. 
8. It is a noble metal, hence, oxidation and corrosion resistant (non-reactive, 
does not tarnish and is resistant to heat and acids). 
9. It has very high recyclability (over 96%). 
10. It is hypoallergenic, so it is the jewellery metal of choice for people who are 
allergic to other metals.
11. It is biologically compatible, so it is important in many medical applications.
PLATINUM ORE BENEFICIATION8, SMELTING AND REFINING
After platinum-bearing ore is excavated from the earth, it undergoes beneficiation, 
which includes the following in sequence:
Comminuition: Crushing and milling to maximise efficiency of the concentration 
process,
Concentration: separating milled ore into concentrate and waste by filtration and 
floatation.
8 Ore Beneficiationmeans the various processes that involve upgrading, improvement, processing or treatment of a 
primary ore by the removal or separation of impurities from the economic mineral/s or metal/s. Strictly speaking, 
beneficiation means the treatment of ore to improve physical and chemical properties in preparation for further 
processing, especially smelting.
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Figure 1.8: Platinum ore beneficiation, followed by smelting and refining 
processes
After beneficiation of the ore, the processes of smelting and refining follow in the 
following sequence: 
 Smelting: Extraction of metallics from the concentrate by pyrometallurgical 
processes to form a matte containing base metal/precious metal alloy,
 Refining: Refining of the matte includes extraction of base metals and 
recovery of precious metals, and finally, the 
 Casting of platinum bars. 
PLATINUM SUPPLY: SOUTH AFRICA – PLATINIZING THE WORLD
Mine production of platinum is dominated by South Africa (see Figure 1.9), which 
contributed about 3.1 Moz (95.2 tons) or 66% of World supply in 2014 (GFMS Ltd., 
2015). This contribution is down from the 75% plus in preceding years, and was due 
to supply disruptions in 2014 caused by one of the biggest strikes to hit the South 
African mining industry. Other producing countries are Russia (supplied 0.72 Moz in 
2014), Zimbabwe and the North American countries (Canada the USA). 
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Proposals by South Africa and Russia to have a greater influence on supply and 
ultimately price of platinum are discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. 
Figure 1.9: Top platinum producing countries, 2014
(Source: Platinum & Palladium Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
PLATINUM USES
Autocatalysts
Platinum is a precious metal and an industrial metal. The main use for platinum, 
however, is in autocatalysts, which according to GFMS Ltd. (2015) consumed 3.1 
Moz (95 tons) in 2015. Platinum usage in autocatalysts is linked to the introduction 
and evolution of emission regulations and standards (Johnson Matthey, 2003). 
These are currently in force in many developed countries, but standards vary from 
country to country. South Africa is yet to introduce such regulations. 
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Figure 1.10: Platinum demand/fabrication sectors, 2014
(Source: Platinum& Palladium Survey 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
Jewellery
The second biggest demand sector is in jewellery, a sector that consumed 2.6 Moz
(80 tons) in 2014, according to GFMS Ltd. (2015). The main jewellery fabricating
countries are Asian countries, in particular China (1 680 Koz in 2014) and Japan
(321 Koz in 2014), where citizens have a particular fondness for the “white” metals.
Industrial
Industrial demand for platinum, the third biggest demand component, consumed
some 1.64 Moz in 2014 (GFMS Ltd., 2015). Industrial uses for platinum include
platinum-based catalysts in the chemical industry and the petroleum refining
industry, electronic applications (e.g., in computer hard disks & fuel cells) and
platinum-containing equipment for the glass industry.
Investment
Demand for platinum in investment products, at 138 000 ounces (4.3 tons) in 2014,
was strong due to high investment demand for precious metals. Investment products
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include platinum coins (such as the famous US platinum American Eagle proof
coins), small and large platinum bullion bars and platinum Exchange Traded Funds
(ETFs). Sales of platinum coins and investment bars are price-sensitive.
South Africa, the World’s largest producer of platinum, has never minted platinum
coins. However, the SA Mint has plans to introduce South Africa’s first platinum coin,
in the near future (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 8).
PLATINUM TRADING
Size of the market
In comparison with gold, the platinum market is small and relatively illiquid. Market
commentator, Market Predict (2003), quoted dealers as suggesting that purchases
or sales of only 10 000 ounces can swing the price by about $10/ozt. At an average
price of $1 386/ozt the platinum supply of 6.27 Moz (239 tons) in 2014, was valued
at approximately $8.7 billion, which was about a fourteenth (1/14) of the value of
primary refined gold production ($127 billion).
Until four years ago, platinum supply lagged behind demand growth, resulting in 
rising prices. However, since 2009, the weakening in Eurozone and the US 
economies has dampened demand growth. According to GFMS Ltd., demand in 
2014 amounted to 7.28 Moz. Similarly, if one applied an average price of $1 386/ozt, 
this consumption was valued at about $10.1 billion. 
Due to the mining strikes in South Africa in 2014, the physical surplus in the platinum 
market over the last four years turned into a physical deficit. Movement of stocks to 
balance the deficit was a net 1 082 000 ounces (GFMS Ltd, 2015) in 2014 (worth an 
estimated $1.5 billion). 
Limited above-ground stocks and minor spot market
Platinum’s limited supply and relatively small quantity of aboveground stocks (203 
tons according to GFMS Ltd., 2015) are essential differences relative to gold. These 
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and irregular shipments from Russia have been responsible for the volatility of the 
platinum price in years prior to 2009. Recently supply disruptions at certain South 
African mines due to labour action and safety-related stoppages have also affected 
production and consequently prices. 
The size of the Russian stockpile was a very important price-influencing factor in the 
1990s, but it has dwindled in significance recently. Presently, the factors influencing 
mining in South Africa and Russia, economic conditions in the main consuming 
countries such as Japan, USA, China and the price of gold have a greater influence 
on the platinum price. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that most of the World’s supply of platinum is sold through 
long-term contracts to industrial consumers and thus is not available on the spot 
market. These industrial consumers include Johnson Matthey and large motor car 
manufacturers such as General Motors. 
The main physical market for spot delivery is the London Platinum and Palladium 
Market. The market also maintains the London/Zurich Good Delivery List, which is a 
list of acceptable Melters and Assayers. Forward prices are also quoted for 
stipulated maturity dates, thus allowing producers and industrial consumers to hedge 
in volatile market conditions. 
Price Discovery Mechanism9
The London Platinum & Palladium Market (LPPM) Fixings, also referred to as the 
London Fix, is considered the international benchmark for platinum and palladium 
prices and is transmitted by newswires. The quotation is done twice a day at 09H45 
and 14H00 (GMT). The fix is a bid price loco Zurich i.e., a price that LPPM members 
would have been prepared to pay for platinum and palladium in the form of plate or 
ingot, deposited in a Zurich vault (Platinum.Matthey.com, 2003). The fixing 
procedure is similar to the London Gold Fix, in that it is a balancing exercise of 
buying and selling orders received from members or their clients, who respond to 
9 At the time of writing, the London Metal Exchange (LME) had been selected as the administrator of the London 
Platinum and Palladium Fixing.
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price announcements and subsequent adjustments. The fixing price is the one at 
which all orders are cleared. Settlement is made within two days after the date of 
contract. 
Figure 1.11: Platinum, gold and palladium prices, 2002 - 2014
The reference price for all platinum-group metals, including platinum, is the Johnson 
Matthey Base Price10. It is Johnson Matthey’s quoted selling price for platinum-group 
metals set by the company’s trading desks in the USA, Hong Kong and London, 
based on market offer prices (Platinum.Matthey.com, 2003). The price is for metal in 
sponge form, ex-Johnson Matthey refinery. The JM Base Price is set at 09H00 and 
15H00 EST in the US, at 15H00 in Tokyo and 09H00 in Zurich every weekday. The 
prices are also published in Platt’s Metals Week and American Metals Market. 
Storage and delivery
The London and Zurich markets have facilities for storage of platinum and palladium 
in high security vaults. The metals can be held on unallocated or allocated accounts. 
10 Johnson Matthey, 2003
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Many clients do not take delivery of their metal and request the members of the
market to open metal accounts in their name. In such unallocated accounts, the 
specific bars are not set aside and clients have a general entitlement to the metal. 
This practice is popular because it is convenient and cheap. Allocated accounts are 
opened for clients who prefer their metal to be physically segregated and need a 
detailed list of weights and assays. 
Futures Markets and Contracts
Exchanges offer the facility for trading futures and options on behalf of clients. 
Platinum futures and options are primarily traded on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) and Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM). The trading of 
platinum contracts is conducted electronically at TOCOM but by open outcry at 
NYMEX. 
Forward Contracts
Forward contracts are more flexible than futures contracts and are conducted 
principal-to-principal usually by mining companies to sell their platinum at an agreed 
price for delivery on a fixed future date. These are not transacted on an exchange, 
and usually always result in physical delivery of platinum. 
NATURE OF THE PRODUCTS: OTHER PGMs
Although this study focuses on the platinum and palladium - the most important of 
platinum group metals. It is worth noting that the minor platinum-group metals are 
also regulated in South Africa, and that all the platinum-group elements are 
associated with each other (variably) in mineral deposits. The essential facts 
regarding the other platinum-group metals given below should also be borne in mind 
in the discussions in Chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8. 
It should be noted that all the PGMs can be used as catalysts and in the electronics 
industry. Palladium often substitutes for platinum in autocatalysts and jewellery, 
because it is cheaper. Palladium is alloyed with gold to produce white gold jewellery. 
Rhodium and iridium are difficult to work; they are nevertheless popular in alloys and 
chemical compounds. Ruthenium and osmium are hard and brittle and thus 
38
unworkable in the metallic state, but are used in combination with other metals. 
Iridium is the rarest of the precious metals. In fact, anomalously high concentrations 
of iridium in the Earth’s crust can be indicative of extra-terrestrial (meteorite or 
asteroid) contamination. 
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE WORLD GOLD COUNCIL’S CONFLICT-FREE 
GOLD STANDARD
THE WORLD GOLD COUNCIL
The World Gold Council (WGC) is the market development organisation for the 
global gold industry. The WGC works within the investment, jewellery and 
technological sectors as well as engaging with governments and central banks. Its 
main purpose is to stimulate and sustain demand for gold worldwide, but is also seen 
by many as the “Board of Directors”, in other words, the controlling body of the global 
gold industry as its member companies represent 80% of world gold production
(WGC, 2014).  South African members11 of the WGC are AngloGold Ashanti 
(including Rand Refinery) and Gold Fields Limited. 
BACKGROUND TO THE WGC’S CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD
When the intergovernmental Kimberley Process was formulating the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds in the early 2000s, many were of 
the opinion that such a scheme could not be applied to the gold industry because of 
the magnitude, depth and complexity of the gold industry. To use just one indicator, 
that of the annual supply value, the value of gold supply per year (over 4 300 tons 
valued $178 billion) is more than 12 times that of annual diamond supply value (130 
million carats valued at $14 billion). Moreover, the gold supply chain is complicated 
by the following:
1) The role of gold as a monetary asset i.e., a parallel currency
2) The high level of gold recycling (more than 35% of annual supply)
3) Gold is easily melted and once mixed with other sources of gold in refineries, 
its country of extraction or mining cannot be traced. 
4) Gold is sold through a complex trade network of refiners, bullion banks, 
manufactures and retailers. 
11 As of 2015, there are no South African members of the World Gold Council
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5) Significant gold production (10-15%) comes from artisanal sources (higher 
than that for diamonds)
6) There are several large suppliers of gold, while diamond production is 
dominated by only 3 companies (De Beers, Alrosa and Rio Tinto), and many 
more countries produce and/or refine gold (>70) than produce diamonds (22). 
Despite these complexities, the World Gold Council began working on a “Conflict-
Free Gold Standard” in November 2009 and released a draft Standard in June 2011 
designed to ensure that “conflict gold” (<1% of total annual production – see 
definition below) is kept out of the supply chain of World Gold Council members. 
Major impetus was lent to the Standard when the USA passed legislation (Section 
1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act) in July 2010, which declared four minerals: tin, 
tantalum, tungsten and gold as potential “conflict minerals”. 
Section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act requires persons to disclose
annually whether any conflict minerals that are necessary to the 
functionality or production of a product of the person, as defined in the 
provision, originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an 
adjoining country and, if so, to provide a report describing, among 
other matters, the measures taken to exercise due diligence on the 
source and chain of custody of those minerals, which must include an 
independent private sector audit of the report that is certified by the 
person filing the report. 
In addition, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
also developed guidelines for the responsible sourcing of minerals in May 2011. 
These Guidelines focused on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the eight 
adjoining countries, the so-called “conflict affected or high risk” areas. 
Other industry-led initiatives have also been developed to complement the WGC’s 
Conflict-Free Gold Standard, including the London Bullion Market Association’s 
Responsible Gold Guidance (focused on refiners like the Rand Refinery), the 
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Responsible Jewellery Council’s Chain-of-Custody Standard for Precious Metals 
(focused on jeweller’s) and the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition’s (EICC) 
Conflict-Free Smelter Protocols for tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold (focused on the 
electronic products supply chain). 
Since then the Standard was “stress tested” by major producers and refiners, and 
the WGC sought and continues to seek feedback from various stakeholders 
including governments, NGOs, other supply chain participants, academics and civil 
society organisations. 
OECD’S DRAFT SUPPLEMENT ON GOLD
Although the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Draft 
Supplement on Gold does not go into as much detail as the WGC’s Conflict-Free 
Gold Standard, is not compulsory, nor does it require external assurance compliance 
(PWC, 2012), it is still worth noting as a conflict-gold initiative. 
The Supplement focuses on the steps companies should take to avoid contributing 
to conflict and serious abuses of human rights in the supply chain of gold potentially 
sourced from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. It includes due diligence 
measures to be taken on recycled/scrap or previously refined gold (“Recyclable 
Gold”) only insofar as recycled material is a potential means of laundering gold that 
has been mined in conflict-affected and high-risk areas in order to disguise its origin. 
Gold investment products (ingots, bars, coins, and grain in sealed containers) held in 
bullion bank vaults, central bank vaults, exchanges and refineries with a “verifiable 
date” prior to 1 January 2012 (“Grandfathered Stocks”) do not require information on 
their origin in terms of this Supplement. However, gold investment products will 
require “Know Your Counterparty” due diligence to ensure the trade in 
Grandfathered stocks is not carried out in violation of international sanctions or does 
not enable money-laundering resulting from, or connected to, the sale of gold 
reserves in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.
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CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY CERTIFICATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY 
COUNCIL (RJC)
The Chain-of-Custody Certification scheme of the Responsible Jewellery Council 
focuses on ensuring that gold and platinum-group metals are conflict-free and 
produced in a “responsible” manner. The RJC Chain-of-Custody (CoC) Standard 
builds on and complements the Code of Practices of the RJC, and is voluntary for 
RJC Members (Responsible Jewellery Council, 2012). The CoC Standard provides 
requirements for the creation of a Chain-of-Custody for responsibly-sourced 
Precious Metals produced, processed and traded through jewellery supply chains.
It specifies requirements for a company or business to segregate CoC Material from 
other material in its custody, and to provide relevant information supporting the 
provenance of CoC Materials when transferred or sold to other parties. CoC Material 
may be purchased and sold between different businesses certified as conforming 
with this Standard, thereby enabling credible claims to be made about the
responsible sourcing of Precious Metals (Responsible Jewellery Council, 2012). 
THE CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD AND HOW IT 
WORKS
Definitions (WGC, 20111&2):
“Conflict-Affected or High-Risk Area”: A definition adopted from the OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance, which means: “an area identified by the presence of armed 
conflict, widespread violence, including violence generated by criminal networks, or 
other high risks of serious and widespread harm to people.  High risk areas are 
those where there is a high risk of conflict or of widespread or serious abuses. 
“Conflict Gold”: Gold which enables, fuels or maintains conflict through directly or 
indirectly financing or otherwise benefiting armed groups.
“Due Diligence”: Also a definition adopted from the OECD Guideline, and which 
means “an on-going, proactive and reactive process through which companies can 
identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential 
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adverse impacts as an integral part of business decision-making and risk 
management systems”. 
The Conflict-Free Gold Standard essentially takes the form of a decision tree split 
into 5 parts:
Part A – Conflict Assessment: This part involves the use of external criteria to 
assess whether the area or country in which the company is operating should be 
considered as “conflict-affected or high risk”12. 
Part B – Company Assessment: If the area or country is considered “conflict-
affected or high risk”, this part assesses whether the company has the appropriate 
management systems in place in order to carry out its obligations in this area, to 
avoid fuelling or funding conflict and associated human rights abuses. 
Part C – Commodity Assessment: Where the area or country is considered 
“conflict-affected or high risk”, this part assesses how and by whom the gold is 
handled and the potential for this to contribute to conflict. 
Part D – External Sources of Gold Assessment: When the company or operation 
site of the company acquires gold, this part assesses the process that needs to be in 
place to ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken on this gold so as to 
exclude gold tainted by conflict. 
Part E – Statement of Conformance Documentation: Where the company has 
demonstrated conformance to parts A to D (where relevant), an appropriate 
statement needs to be provided to the next party in the chain of custody. 
12 Sources for guidance in “conflict affected or high risk areas”  include the UN Security Council, the EU, AU, 
Organisation of American  States, national bodies with international acceptance, authoritative NGOs
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Figure 2.1: Decision tree relating to the Conflict-free Gold Standard
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THE RATIONALE FOR THE WGC’S CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD
The Standard is mainly aimed at maintaining confidence which consumers, 
investors, governments and producing nations place in gold (Shishmanian, 2012). 
The objective is to create “absolute trust that gold produced under its principles and 
processes is delivered in a manner which does not fuel armed conflict or fund armed 
groups, nor contribute to the abuse of human rights associated with such conflicts” 
(Shishmanian, 2012). In addition to maintaining confidence, the Standard also seeks 
to avoid stigmatisation of gold from Africa. 
In this respect it is very similar to the Kimberley Process for diamonds except that 
while the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an intergovernmental 
rough diamond trading scheme (with representation from industry and civil society as 
observers), the WGC’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard is essentially a gold industry 
initiative. However, as will be discussed below, the Kimberley Process is not 
concerned with human rights abuses in connection with diamonds – something much 
criticised by outside parties, especially NGOs. 
CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD AND KIMBERLEY PROCESS 
CERTIFICATION SCHEME FOR ROUGH DIAMONDS COMPARED
Definition of “conflict”: 
The main difference between the WGC’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard and the 
Kimberley Process is in the crucial definition of “Conflict”. The Kimberley Process 
Core Document defines “conflict diamonds” as follows: 
KP definition: “CONFLICT DIAMONDS means rough diamonds used by rebel 
movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate 
governments, as described in relevant United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC 
resolutions which may be adopted in the future, and as understood and 
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recognised in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or 
in other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future;”
The following points are important to note about this definition:
(1) The definition is restricted to rough diamonds used by rebel movements or 
their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments.  
It matters not if that government is a dictatorship, military government or not 
which in certain countries is indeed a problem. 
(2) The definition makes no mention of the abuse of human rights, which NGOs, 
such as Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness have voiced 
concerns over. 
(3) The form of diamonds is specified: rough diamonds. In other words polished 
diamonds are not an issue here. 
OECD definition: “CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS: Areas 
identified by the presence of armed conflict, widespread violence, including 
violence generated by criminal networks, or other risks of serious and 
widespread harm to people. Armed conflict may take a variety of forms, such 
as a conflict of international or non-international character, which may involve 
two or more states, or may consist of wars of liberation, insurgencies, or civil 
wars. ‘High-risk’ areas are those where there is a high risk of conflict or of 
widespread or serious abuses as defined in paragraph 1 of Annex II of the 
OECD Guidance. Such areas are often characterised by political instability or 
repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure, 
widespread violence and violations of national or international law.”
Likewise the following points are important to note about this crucial OECD 
definition:
(1) The definition is far wider - covering intra-national conflict, international 
conflict, wars of liberation or insurgencies, civil war, violence by criminal 
networks, widespread human rights abuses or other forms of harm on this 
scale. The most important of these is widespread human rights abuses, 
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which is what NGO’s have been calling for in relation to conflict diamonds 
and the Kimberley Process. 
(2) The Standard does not require a different approach between areas 
considered to be ‘conflict-affected’ or ‘high-risk’ areas.
The wider definition of the Conflict-free Gold Standard/OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance is what the critics of the Kimberley Process have been calling for many 
years. The narrow definition of the Kimberley Process definition is seen as outdated 
as it was drafted in the time of rebel wars in Angola and Sierra Leone which are now 
a thing of the past. 
Who is the implementer?
In the case of the Conflict-free Gold Standard, the implementer is the Producing 
Company - in other words, the mining company producing gold in conflict or high-risk 
areas. In the case of the Kimberley Process, the implementer is the government of 
Participating countries who export or import rough diamonds, despite the problem 
being in or potentially being in producing countries in Africa in particular. 
Self-regulation versus regulation by government 
The Conflict-Free Gold Standard is an industry initiative and is classified as self-
regulation. It entails industry itself taking steps to prevent “conflict gold” from entering 
the companies’ supply chains.  The Standard is not supported by any 
legislation/regulation. 
The Kimberley Process is an initiative of governments of producing and trading 
countries. It entails governments implementing national legislation underpinning 
internal controls, and export and import controls to prevent conflict diamonds from 
entering the legitimate diamond trade. There are also severe penalties for 
transgressions in national legislation of Participating countries. 
Certification:
The Kimberley Process is a certification scheme, in which governments certify 
exports of rough diamonds to any Participating country as “conflict-free”, whereas in 
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the case of the Conflict-free Gold Standard a “statement” is made to the next party in 
the value chain. 
Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM)
To deal with the Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) issue, the Kimberley 
Process created the Diamond Development Initiative International, which the gold 
industry is yet to address. As artisanal and small scale mining of gold is relatively 
higher than that of diamonds, it can be classified as a weakness. This and other 
weaknesses are documented below. 
AREAS OF WEAKNESS IN THE WGC STANDARD
(INCLUDES OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN INTERVIEWS & SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRES)
1. The biggest weakness is that there is no government oversight, and the 
Conflict-Free Gold Standard is implemented voluntarily by 20 large gold 
producers only. Moreover, it has to make financial sense to the company that 
adopts it. This leaves big loopholes in the system. Often in such matters, it is 
the small producers that are targeted by criminal syndicates to by-pass 
controls. 
There is also the matter of WGC members sometime deciding to exit 
membership of the WGC for cost-saving purposes.
2. It is also suggested that the percentage of supply that can be termed “conflict 
gold” is small (maybe 1 to 2%) relative to illicit gold, which is estimated at 
between 10-20% worldwide. 
3. The other significant weakness is that once gold is melted and mixed with 
gold from other sources (including conflict-affected and high-risk sources), 
the origin is practically un-traceable. 
4. The third weakness is that “conflict gold” can be legitimised, if unscrupulous 
traders import gold into a country such as South Africa and then re-export it. 
There is no requirement to record the country of extraction on export 
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documents, as is the case with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
for rough diamonds. 
5. Fourthly, sanctions for non-compliance are not adequate. It basically means 
that if something slips through the system, it would depend on the external 
auditor to pick up, which is difficult given the complexity and volume of trade. 
6. At the World Gold Council Roundtable on Conflict-Free Gold (New York City, 
7 September 2011), various other problems were pointed out. These include 
the following (World Gold Council, 20113):
 It was suggested that using “conflict” and “high risk” interchangeably 
leads to ambiguity. 
 It was pointed out that two gold mining companies operating in close 
proximity could come to different conclusions about the conflict risks 
inherent in a region, and therefore there is a need for consistency of 
application of the Standard.
 Some argued that there was significantly less buy-in from India and 
China, which creates opportunities for “conflict gold” flows.
 Participants also suggested that credibility could be enhanced if there 
was monitoring of progress in Standard implementation, and publicising 
aspects of internal management and training procedures.
 Civil Society pointed out that public disclosure of external audits would 
improve transparency
 Some also expressed the view that Artisanal and Small-scale Mining can 
be a challenge. A refiner voiced frustration that while the standards for 
large scale firms must be rigorous, well documented, audited, 
transparent, and verified by civil society, artisanal miners are seemingly 
subject to none. This places refiners in a difficult position, he claimed. He 
added that with respect to the DRC, refiners feel that Artisanal and 
Small-scale producers just cannot meet necessary standards of due 
diligence in that country. He believed that gold will get to the market 
through informal sectors or through refiners who don’t care about 
standards (e.g. the Ugandan refinery). 
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 Some participants suggested that there should be a whistle-blowing 
mechanism to strengthen the Standard.
 It was pointed out that the objective of stopping the flow of conflict-gold 
out of the DRC is laudable, it will be impossible without government buy-
in and the rule of law.
 If industry took the lead in the formalisation of Artisanal and Small-scale 
mining, it would greatly improve the situation in the conflict and conflict-
affected areas. 
 The Standard was also criticised for not seeking harmonisation and 
synergies with existing initiatives like that of the Responsible Jewellery 
Council. 
 Many felt that there is room for increased Civil Society involvement in the 
initiative. 
The views of Manhart and Schleicher (2013) who evaluated the Dodd-Frank Act and 
other resource-related measures are also worth noting in the context of the Conflict-
free Gold Standard. They showed that the root causes for conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo are manifold and only secondarily related to resources. 
According to them political power struggles were major triggers of conflict (wars), but 
strategies for stabilising the Great Lakes Region that do not address conflict minerals 
like gold are also prone to failure. They therefore recommended that measures on 
conflict minerals need to be embedded into a comprehensive strategy for the DR 
Congo. They also stated that the concept of Due Diligence is useful and should be 
supported as it helps to mitigate risks of directly or indirectly contributing to conflict 
and human rights abuses, however, extensive mandatory verification and reporting 
requirements can cause embargo reactions and unintended socio-economic side-
effects (Manhart and Schleicher, 2013). The most important recommendation in their 
paper, however, is that rather than investing into costly downstream chain-of-custody 
systems, these resources could be better used to directly support responsible mining 
within the DR Congo. 
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IMPLEMENTATION OF A RESPONSIBLE GOLD INITIATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(CASE STUDY: RAND REFINERY LIMITED).
As Rand Refinery refines gold from other African producing countries, refines scrap 
sourced in South Africa and in other African countries and is the only LBMA-
accredited refinery in South Africa, its implementation of the Responsible Gold 
Guidance in South Africa is illustrative. 
The former Chief Executive Officer of Rand Refinery, Mr Howard Craig, spoke about 
the implementation of the Responsible Gold initiative at a recent (2013) African 
Mining Indaba. What he said at the conference is good summary of what Rand 
Refinery has been doing in this area. 
He stated that Rand Refinery has adopted a Responsible Gold Policy which publicly 
confirms the company’s commitment to the sourcing of Responsible Gold. This 
policy contains the guiding principles against which the company’s commitment will 
be measured. Secondly, Rand Refinery has fully implemented the requirements of 
the LBMA’s Responsible Gold Guidance. In this regard, the company has subjected 
itself to an external, independent readiness review audit in preparation for its first 
annual audit towards the end of 2013, as required by the LBMA. This will assist the 
company in identifying potential gaps and weaknesses in its processes.
In addition, the company has reviewed and revised its “Know Your Customer” 
process, which is applied rigidly when screening both potential and existing 
customers. In this way, all gold deposits entering Rand Refinery’s systems and 
processes will conform to Responsible Gold, meeting the requirements of the LBMA 
Responsible Gold Guidance.
To offer certainty to customers that they are purchasing responsible, newly-mined 
gold as opposed to secondary or scrap gold, Rand Refinery can issue a certificate of 
assured “Chain of Custody”. This is made possible by the company’s capability to 
separate and stream particular batches of gold through its various processes, 
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thereby ensuring full traceability from mine to end product. This streaming capability 
is independently verified and audited by an international audit company.
The company has taken it a step further, with the introduction of a premium product
brand into its markets across the world – the RandPureTM mark, which brand not only 
guarantees the ethical provenance, but also the fineness and exceptional quality of 
the gold it endorses. Used only to brand premium products which are manufactured 
using certified newly-mined gold under the company’s control to finished end-
product, the RandPureTM mark guarantees a fully verified chain of custody from “ore 
to store”, states Mr Craig (2013). 
Mr Craig also highlighted the fact that Rand Refinery was the chosen refinery to work 
with the first legitimate, large-scale gold mining operation in the DRC. He added that 
the Rand Refinery works in close co-operation with the Twangisa Mine, operated by 
the Banro Corporation to establish the appropriate procedures and processes which 
ensure full compliance with the standards and guidelines. This first engagement in 
the DRC is used as an example to establish an acceptable responsible gold protocol 
which the company can replicate in contracts with other future legitimate gold mining 
operations across the DRC. 
With regard to the problematic issue of scrap, or secondary recycled, gold; the LBMA 
Responsible Gold Guidance requires rigorous screening of the last entity providing 
this gold to the refinery. Mr Craig stated that Rand Refinery will only deal with a 
select few, internationally reputable scrap traders. The company also applies its 
Know Your Customer process to secondary gold. 
With regard to artisanal mining, Rand Refinery has adopted a model in which it will 
work with legitimate governments, government authorities and reputable financial 
institutions to provide a responsible supply chain for artisanal miners operating within 
a legal framework. In this way, the company can be sure that artisanal miners hold 
legitimate licenses from their governments and that the global financial institutions 
have applied their own compliance procedures in their dealings with the artisanal 
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miners. Mr Craig emphasised that the financial institutions pay a fair price for the 
gold and also are able to offer financial assistance to these miners. 
Rand Refinery has implemented this model in countries in East Africa and is looking 
to work with other governments and similar reputable financial institutions in other 
parts of Africa. Mr Craig admitted that it is a challenge to evaluate and process 
numerous (sometimes hundreds at a time!), quite small artisanal mining deposits in a 
short time frame, but one that the company is prepared to accept. 
CAN THE WGC CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD BE APPLIED TO COPPER
OR DIAMONDS?
(INCLUDES FEEDBACK FROM INTERVIEWS)
In South Africa, especially, and in a few other countries, copper theft is a huge 
problem. In fact, copper theft in South Africa costs the country up to R5 billion a year. 
Copper is stolen in all forms mainly from storage warehouses and electrical 
installations (cables). Copper is also smuggled into and out of the country. High 
prices for copper over the last decade, fuelled by the recent13 almost insatiable 
demand from China, have worsened the situation. 
One of the questions asked in this study is if the Conflict-Free Gold Standard could 
be applied to expunge illicit or stolen copper from the massive legitimate trade. To do 
this, each aspect of the Conflict-Free Gold standard is assessed to gauge its 
applicability to copper or the copper industry. 
13 Demand from China has declined towards the end of 2015, and with it prices have also come down
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Table 2.1: Applicability of the Conflict-Free Gold Standard to copper
From the above, it can be seen that theoretically the Conflict-Free Gold Standard 
can be applied to copper with some modifications. Practical implementation, 
COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT-
FREE GOLD STANDARD
APPLICABILITY TO COPPER
(1) Assessment of whether an 
area/country is High Risk 
This is not applicable to copper, as illicit copper dealers 
are not confined to certain countries or areas. They can 
be found in any country, in urban areas and rural areas, 
in first world countries and third world countries. Many
tend to be part of criminal syndicates that operate in
several countries/across borders. 
(2) Where the area/country is 
considered High Risk, 
assessment of whether the 
company has appropriate 
management systems in place
Having appropriate management systems, policies and 
skills in place can indeed help to ensure a company 
excludes stolen and illicit copper from the company’s 
supply chain. 
(3) Where the area/country is 
considered High Risk, 
assessment of how and by 
whom the commodity is handled
Knowing your clients in the supply chain is crucial to the 
system working to exclude illicit or stolen metal. If only 
trustworthy parties are involved in handling and working 
with copper, then the company can be reasonably sure 
of dealing with only legitimate players. 
(4) Where the company acquires 
the commodity, assessment of 
the processes in place to ensure 
that illicit or stolen commodity is 
excluded
Having appropriate processes can help ensure a 
company excludes stolen and illicit copper from supply 
and work streams. 
(5) Where the company has 
demonstrated conformance, to 
(1) to (4) where relevant, an 
appropriate statement needs to 
be provided to the next party in 
the chain of custody
A chain of warranties across the whole supply chain is 
essential and can help avoid illicit and stolen copper. An 
audit trail is essential for this. 
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however, will not be without challenges as barriers to entry are low and it requires 
willingness across a huge industry to be successful. 
Table 2.2: Applicability of the Conflict-Free Gold Standard to rough diamonds 
(Includes feedback from interviews)
COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT-
FREE GOLD STANDARD
APPLICABILITY TO ROUGH DIAMONDS
(1) Assessment of whether an 
area/country is Conflict-affected 
or High Risk 
This is applicable to rough diamonds, as there are areas 
of conflict where diamonds are mined. There are also 
areas of high risk where there is violence and human 
rights abuses associated with the exploitation and trade in 
rough diamonds. 
(2) Where the area/country is 
considered High Risk, 
assessment of whether the 
company has appropriate 
management systems in place
Having appropriate management systems, policies and 
skills in place can indeed help to ensure a company 
excludes conflict diamonds from its supply chain.  
(3) Where the area/country is 
considered High Risk, 
assessment of how and by 
whom the commodity is handled
Knowing your clients in the supply chain is crucial to the 
system working to avoid conflict diamonds. 
(4) Where the company acquires 
the commodity, assessment of 
the processes in place to ensure 
that illicit or stolen commodity is 
excluded
Having appropriate processes and internal controls in 
place can ensure a company excludes conflict diamonds. 
(5) Where the company has 
demonstrated conformance, to 
(1) to (4) where relevant, an 
appropriate statement needs to 
be provided to the next party in 
the chain of custody
A chain of warranties across the whole supply chain will 
indeed assist in avoiding conflict diamonds. 
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SUMMARY
The above assessment shows that the Conflict-Free Gold Standard can be applied 
to rough diamonds better than it can to copper, due to the smaller size of the industry 
and due to the fact that there are Conflict-affected and High Risk countries and 
areas. This is probably due to the higher unit value of diamonds compared with 
copper. 
It can be summarised from the discussion above that the Conflict-Free Gold 
Standard provides some practical guidance on a way to work responsibly in conflict-
affected and high risk environments, at least on paper. 
LESSONS FROM THE CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD FOR THE FUTURE 
REGULATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRIES
There are a few lessons that one can learn from the Conflict-Free Gold Standard:
(1) There is a place for self-regulation by industry. When regulation is voluntary, 
the companies embrace it as part of business and essential to good business 
knowing that ultimately it will translate to consumer confidence in the product 
that the company produces (PwC, 2012). Consumer confidence, in turn, 
translates to better product branding, which leads to greater demand and 
better profits for the company. 
A system of such voluntary self-regulation by industry does indeed contribute 
to an effective internal control system.
Self-regulation also tends to be less burdensome for the company in terms of 
paperwork and compliance in general. Most often companies incorporate the 
audit trail, including statements to the next party, into their enterprise 
software such as SAP. On the other hand legislation in the precious metal 
sector is regarded as too prescriptive. This is put very eloquently by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (2012) which concludes on the matter by saying that: 
“the use of voluntary and market mechanisms to achieve greater levels of 
governance and accountability are progressing operating standards and 
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transparency significantly”. PWC (2012) adds, however that “legal 
compliance requirements still have a role to play”. 
(2) In contrast to the simpler and easier-to-regulate diamond industry, the gold 
industry is extremely complex and involves 1000s of players. This includes 
about 90 producing countries, and 1000s of traders throughout the world. 
Having a certification scheme, although possible will be a huge logistical 
challenge. Even if there is a certification scheme for gold like the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme, it will not be able to plug all the gaps. Self-
regulation if implemented by all players in the value chain can close 
loopholes that a government-implemented certification scheme cannot. 
(3) The third lesson is that government oversight or regulation can improve the 
system. If a system is voluntary, it will be implemented by the larger, more 
ethically conscious players only, leaving numerous small gaps that can be 
exploited by criminals and unscrupulous traders. 
(4) The fourth lesson from the Conflict-Free Gold Standard is that external 
assurance from an external party provides a measure of confidence in the 
system. 
APPLICABILITY OF LESSONS
These lessons from the Conflict-free Gold Standard suggest that three different 
approaches can be used in dealing with conflict minerals like gold and diamonds: 
(1) Government Regulation backed up by industry self-regulation.
(2) Self-regulation backed by external (Independent) assurance
(3) Deregulation, because no system is perfect, and well-resourced criminal 
syndicates will exploit weaknesses. 
In South Africa, the trend is for more regulation, judging from the more than 3 000
pieces of legislation passed by government in the last decade, and therefore 
deregulation is unlikely in the short term. 
58
For this study, Government regulation backed up by self-regulation is explored firstly 
to gauge its feasibility and then to make proposals for the future regulation of the 
gold industry in South Africa.
(1) SELF-REGULATION:
It would be a relatively easy task to make provision for industry-self regulation in
current precious metals legislation (Precious Metals Act, 2005). The essential 
ingredient is to make provision for recognition by the South African Diamond & 
Precious Metals Regulator of self-regulation by holders of precious metal 
licences (mining licences, refining licences, beneficiation licences and jeweller’s 
permits). 
(2) KNOW YOUR CLIENT/COUNTERPARTY:
“Know your customer” (KYC) is not a new practice. It is used widely especially in 
the Financial and Investment service industries. It refers to due diligence 
activities that regulated companies must perform to ascertain relevant 
information from their clients for the purpose of doing business with them. It 
entails customers providing detailed anti-corruption due diligence information, to 
verify their probity and integrity to the service provider. 
Once again, it is relatively simple to insert such a provision in precious metals 
legislation and to require that holders of precious metals licences perform due 
diligence to ensure the integrity of the person they are sourcing precious metal 
from. It can be made compulsory that holders of precious metals licences satisfy 
themselves with reasonable certainty that their clients have not associated 
themselves with conflict or illicit gold. 
(3) CHAIN OF CUSTODY:
The chain of custody is fundamental to any scheme to prevent conflict gold from 
entering the legitimate trade. If a chain of custody is backed up by industry self-
regulation, then it is substantially strengthened. 
59
There are some measures already in the Precious Metals Act, 2005. In particular 
holders of precious metals licences must record transactions of precious metals 
purchases and sales in registers prescribed by regulation. There are however, no 
assurances given to the next party that the gold was purchased or handled in a 
manner that is “conflict-free” or human rights abuse free.  This can be fixed in 
current precious metals legislation by inserting a provision requiring invoices of 
sales and exports contain a “conflict-free” or “human-rights-abuse free”
statement such as:
The gold/gold-bearing material invoiced herein has been acquired lawfully and/or 
handled in a manner that is conflict and human-rights-abuse -free and meets the 
minimum requirements of the OECD Guidelines on sourcing of minerals from 
Conflict-Affected or High Risk areas. 
(4) IMPORT AND EXPORT OF PRECIOUS METAL:
Current precious metals legislation can be improved by requiring that assurances
of the conflict-free and human-rights-abuse free nature of the gold or gold-
bearing material being exported is declared in writing on invoices and export 
documents. 
(5) MINE PROFILING BY GEOCHEMICAL FINGERPRINTING: 
Although this ground-breaking provision was inserted in precious metals 
legislation when the Precious Metals Act was drafted in 2005 (Section 22 of the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005), there is room for improvement. 
As it stands, the legislation requires that Producers in South Africa provide 
profiling specimens from each mine in the name of that Producer to the 
Forensics Science Laboratory of the South African Police Services. The 
Forensics Science Laboratory uses trace element geochemistry in a proven 
methodology (since 1993) to fingerprint gold (gold, gold-bearing ore or gold in 
various stages of metallurgical processing) form different mines. Gold from each 
mine has a geochemical signature that distinguishes it from gold from another 
gold mine. 
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The major short-coming is the fact that the database of profiling specimens from 
different mines is inadequate for non-South African Mines. There should be a 
requirement that any precious metal licence holder operating in gold mines 
outside South Africa or acquiring or receiving gold or gold-bearing material 
sourced from outside South Africa also provide profiling specimens. This can be 
easily inserted in current legislation as well. 
CONCLUSION
The above discussion suggests that Government regulation backed by self-
regulation efforts such as the World Gold Council’s Conflict Free Gold Standard is 
feasible in the South African context, and would tighten regulation of the precious 
metals industry should this be the objective of Government. Indeed, it would solve 
certain problems as suggested above, but it will not solve all the problems. In 
particular, it would not solve the problem of illegal mining in South Africa – as 
initiatives such as the World Gold Council’s Conflict Free Gold Standard are 
implemented by the larger, legitimate mining and refining companies only. 
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CHAPTER THREE:
RESOURCE NATIONALISM
(IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRY)
“The desire of gold is not for gold. It is for the means of freedom and benefit.”
Ralph Waldo Emerson
RESOURCE NATIONALISM: DEFINITION
Resource Nationalism is a term that encompasses various efforts by people and 
governments (in resource-rich nations) to assert political and economic control over 
their energy and mining sectors (Bremmer and Johnston, 2009). 
The rationale for resource nationalism is indeed a noble one in theory, that of 
maximising society’s or the country’s benefit from resource extraction. Rationalised
like this, it is easy to see why the word “beneficiation” has become synonymous with 
the concept of resource nationalism. However, beneficiation is just one aspect of 
resource nationalism. 
Other examples of resource nationalism include:
 State-owned mining/mineral companies;
 State equity in mining companies (free-carried interest without any 
contribution or with contributed (paid for) interest);
 Taxes and/or royalties on mineral resource extraction or export (sometimes 
including windfall or super profits taxes);
 Indigenous participation (indigenisation and local equity requirements) in 
mining and minerals processing (in South Africa, this is known as Black 
Economic Empowerment or BEE);
 Use-it-or-lose-it mineral/mining rights policies;
 Social investment requirements on mining licence holders;
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 Mandated local beneficiation by mining companies (value-added processing 
before export, inter alia through export taxes/levies); 
 Mandatory local inputs;
 Restrictions on foreign ownerships (Governments blocking the acquisitions of 
certain mining companies by foreign multi-national companies);
 Review of mining contracts with a view to renegotiation or cancellation (Peter 
Leon, 2013);
 State-owned mineral trading companies (which are empowered by law to buy 
a percentage or the whole of mineral production from mining companies; and 
 In the rare and extreme case, outright expropriation or nationalisation without 
compensation. 
Resource nationalism usually takes the form of regulatory expropriation/controls, in 
which regulation and taxes are adjusted to increase the government’s share of 
resource rents (Reuters, 2013). It usually takes place during periods of high 
commodity prices. Leon (2013) surmised that the challenge from these initiatives is 
to strike a balance of interests ensuring that mining is productive, profitable, as well 
as fair to foreign investors, host states and affected local communities. Ernst & 
Young (2013) identified resource nationalism as the “biggest risk” facing the mining 
industry globally.  
CAUSES OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM OR ITS RISE
The reasons for resource nationalism or the escalation in resource nationalism 
include the following:
1. Minerals are finite;
2. Most countries instituting various resource nationalism measures are trying to 
offset the legacy of colonisation – which often resulted in raw materials 
including minerals being mined and exported in raw form to European 
countries;
3. Some countries instituting resource nationalism measures are trying to avoid 
the Resource Curse;
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4. Populist resource nationalist rhetoric (such as the 2011-2012 calls from the 
former ANC Youth League president now leader of the Economic Freedom 
Front, Julius Malema in South Africa);
5. Often promoted by rising commodity prices;
6. Resource nationalism is contagious (measures are often copied in other 
jurisdictions); 
7. To promote local beneficiation and maximisation of the value from minerals; 
and
8. Seeking energy security (in the case of energy minerals such as coal). 
Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) provided an excellent overview of existing resource 
nationalism instruments in South Africa and an assessment of their effectiveness. 
They pointed out that the Minerals & Mining Policy for South Africa (Mineral Policy) 
released in 1998 outlined the “resource nationalism” objectives of the country: “to 
develop South Africa’s mineral wealth to its full potential and to the maximum benefit 
of the entire population.” This Mineral Policy served as the bedrock for the 
enactment of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002
(MPRDA), which had as its main objectives: to vest mineral rights custodianship in 
the State and secondly, to allow all South Africans to benefit from the country’s 
mineral resources. 
Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) broached that during the commodity boom a few 
years after the promulgation of the MPRDA popular feelings rose revealing 
disillusionment with the mining sector and the notion that foreign mining investors 
were benefiting at the expense of South Africans. This led to the Youth League of 
the ANC utilising the political tool of the call for nationalisation of South Africa’s 
mines in 2010. The Youth League suggested that a State mining company should be 
established and that the MPRDA be amended to ensure all private mining investors 
operate in partnership with this proposed state mining company (Cawood and 
Oshokoya, 2013). This started the debate on nationalisation of mines which 
subsided after the release by the ANC of the SIMS (State Intervention in the 
Minerals Sector) document discussed later in this Chapter. At the ANC Mangaung 
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Elective Conference in 2013, the ANC rejected wholesale nationalisation as a policy 
option, and adopted the National Development Plan as a key strategic area (Baxter, 
2013). Butler (2013) asserted that while there were some positive consequences
from the deliberation about nationalisation (in particular that it was managed by the 
ANC at a time of heightened anti-colonial sentiment) there were costs too that 
resulted from policy uncertainty. 
Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) listed the following as existing resource nationalism 
instruments in South Africa, designed to ensure the State collects a reasonable 
share of resource revenues, and secondly to address inequity and other apartheid 
legacies:
(a) State Custodianship over mineral resources (MPRDA);
(b) Use-it-or-lose-it and conversion from the old order to the new order rights of 
the MPRDA;
(c) Implementation of sustainable development (via the MPRDA);
(d) Promotion of beneficiation (mainly via the Diamonds Act, 1986 and the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005;
(e) Broader participation through new entrants to mining (chiefly via the Broad-
based Socio Economic Empowerment Charter and the requirement for social 
and labour plans in the MPRDA);
(f) Mineral Royalties (via the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 
2008);
(g) Diamond Export Levy (via the Diamond Export Levy Act, 2007). 
Cawood and Oshokoya (2013) concluded that the Royalty Act has had a positive 
impact on the collection of revenue. They added that they did not agree with the 
SIMS report which contended that the MPRDA failed to ensure that the Mining Right 
system provided for in the Act maximised the developmental impact. They suggested 
that any failure in delivery of benefit by the mining right system should be blamed 
rather on “administrative inefficiency and political intervention during the 
implementation and governance of the MPRDA”. 
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Neighbouring country Zimbabwe was also going through several proposals for 
greater benefit from its mineral resources during the period from 2008 to 2015. Of 
relevance to this study is the fact that Zimbabwe has the largest platinum reserves 
after South Africa (USGS, 2013). In 2009, the Zimbabwe government threatened to 
withdraw export licences from miners exporting raw platinum in order to force 
companies like South Africa’s Impala Platinum to build refineries in Zimbabwe. 
Platinum producers including Anglo American Platinum and Impala Platinum argued 
that they need a production threshold of at least 500 000 ounces of platinum to 
justify the creation of a smelter (New Zimbabwe.com, 2013). 
In March 2015, Zimbabwe introduced a 15% tax as a disincentive to the export of 
raw platinum. In May 2015, Zimbabwe put this 15% export tax on hold after Zimplats 
(which has Impala Platinum as a major shareholder) indicated it has the capacity to 
build a smelter in the country and Anglo Platinum’s Unki promised to provide plans
for a local smelter (Miningmx.com, 2015). 
WHY DO PRECIOUS METALS LEND THEMSELVES TO RESOURCE 
NATIONALISM?
Precious metals are a common target for resource nationalism because of their high 
unit value or price. In times of commodity price increases, investors are attracted to 
precious metal exploration or mining assets. Governments see this as an opportunity 
or as leverage to introduce resource nationalism measures such as new taxes etc. 
The extraction of gold, in particular, is relatively well known and easy to adopt 
technology, which makes it less risky for governments to impose resource 
nationalism measures on foreign companies. Should foreign companies be scared 
off by such measures, there are often many local players eager to fill that space. 
Gold and platinum are priced in US dollars; a currency which has an inverse 
relationship with the gold price. So, when the gold price is rising it is usually 
associated with a weakening of the US dollar resulting in revenues from sales being 
even higher in local currency terms. This attracts calls for higher taxes or taxes on 
super profits on gold mining companies in particular. 
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRECIOUS METAL CONTEXT
In South Africa, there have been many resource nationalism measures and 
instruments introduced, proposed or contemplated. The relatively new minerals 
legislation, the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA) is 
the best manifestation of this. Through that Act, custodianship of mineral resources 
was vested in the State after many decades of being in private hands. The Mining 
Charter which is part of the MPRDA, also introduced the concept of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) into the mining and minerals industry, and is now standard 
practice for licensing of prospecting and mining activities. The Act also made 
provisions for the Social and Labour Plan to ensure that communities around the 
mine and employees of the mining company benefit from mining.  However, this is 
now standard practice, and for this research the proposed and contemplated 
measures and instruments are more important to focus on. These are discussed 
below.
PRODUCER-COUNTRY PRICE FOR GOLD AND PLATINUM VERSUS MARKET 
PRICE
In 2011, the author of this thesis was asked by the Mineral Resources Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee (PPC): “What influence does South Africa have on the setting of 
the price of gold and platinum?” This stemmed from the resurgence of resource 
nationalism in 2011 – a philosophy that was being promoted by some members of 
the PPC, who saw the setting of a Producer Price for gold and platinum as beneficial 
to the country and almost as a sovereign right. Producers like South Africa, are in 
fact, price takers, and the price is “discovered” through the market mechanism 
described below.
Currently the price of gold is 'fixed' twice daily at 10.30 am and 3.00 pm (BST) in
London, which has been the centre of the gold market for over 300 years14. The 
process is detailed in Chapter 1.  As far as platinum and palladium prices are 
concerned, the London Platinum & Palladium Market (LPPM) Fixings, also referred 
to as the London Fix, is considered the international benchmark. The quotation is 
14 NB: At the time of writing, the LBMA Gold Price (fixing by electronic auctions platform) replaced the historic 
London Gold Fix.
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done twice a day at 09H45 and 14H00 (GMT). The fixing procedure15 is similar to the 
London Gold Fix, in that it is a balancing exercise of buying and selling orders 
received from members or their clients, who respond to price announcements and 
subsequent adjustments. The fixing price is the one at which all orders are cleared. 
Settlement is made within two days after the date of contract.
PROS AND CONS OF A PRODUCER PRICE FOR GOLD
What are the pros and cons of the hypothetical case where South Africa sets the 
price for gold produced in the country? First of all, it has to be said that the gold 
market is very different from other metal markets. In fact, it is unique mainly because 
of its complexity as described in Chapter 1. 
World production of gold is around 3 000 tons a year and gold is mined in over 70 
countries. Gold is, for all practical purposes, virtually indestructible, thus besides 
some minimal industrial and other losses, almost all the gold that has ever been 
mined (183 600 tons) is still in existence in some form or other (World Gold Council, 
2010). Therefore, there is sufficient gold above ground to even allow for the world to 
do without many years of mine production. It is also a well-known fact that mine 
production has little or no effect on the gold price. The gold price is affected more by 
central bank sales or purchases of the metal, the strength/weakness of currencies 
especially the US dollar, investment demand for the metal, inflation and economic 
uncertainties or slowdowns. 
More importantly, South Africa’s gold production is currently less than 165 tons, and 
is unlikely to wield any power in terms of price setting. The price setting mechanism 
of gold described above is so well established (only changes are technological 
improvements) that it is unlikely a South African price for gold will be of any 
consequence. In the interconnected world we live in, a South African price for gold 
will have to relate to the international price of gold which defeats the purpose of 
having a South African price in the first place. A local price for gold would most likely 
15 At the time of writing, the London Metal Exchange (LME) had been selected as the administrator of the London 
Platinum and Palladium Fixing.
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be nullified by arbitrage opportunities which would be pounced upon by local traders 
and international players. 
Also of importance to note is the fact that South African gold production costs are 
higher compared to other major gold mining countries. This would mean that a South 
African price would most likely have to be higher than the international price for this 
to work otherwise most mines would eventually close down. If those who propose a 
South African price for gold, hope it to be internationally recognised, it is very difficult 
to understand why it would be. The price for gold is set in the major demand areas in 
the US, UK, Hong Kong and Tokyo. A South African price for gold will have 
relevance only in South Africa, and will most probably be ignored by the rest of the 
world unless there are arbitrage opportunities as mentioned above. 
PROS
Between 2011 and 2012, the Department of Minerals Resources (Menoe, 2012), 
proposed a “Development Price” for certain minerals and metals to promote 
beneficiation. Such a development price was proposed as a lower price (relative to 
the market price) to make beneficiation or manufacturing in South Africa of products 
that use such minerals and metals more competitive.  If that were applied to gold, it 
will obviously be of benefit to the jewellery industry in South Africa and make it more 
competitive in theory than their counterparts elsewhere.  This may attract large 
foreign jewellery manufacturing companies to set up in South Africa if the price 
differential from the market price is significant, say 5% or more. 
CONS
The biggest negative of a South African gold price is that it would not be
internationally recognised. That aside, if the gold price in South Africa were to be set 
significantly lower than the market price, although it would make jewellers and other 
fabricators happy in the short term, it would most likely accelerate the demise of the 
gold mining industry in South Africa. If, on the other hand, the gold price differential 
was subsidized by the government, tax payers would be paying for something they 
should not be paying for. This is unlikely to be popular with South African citizens, 
especially since the benefit to South Africa would be relatively small. 
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PROS AND CONS OF A PRODUCER PRICE FOR PLATINUM
What are the pros and cons of the hypothetical case where South Africa sets the 
price for platinum produced in the country? 
With platinum, the main difference is South Africa is the largest producer in the 
world, producing as much as 75% of global mine production, and hosting more than 
80% of the known reserves of the metal. So technically, a South African price for 
platinum produced in the country has a far better chance of being internationally 
recognised than any such gold price. In addition, the above-ground stocks of 
platinum are relatively small. In most years the market supply/demand balance is 
either a small surplus or small deficit. 
PROS
The advantage of a South African producer price for platinum is that it would take 
into account demand from local fabricators, which in turn will attract new players to 
South Africa. A South African price would also take into account the cost of 
production in South Africa and the impact of rand/dollar exchange rates 
CONS
The disadvantage of a South African price is that other countries would hasten to 
become less reliant on South Africa as a source of platinum. There would be more 
emphasis on recycling of platinum, i.e., secondary sources of platinum.  It would also 
result in a doubling or tripling of efforts to find alternatives to platinum in applications 
such as autocatalysts. 
As with gold, some sort of subsidisation for local fabricators would be required, which
would be unpopular with tax payers. However, the biggest disadvantage would be 
that the cost/benefit analysis would hardly be compelling. 
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LESSON: PRODUCER PRICE FOR GOLD AND PLATINUM
It can be deduced from the above discussion that balancing the interests of 
Producers of precious metals and fabricators of precious metals in South Africa 
would be problematic to achieve, making attempts at a South African price for these 
precious metals not favourable in terms of cost/benefit. Moreover, South Africa earns 
far more revenue from mining and exporting precious metals than it does from 
manufacturing products from them and exporting these. The cost of setting up 
efficient price discovery mechanisms for gold and platinum would outweigh any 
benefit, and it is not warranted in South Africa. 
METAL/MINERAL PRICING MECHANISMS AND OTHER EXPERIENCES WITH 
PRODUCER PRICE
There are essentially three methods of price determination for the numerous mineral 
and metal commodities produced internationally: 
(a) determination by commodity exchanges, 
(b) determination by major producers, and
(c) determination through direct negotiation between buyer and seller. 
Prices determined on commodity exchanges are for standardised commodities, 
mainly metals, while those prices determined through negotiation between buyer and 
seller tend to be for commodities for which transport costs are a large portion of total 
value or which are produced according to customer specification. 
Producer prices are determined by producers and, to a lesser extent, by consumers. 
On commodity exchanges, in addition to producers and consumers, brokers, traders 
and speculators are also market participants.  There has been a significant reduction 
in the role of producer pricing for metals since the 1970s. The main reasons for this 
were the decline in horizontal concentration and vertical integration, and the increase 
in international integration. 
Markets that are concentrated tend to have more stable prices than those with many 
producers. This is because of the instruments available to control prices (can vary 
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price, output or inventories). In a competitive market, on the other hand, producers 
are price takers.
The main advantage of exchange-determined prices is their transparency. Exchange 
prices are published continuously and have worldwide visibility. In contrast to 
producer prices, they are actual transaction prices and are uniform across 
customers. Moreover, exchange markets are much more important than their 
physical volumes might indicate. Another useful function of exchanges is their 
inventory-carrying role (warehouse network), which means that a producer need not 
hold unwanted stocks.  A very large quantity of metal sells at prices based on 
commodity-exchange quotes, without actually being sold via an exchange. 
In the late 1980s, commodity exchanges switched from a principal’s market (a 
market where members act as principals for the transactions they conclude at the 
exchange trading floor and with their clients) to a clearing house system. A clearing 
house is an independent body that clears and guarantees transactions between 
member brokers. An outcome of the clearing house system implementation in the 
UK was the introduction of margins (initial margins paid for every trade and variation 
margin calls made as the market moves against trades). In the US, the COMEX 
clearing system requires a daily cash settlement system as opposed to the prompt or 
due date settlement system of the LME. 
There are no examples of producer price set for any mineral/metal by a producer-
country. In the oil industry, there is OPEC which consists of a group of exporting 
countries, but there is a separate discussion below as far as this relates to proposals 
for platinum and palladium. 
Iron ore prices do have a so-called Producer Price, but it is important to note that this 
is at the company level and not at the country level. An explanation of how this works 
is given below.  Some 98% of iron ore is used to make iron and steel, thus its price is 
determined by what steelmakers are willing to pay for it, and that is based on how 
the ore behaves in the iron making process, i.e., whether it raises or lowers the costs 
of producing steel (Kirk, 1996). 
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Generally, iron ore prices are set on a yearly basis, even for contracts longer than 
one year, and are most often negotiated directly between buyer and seller. The 
benchmark level in price negotiations is usually set by the major producers and the 
Japanese steel industry, or between Brazilian producers and German steel 
fabricators.  The reference price of Fine Ores is usually established first as this 
represents about 60% of the traded market. Prices for lump and pellets are then 
usually determined as a premium to the Fines price. 
OPEC-STYLE TRADE BLOC FOR PLATINUM AND PALLADIUM?
At the recent BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit held in 
Durban, South Africa in March 2013, South Africa and Russia, countries that hold 
about 80 percent of platinum-group metal reserves, announced that they plan to set 
up an OPEC-type trading bloc to coordinate exports of platinum and palladium 
(Bloomberg, 2013).  “It can be called an OPEC,” Russian Natural Resources Minister 
Sergey Donskoy said at the meeting in Durban. “Our goal is to coordinate our 
actions accordingly to expand the markets. The price depends on the structure of the 
market, and we will form the structure of the market”, he added. 
Donskoy (2013) stated that the two countries had formed a working group to work 
out joint actions on the markets for platinum and palladium which will be meeting in 
July 2013 to discuss mechanisms in detail.  South Africa’s Mineral Resources 
Minister at that time, Susan Shabangu (2013) stated that the deal sought to counter 
oversupply of platinum, possibly through taxes and incentives. When questioned 
about whether a cartel would be created, the Minister was quoted as saying: “We’re 
not really controlling the market. We want to contribute without creating a cartel, but 
we want to influence the markets.”
South Africa produces about 75% of the world's platinum and 38% of its palladium. 
Russia produces about 14% of the global mine output of platinum and 41% of its 
palladium. Together the two countries contribute 89% of the global mine production 
of platinum and about 80% of global palladium mine production. Major (2013) head 
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of mining and resources at Cadiz Corporate Solutions, said that the proposed trade 
bloc could break international trade law and agreements and fall foul of competition 
authorities, particularly in regions such as Europe, which is the main market for 
platinum and palladium. He also commented that China which is a major market for 
PGMs as well is also a BRICS country and would not welcome the market being 
controlled artificially. 
OPEC (FOR OIL) AND HOW IT WORKS?
OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries is an oil cartel whose 
mission is to coordinate the policies of the oil-producing countries. Its goal is to 
secure a steady income to the member states and a secure supply of oil to 
consumers.  OPEC is an intergovernmental organization that was created at the 
Baghdad Conference in September 1960, by Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela. Later it was joined by nine more governments: Libya, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Indonesia, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, and Gabon, to make 
up its current 12 member countries (OPEC, 2014). Important in the context of this 
study, OPEC was formed at a time when the international oil market was largely 
separate from centrally planned economies, and was dominated by multinational 
companies (Yergin, 1991). OPEC's ‘Policy Statement' states that there is a right of 
all countries to exercise sovereignty over their natural resources (Weil, 2007). OPEC 
is a swing producer and its decisions have had considerable influence on 
international oil prices. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN OPEC-TYPE TRADE BLOC FOR 
PLATINUM AND PALLADIUM
It is suggested that although it is feasible for South Africa and the Russian 
Federation to create an OPEC for platinum and palladium, because of their 
dominance of global mine production, it would be difficult for the two countries to 
work together to manage the trade bloc, to manage supply and demand and to price 
platinum and palladium in these internationally integrated markets for reasons set 
out below. 
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Russia’s platinum and palladium industry is state-centric and has been since the 
Soviet era. It has the Gokhran, which is the State Precious Metals and Gems 
Repository - a state institution under the Russian Ministry of Finance responsible for 
the State Fund of Precious Metals and Precious Stones of the Russian Federation. It 
is responsible for the purchase, storage, sale, and use of precious metals, precious 
stones, jewellery, rocks, and minerals by the State Fund. 
So, similar controls needed are well known and used in Russia for palladium. In fact 
Russian stockpiles of palladium were for many decades one of the major controls on
the palladium price. Much of these stockpiles have been exhausted, and so it is in 
the interests of Russia to have a partner such as South Africa to influence palladium 
markets. 
In South Africa on the other hand, there is no State body purchasing platinum or 
palladium mined in South Africa. In fact, export of these metals was encouraged for 
many years as it was either the highest or second highest mineral export revenue 
earner for the country.  Most importantly, however, the platinum and palladium 
produced do not belong to the State, but to the mining companies of which Anglo 
Platinum, Impala Platinum, Lonmin and Northam Platinum are the most important. 
There are two ways in which South Africa can institute controls on the market for 
platinum and palladium:
(a) by controlling exports, i.e., limiting exports by export taxes and an export 
licence system; and
(b) by forming a State Platinum Trader to buy up platinum in times of excess 
supply, or like the State Diamond Trader to buy a percentage of platinum 
mined in South Africa from each Producer (stands at 10% for diamonds 
currently). 
This is analysed further below: 
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MARKET MONITORING AND SUPPLY/DEMAND MANAGEMENT REQUIRED
It is suggested that South Africa does not have the required expertise or 
infrastructure to monitor the global platinum and palladium markets or to manage 
supply and demand of platinum and palladium. 
Although the Reserve Bank did, prior to 1997, buy up a significant portion of the 
country’s gold mine production and act on behalf of South Africa in the gold market, 
it has no knowledge or expertise of note in the platinum and palladium markets.  
Some may argue that such expertise could be hired, but even so, it will take many 
years to develop and commission the systems to achieve the required level of real-
time knowledge and efficiency that will allow for market monitoring and 
supply/demand management. 
RECYCLING WILL INCREASE
Platinum and palladium are readily recyclable, supplying 20-25% (see Figures 3.1, 
3.2 & 3.3) of global demand for the metals (a record 25.1% of global platinum supply 
in 2014). The tightly controlled recycling of catalytic converters is a profitable and 
reliable source of platinum and palladium, with recyclers often hoarding stock until 
they feel the price is right (Freer, 2013). It is an alternative supply of platinum which 
will become more and more significant, if controls on supply are instituted.  
According to Freer (2013), the recycling industry lies outside the control of Russia 
and South Africa and the existence of this source starts annulling the first condition 
for successful cartels which is to limit the number of suppliers. In 2011 and 2012, the 
recycling industry supplied the equivalent of 90% of South Africa’s contribution to the 
global supply in the same two years (Freer, 2013). The graphs below (see Figures 
3.4 and 3.5) show that recycling of both platinum and palladium are significant and 
currently correlated to prices (i.e., recycling is price elastic). It is worth noting that at 
present there is no clear negative correlation between mine production and recycling 
and this indicates that recycling is currently chiefly price driven. That trend could 
change if mine production is controlled by an OPEC-type trade bloc or similar 
mechanism. 
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SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES WILL INTENSIFY
If controls on supply are instituted by South Africa, the search for alternatives will 
intensify, and at the very least thrifting (using less of the metals) will become more 
innovative. Platinum and palladium are very rare metals and a suitable replacement 
has not been found nor will it be found soon, but it will be a certainty that efforts to 
find alternatives will receive more funding; perhaps ten-fold is not out of the question. 
Figure 3.1: Supply of platinum from recycling of scrap, 2005-2014
After the Marikana debacle, which resulted in a significant rise in the platinum price 
in anticipation of a shortage, industries have continued to pursue the search for less 
expensive, more readily available alternatives (Freer, 2013).
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
77
Figure 3.2: Supply of palladium from recycling of scrap, 2005-2014
(Source of data for figures 3.1-3.5: Platinum and Palladium Survey, 2015, GFMS Ltd.)
Figure 3.3: Platinum & palladium recycling, 2005-2014
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Figure 3.4: Platinum recycling versus average annual price, 2005-2014
Figure 3.5: Palladium recycling versus average annual price, 2005-2014
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STABILIZATION FUND FOR PLATINUM
Saville (2015) asserted that the platinum industry is an oligopoly in which three 
players control the bulk of new mine supply, but that the industry is a price taker that 
is vulnerable to swings in the prices of platinum-group metals. He posed the 
question: are there remedies available to producers or are they likely to remain 
victims or beneficiaries to price movements down and up, respectively. He added 
that while the proposed platinum producers’ cartel could be a solution, a cartel 
comes with risks such as cheating on supply quotas when prices rise. He also 
suggested that a cartel requires a lead steer to act as the co-ordinator and also the 
swing producer, but argues that South Africa’s production inflexibility would mitigate 
against mining groups in the country taking on such a role. He claims that the 
greatest political and legal challenge to a cartel would come from South Africa itself 
where it is illegal to collude and agree prices. South Africa’s Competition 
Commission continues to dismantle any remaining harmful, non-competitive industry 
practices borne under Apartheid. Saville (2015) concludes that because of such risks
and challenges a platinum cartel is not a realistic solution. He proposes instead a 
stabilisation fund – a mechanism aimed at protecting producers from volatile prices, 
which he explains works as follows: Firstly, an “industry effective” price needs to be 
determined, which is a price that corresponds to a healthy return. If the platinum 
price rises above the agreed level, the “surpluses” are “side pocketed”, and if the 
prices fall below the agreed level, funds are withdrawn from the “side pocket” to 
stabilise revenue. 
While some people commented that it could work (such as Wagner, 2015), others 
questioned where the money would come from to set up the stabilisation fund. 
Conroy (2015) argued that miners don’t have the money, labour unions would not 
put in their own money, and shareholders are unlikely to do this. He adds that only 
government can be the real source of such a fund. Considering that it would require 
billions of dollars for such a fund to be successful, in the current climate of low 
economic growth, it is unlikely that government would be keen to set aside such an 
amount of money for one industry. 
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STATE PLATINUM TRADER?
Since the State in South Africa does not own the platinum produced in the country;
to be able to control supply to the market, a State Platinum Trader in the mould of 
the relatively recently established State Diamond Trader could be created. As with 
the State Diamond Trader, if established, a State Platinum Trader would have the 
following functions:
 buy a percentage of platinum (say 10%) from producers (miners) possibly at 
a cost plus basis;
 Buy-up surplus production at a “market-related” price, whenever a surplus is 
evident;
 Sell platinum to local fabricators (beneficiators) at a cost plus margin basis or 
at a “Developmental Price” (discounted market price);
 Play a vital role in supply/demand management; 
 Provide market intelligence in terms of platinum supply and demand, and
 Promote local fabrication of platinum. 
A State Platinum Trader is feasible in South Africa. In fact it has a better chance of 
achieving its objective (that of local beneficiation) than the State Diamond Trader. 
However, its major obstacles would be safe and secure warehousing of a relatively 
bulkier commodity, systems and human resources for global supply/demand 
monitoring and the logistics of transport, distribution and insurance. 
Most importantly, however, is the crucial issue of pricing of platinum. Currently the 
State Diamond Trader buys rough diamonds at market price from producers and 
sells this to its clients (diamond beneficiators) at a margin of between 2 to 4 percent. 
This it needs to do in order to fund itself – a flaw in its model if its mandate of 
promoting beneficiation is considered. A State Platinum Trader working in the 
context of this pricing model would almost certainly be a failure. If, alternatively, a 
State Platinum Trader were to buy platinum at a discount from producers, it would 
affect the profitability of platinum mines in South Africa and the marginal ones would 
close down.
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SINGLE EXPORT-CHANNEL FOR MARKETING OF PLATINUM
Paul Jourdan (2015) proposed that there should be a single channel for the export of 
platinum from South Africa owned and run by the producers themselves. He 
proposed that platinum producers should be given the first right to run such a 
“Central Selling Organisation”, but with conditions. One condition would be that once 
running smoothly, the large players like Johnson Matthey should be persuaded by 
the producers to re-locate their operations to South Africa – like the previously 
London-based Diamond Trading Company of De Beers was coerced into relocating 
to Gaborone in Botswana by the Botswana government. 
This proposal by Jourdan seemingly has the same rationale as the other platinum 
proposals discussed above: control of supply to influence prices. The difference with 
his proposal is that he advocates that South Africa’s producer power be used as 
leverage to draw the large traders and fabricators to relocate to South Africa, and 
thereby transplant large scale fabrication (of autocatalysts and industrial chemicals) 
to the country. 
This proposal can only work if all platinum producers in South Africa, large and 
small, buy into the concept first. If there are any producers that want to export 
platinum outside the Single Channel, the model will not work. The famous Central 
Selling Organisation (CSO) of De Beers which existed prior to 2000 eventually failed 
and was replaced by the Supplier of Choice Strategy because of the exit of 
companies from the CSO (started most famously by the Argyle Mine of Australia in 
1996). Secondly, the single channel marketing of platinum would encounter the 
same resistance as the OPEC-type trade bloc proposal from competition authorities 
in the EU and the US – the major markets for platinum. 
PRECIOUS METALS EXCHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Damarupurshad (2003) suggested the establishment of a major financial hub in 
Johannesburg built around a precious-metals exchange.  He stated that while 
mineral-commodity exchanges have been established worldwide, South Africa at 
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present only has a diamond exchange, which was set up solely to provide an avenue 
for diamond producers and dealers to avoid the payment of duty on the exportation 
of rough diamonds, and does not even provide a platform for the trading of polished 
diamonds. 
Damarupurshad argued that South Africa could benefit strongly from a precious-
metals exchange based on examples of such as the LME in the UK, the Comex in 
New York, Tocom in Tokyo, Dubai’s Metals & Commodities Centre and gold 
exchanges in Shanghai and Istanbul. He added that a physical exchange for 
precious metals would offer a crucial first step towards market opening and 
nurturing, by allowing for such activities as gold loan schemes.  He argued further 
that a futures precious-metals exchange could also provide the catalyst to 
developing Johannesburg into a major financial hub, built around precious metals-
backed financial-instruments trading. Damarupurshad argued that that such an 
exchange could be seen as a natural progression for Johannesburg as one of the 
world’s main mining centres.
THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE POTENTIAL VIABILITY OF A SUSTAINABLE 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
In 2005, the Fund for Research into Industrial Development, Growth and Equity 
(FRIDGE) commissioned a study to investigate the potential viability of a sustainable 
commodity exchange in South Africa. The study was conducted by Virtual Metals 
Research & Consulting Ltd. (hereinafter Virtual Metals) and chaired by the author of 
this thesis (Ashok Damarupurshad). They found the following:
South Africa as a location: In its favour, South Africa has the legal infrastructure 
than can support an exchange, well established and functioning credit systems, good 
financial regulation, sufficient financial resources and banking skills, and in the Rand 
Refinery, a world-class gold depository (Virtual Metals, 2005). Against the country, 
are its limited cash markets in gold and platinum, and the lack of first-mover 
advantage (it will be extremely difficult to grab liquidity from existing successful 
exchanges like Nymex and COMEX). 
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South Africa’s pre-eminence (this was in 2005) in the production of gold and 
platinum-group metals does not necessarily give the country a comparative 
advantage relative to the non-mining host countries of existing or potential 
exchanges (Virtual Metals, 2005). Virtual Metals (2005) added that strong metals’ 
production is not a particular advantage. The reason for this it said is that a small 
percentage of futures contracts come to physical delivery (<1% in the case of gold 
and PGMs) and thus access to this metal, by virtue of proximity to mines, is not of 
huge importance. Although South Africa produces these metals, the bulk of annual 
output is exported and thus there is little in the way of metal circulating in the local 
markets whence a physical market could logically develop into a derivatives one.
Virtual Metals emphasised that of more importance than production, is the access to 
and association with secure and reliable warehousing and safe transportation to and 
from the warehousing, which is found in terminal markets rather than in producing 
countries. 
Virtual Metals concluded that the likelihood of the emergence of sufficient local 
trading interest in a South African commodity exchange does not look positive. The 
South African metal futures contracts will have to compete with COMEX/Nymex, 
where history has shown, latecomers to a competing market usually enter at a 
disadvantage. Virtual Metals suggested in their conclusion that the prognosis for a 
South African commodity futures exchange will greatly improve once a cash or 
physical market for the commodities has evolved in the country. Even the latter will 
be difficult to achieve, the Consultancy said, as most of the country’s production is 
exported as domestic demand for the commodities is small. 
CONCLUSION RELATING TO A PRECIOUS METAL EXCHANGE
Although it is relatively easy to provide for a Precious Metals Exchange in the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005, from experience with the diamond exchange one will find 
that since domestic demand is low, most of the metal offered at a proposed Precious 
Metals Exchange will eventually still be exported. We find this with diamonds where 
only 3-4% of mine production is actually beneficiated in the country with the rest
being exported directly or after changing hands in the secondary market. Of this, 3-
4%, a significant portion is also sold directly from producer to diamond cutter or 
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dealer, without making use of the Diamond Exchange. In short, current physical 
demand, is not sufficient to support the creation of a Precious Metals Exchange in 
South Africa.
It would be better if South Africa were able to use local precious metal (platinum, 
gold, palladium and rhodium) at discounted prices to attract fabricators into the 
country first before establishing an exchange. Discounting metal comes with its own 
problems, not the least of which is the prospect that the discount would have to be 
funded by government (subsidisation). 
Moreover, South Africa does not have much in the way of warehousing and before 
any Precious Metals Exchange can be provided for in legislation, the logistics of 
creating an exchange infrastructure would have to be looked at. Warehousing tends 
to be located in terminal markets or established port-gateways to terminal markets, 
which South Africa is/has not. 
PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A STATE GEM & PRECIOUS METAL 
BOURSE
The Bourse concept proposed by the Department of Mineral Resources in 2014 
entails the creation of a State-owned, “State of the Art Bourse” to trade in diamonds, 
semi-precious stones and precious metals (DMR, 20142). It is envisaged by the DMR 
that the Bourse would be an extension of the Diamond Exchange and Export Centre 
a statutory export/import centre and exchange established in terms of the Diamonds 
Act, 1986 and it would also be a member of the World Federation of Diamond 
Bourses. Analysis of this concept by commodity is given below and is imbued by 
feedback from industry players interviewed. 
DIAMONDS:
There is already a functioning rough diamond bourse in the form of the Diamond 
Exchange & Export Centre which is a statutory exchange and export/import centre 
created by legislation (Diamonds Act, 1986). It functions because it is the only 
legislated export and import centre for rough and polished diamonds and legislation 
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compels all exporters to offer rough diamonds for local sale via the exchange and 
only if not sold may such rough diamonds be exported. This legislation has not been 
tested in the constitutional court as yet.
GOLD: 
For gold to be traded on a bourse there would most probably need to be a legislated 
requirement for producers to offer a certain percentage of production (say 10% as 
with the State Diamond Trader in the case of diamonds). Producers would not 
voluntarily sell a percentage of production via a bourse as it would serve no benefit 
to them to do so. Gold producers are price takers.  In addition, most of the major 
gold mining companies use the Rand Refinery to export gold on their behalf. Rand 
Refinery exports such metal to some 20 international banks mainly in London, Hong 
Kong, Tokyo, Chicago and New York. Some smaller companies also have export 
arrangements with Dubai, while several small companies do not export bullion but 
concentrates or melted scrap metal bars for further upgrading and refining in 
countries such as Belgium, UK and in Dubai. 
The main issue relates to pricing. If the gold offered will be priced through price 
discovery – i.e., through bids and offers by market participants, then one would 
require significant liquidity for this to work. Considering the competition from other 
exchanges in particular the London market as discussed above (under Precious 
Metals Exchange in South Africa), it would be difficult to attract such liquidity for a 
physically delivered product. Physically delivered products are of interest to 
fabricators essentially. In South Africa, fabrication is small. Domestic demand for 
gold is less than 2 tons currently and most of this comes from recycling of scrap. So 
domestic fabricators, the bulk of who transact in grams at a time, will therefore not be 
purchasers of metal from a proposed bourse but rather from local refiners. Some 
foreign players may be interested, but because of deterrents such as VAT,
Exchange Control (capital controls) and distance from markets, other Exchanges 
would be preferred. Furthermore, arbitrage opportunities would nullify any 
differences in price relative to the international benchmarks, in particular the LBMA 
Gold price which is fixed twice every weekday. 
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PLATINUM: 
For platinum to be traded on the bourse, it is suggested that legislation would be 
required to force all platinum produced in the country to be sold via the bourse. This 
would not be popular with platinum miners who have built up relationships with 
overseas customers over decades. Moreover, most of the platinum is sold via long-
term contracts with fabricators and traders such as Johnson Matthey, General 
Motors, Mitsubishi etc. Very little platinum is sold on the spot market. As South Africa 
dominates production of platinum, this could work if producers agree to change the 
way they have operated for decades and relationships with end-users overseas are 
severed. This would affect the platinum market seriously – in fact, turn it on its head 
and the arguments raised above relating to an OPEC for platinum will also apply. In 
particular, end-users would take steps to become less reliant on South Africa for 
platinum, such as through focussing on recycling. They would also concentrate on 
efforts in developing substitutes for platinum, and there will be a move away from 
diesel cars.
AFRICAN GEMSTONES
To attract trade in gemstones such as tanzanite and emeralds mined in other African 
countries, South Africa would have to convince producing countries such as 
Tanzania and Zambia that a South African bourse would offer them better prices for 
rough stones and they would have to relinquish their control on pricing of mined 
gemstones. This would not be an easy task as South Africa is not an end-user 
market. Moreover, coloured gemstones such as emeralds, rubies and sapphires are 
also popularly traded by the Auction System, without the need for bourse 
(Gemstone.org, 2015). 
It is also unlikely that the polished trade in such coloured stones would be attracted 
to a South African bourse as there are established markets for polished stones in 
Thailand, Sri Lanka and India which are end-user markets, while South Africa is not. 
Tanzania the source of tanzanite, it should also be pointed out, has a Sightholder 
System (preferred client system) for tanzanite, with Sightholders from the USA, 
India, China (Hong Kong) and other gem-set jewellery manufacturing countries 
(Tanzaniteone.com, 2015). In fact, tanzanite is not found anywhere else in the world 
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and Tanzania has given the exclusive rights to mine tanzanite to one company, viz., 
Tanzanite One (Tanzaniteone.com, 2015) which has spent millions on marketing. 
SOUTH AFRICAN GEMSTONES
The gemstone (other than diamond) industry in South Africa has always been 
fragmented – consisting of several small producers and traders. South Africa is not a 
significant producer of gemstones. There is some tiger’s-eye, sugilite, blue lace 
agate and rose quartz production, but much of it is informal and most of it is 
smuggled out of the country in rough form. Customs at points of exit are unable to 
control the smuggling due mainly to a lack of knowledge on gemstones. It is highly 
unlikely that this problem can be eradicated by the creation of a bourse to trade in 
them; in fact it will increase the smuggling of these gemstones out of the country. 
Traders who benefit from the current lax controls are unlikely to change by the 
creation of a bourse. 
CONCLUSION ON STATE BOURSE 
It is argued that successful bourses are created by association of commercial traders 
who form such a bourse because of a market need for a trading platform. There is no 
need for a trading platform for gold and platinum in South Africa because producers 
have established their own marketing arrangements directly or via agents such as 
Rand Refinery. Domestic demand for gold is low and supply to fabricators is 
managed by refiners such as Rand Refinery, Metal Concentrators and Cape 
Precious Metals. Autocatalyst fabricators in South Africa are supplied platinum-group 
metals by the mining companies (Anglo Platinum, Lonmin and Impala Platinum). The 
system works and no fabricator of precious metals in the country complains about 
not being able to access metal for manufacturing purposes (Budhai, 2015). There is 
therefore no market need for a State Bourse trading precious metals, and this was 
the view of 95% of industry players interviewed in this study. 
States do not establish bourses, but rather marketing commissions, or State-
controlled central selling organisations, such as in Zimbabwe and Angola. This often 
occurs where the State owns mines or has a significant interest in mines. This is not 
the case in South Africa where 99.9% of diamond production, 100% of gold 
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production and 100% of Platinum-group metal production is in private hands. The 
State is also not involved in the trading of precious metals in South Africa. It 
therefore does not have any experience or expertise in trading of precious metals. 
The State Diamond Trader was a test of the trading environment by the State, which 
has not proven to be a success as at seven years of its existence. It is argued that if 
a bourse is to be established in South Africa, either a public private partnership or a 
completely private endeavour is required. A bourse requires an association of banks, 
and large trading companies as its basis, not the State (Budhai, 2014). 
PLATINUM COIN CONCEPT
Despite South Africa’s dominance of platinum production for decades and the 
tremendous success of the Krugerrand (gold legal tender coin regarded as the 
world’s most successful by several metrics), South Africa has never issued a legal 
tender platinum coin.  It is proposed that, unlike the other proposed interventions 
discussed above, a legal tender platinum coin would be very positive for the platinum 
industry. A legal tender platinum coin, in the mould of the Krugerrand, is long 
overdue in South Africa and should have been launched during the FIFA Soccer 
World Cup in South Africa in 2010, which was the best marketing opportunity the 
country has ever had. Patel (2014) suggested that the platinum coin will have more 
international appeal and prestige if it was made with South African platinum, by 
South Africans and it depicted Nelson Mandela. He proposed that it be called the 
“MandelaRand” (Patel, 2014). It will provide a means for South Africans to own 
platinum other than in jewellery form and minted bars, both of which are not popular 
in South Africa. It would need to be marketed in a manner that associates (brands) 
South Africa as the “Land of Platinum” and the Bushveld Igneous Complex (layered 
igneous intrusion containing world’s largest reserves of PGMs) whence platinum is 
mined as a unique heritage of the people of South Africa bestowed by nature (or 
God, for those religiously inclined). 
A legal tender coin would have the benefit of being VAT-free, and the same 
restrictions as to export of Krugerrands could apply for exchange control purposes. 
In the current market conditions of excess supply and low demand, a platinum coin 
could provide a new demand sector and reduce the excess supply in the market and 
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stockpiles held by producers. If the platinum coin is legal tender, it will also allow for 
other financial instruments such as those linked to the Krugerrand offered by Rand 
Merchant Bank. 
THE SIMS REPORT AND ASPECTS INCORPORATED IN THE 2012 
AMENDMENTS TO THE MPRDA
The SIMS report (2012) is the ANC study document “Maximising the Development of 
People’s Mineral Assets: State Intervention in the Minerals Sector” that ensued after 
a robust debate on the threat of nationalisation of the mining industry. This study 
concluded that nationalisation of the mining industry was not a feasible option for 
South Africa and that at a cost of R1 trillion it would be unaffordable, and that 
nationalisation without compensation would be unconstitutional (Parson, 2012). 
Dismissing nationalisation as an option, the report then focussed on proposing 
various State interventions in the mining industry. These include the following in 
simple terms:
 Introducing a 50% resource rent tax on all mining profits above a 15% return 
on capital and when implemented a reduction in royalties to 1%. 
 Imposing export duties or restrictions and infrastructure tariffs, to encourage 
local beneficiation on the assumption that the raw mineral producer would be 
persuaded to transform the product into a higher value-added product that 
would not attract a tariff/duty. 
 A ban on scrap metal exports
 Prohibiting the sale of platinum without National Treasury approval. 
 Creation of Minerals Beneficiation Hubs, especially in Industrial Development 
Zones close to areas of high unemployment
 Increasing State participation in mining companies (in some strategic 
instances to over 50%);
 Local procurement conditions in mining concessions
 Increasing the required minimum equity ownership by historically 
disadvantaged South Africans from 26% to 30% of voting shares. 
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 State Minerals Company16 mandate should include the development of 
strategic minerals” (including platinum-group metals) in partnership with other 
investors if necessary, in order to supply them into the domestic market at 
competitive or utility prices. 
 Amending the MPRDA to maximise the Development Impacts
 Amending the MPRDA and Regulations to cater for “strategic minerals” such 
that it would permit concessions/licences to have sales/pricing and other 
conditionality 
 The State Minerals Company should be given preferential exploration rights 
for “strategic minerals” (including platinum-group metals) and a free carry** in 
mineral right concessions (which will be issued by public tender).
It is important to bear in mind that the SIMS document is an ANC document, not a 
government document. However, the ANC is the ruling party, and such proposals 
have a good chance of becoming government policy, if not legislation. Indeed, at the 
end of 2012, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Draft Amendment 
Bill, 2012 (hereinafter MPRDA amendment Bill), incorporating some of these 
proposals, was published for comment. These are discussed below. 
FREE CARRIED INTEREST**
The MPRDA amendment Bill defines “free carried interest” in order to implement the 
proposal of the SIMS document. It is defined as “a share in the annual profits derived 
from the exercise of an exploration right in terms of the Bill as acquired by the State 
in terms of section 80(7) or section 84(6) as the case may be, despite the State not 
contributing to the capital expenditure.”
STRATEGIC MINERAL
The MPRDA amendment Bill defines “strategic minerals” as “such minerals as the 
Minister may declare to be strategic minerals from time to time”. This means that 
government intends to give force to the proposals made in the SIMS document 
16 At the time of submission of this report, government release d a draft Bill titled African Exploration Mining and 
Finance Corporation Bill, 2015 for public comment
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relating to strategic minerals [preferential exploration rights for “strategic minerals” 
(including platinum-group metals), and a free carry** in mineral right concessions; 
concessions/licences to have sales/pricing and other conditionality; State Minerals 
Company mandate should include the development of “strategic minerals” (including 
platinum-group metals) in partnership with other investors if necessary, in order to 
supply them into the domestic market at competitive or utility prices].
OFFER BY PRODUCERS FOR LOCAL BENEFICIATION AT A CERTAIN PRICE
The draft amendments to the MPRDA also provide for the Minister to “from time to 
time by notice in the Gazette determine such percentage per minerals commodity or 
form of petroleum and the price in respect of such percentage of raw minerals as 
may be required for local beneficiation, after taking into consideration national 
development imperatives.” The draft amendments provide further that: “Every 
Producer shall offer to local beneficiators a certain percentage of its raw mineral 
production as prescribed by the Minister”. 
EXPORT LICENCE
The draft amendments to the MPRDA also provide for an export licence in 
everything but name. The provision is as follows: “Any person who intends to export 
any designated minerals mined or form of petroleum extracted in the Republic may 
only do so with the Minister’s written consent subject to such conditions as the 
Minister may determine”. 
HOW THE PUSH FOR GREATER BENEFICIATION AFFECTS THE SA 
PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRIES
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 has as one of its key objectives the promotion of 
“equitable access to and local beneficiation of precious metals” in South Africa. This 
is an extension of the provision in the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development 
Act, 2002, which provides that any person who wishes to beneficiate a mineral 
mined in South Africa outside South Africa must obtain written permission from the 
Minister. 
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HOW IS BENEFICIATION PROMOTED IN THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT
Beneficiation is promoted in the Precious Metals Act 2005 as follows:
(1) The Act provides as one of  the key objects (objectives) of the South African 
Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator, the promotion of equitable access to, 
and local beneficiation of, South Africa’s precious metals;
(2) In considering an application for any licence, permit or certificate the 
Regulator must have regard to the promotion of equitable access to and the 
orderly local beneficiation of precious metals.
(3) The Act provides for a Precious Metals Beneficiation Licence for the 
fabrication (manufacture) of precious metal products (products consisting of 
or containing precious metals). 
(4) The Act deregulates the possession, buying and selling of silver.
(5) The Act provides for a nominal fee for the jeweller’s permit (which is for the 
manufacture of jewellery from precious metals) of R100 (increased to R500 in 
2015). 
(6) Most importantly it provides for an Export Approval for any person who 
wishes to export any unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal, which is 
subject to the promotion of equitable access to, and orderly local 
beneficiation of such metals. 
IMPACT OF THIS LEGISLATION ON BENEFICIATION OF PRECIOUS METALS
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 has been in effect since July 2007, a period of almost 
8 years. The question that needs to be asked is: What impact has this legislation had 
on beneficiation of precious metals in South Africa? The best way to answer this 
question is to look at the fabrication statistics:
 Since 2007, gold jewellery fabrication in South Africa has dropped from 7.5 
tons to 2 tons (Jewellery Council., 2015);
 Gold coin fabrication has increased from 6.8 tons to 21.5 tons (Rand 
Refinery, 2014);
 Since 2007, platinum jewellery fabrication in South Africa has dropped from 
0.5 tons to 0.3 tons (Jewellery Council, 2015).
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 Consumption of PGMs in the manufacture of catalytic converters has 
dropped from 40 tons to 30 tons (Catalytic Converter interest Group, 2014). 
The statistics show that since the implementation of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
beneficiation (fabrication) of precious metals has declined in all sectors except in 
gold coin fabrication. Even the gold coin fabrication expansion was not attributable to
the Act, but due to the bullish market in gold (upward trend in prices from 2002 to 
2012) which spurred unprecedented demand for investment products such as gold 
coins especially at the time the US debt crisis was receiving much media coverage. 
Therefore, legislating for beneficiation of precious metals has seemingly had a 
negative impact on beneficiation of precious metals in South Africa. This is because 
it has not addressed the factors that people consider before investing in large scale 
fabrication projects, which are lowering the cost of production, access to competitive 
metal loan schemes, access to skilled and productive labour, market development 
and market access. It is proposed that legislation is not the instrument to deal with 
such issues.
Promotion of transformation (discussed below) simultaneously with beneficiation has 
reportedly had a negative impact on beneficiation (anonymous, 2014). A person who 
insisted on remaining anonymous claimed that before the implementation of the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005 (with BEE as a major objective) there were over 5 000 
holders of jewellery permits in South Africa, and this number has dropped to 2 000. 
He claimed that some medium to large jewellers had closed down because they did 
not wish to share ownership in what were previously family-owned and run 
businesses. He also suggested that BEE is yet another form of taxation on an 
already over-taxed and barley viable sector. 
It is argued that the Broad-based Socio Economic Charter (Mining Charter) was not 
designed and should not be applicable to the downstream industry but to the mining 
industry in particular. The downstream industry (which the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
regulates) involves trading and manufacturing and the players in these sectors were 
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not involved in the negotiation of the Mining Charter in 2001-2002. Some of the 
pillars in the Mining Charter such as Housing, Mine Community Development, 
Sustainable Development and Growth were clearly not intended for the downstream 
industry. 
It is suggested that legislating for local beneficiation of precious metals has not had a 
positive effect on beneficiation of precious metals in South Africa because it has not 
addressed the factors that prospective beneficiators consider before investing in 
large scale fabrication projects, which are lowering the cost of production, market 
development and markets access. Promoting beneficiation by legislation is not a 
simple task and sometimes, as explained above, legislation actually has the opposite 
effect. This is especially in the case of precious metals where it is a known fact that 
there is no clear advantage of the beneficiation taking place in proximity to mine 
production (i.e., in a producing country).
If one looks at gold jewellery fabrication, the following contribute to higher jewellery 
fabrication in the large jewellery fabricating countries:
1. Access to gold loan schemes at attractive rates (as low as 1%) to finance 
working inventory;
2. Family businesses in jewellery manufacture that have been passed down for 
generations;
3. A pool of excellent jewellery designs and world-class jewellery designers;
4. A high level of skill, work ethic and productivity of goldsmiths;
5. No red tape and bureaucracy in accessing gold (it is not illegal to be in 
possession of unwrought and semi-fabricated gold in other fabricating 
countries for example);
6. Favourable tax treatment (such as VAT exemption relating to gold purchases 
for fabrication and gold imports);
7. Favourable Customs infrastructure to enhance gold jewellery manufacture 
like Export Processing Zones; 
8. Market Development and Market Access promoting organisations; and most 
importantly, 
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9. Significant and growing domestic demand for jewellery (including cultural 
links to jewellery). Domestic demand drives beneficiation as mentioned in 
Chapter 1. 
Of the 9 factors listed above, only 5, 6 and 7 have anything to do with legislation; and 
only factor 5 bears any relation to the Precious Metals Act, 2005. Based on the 
above, the following are suggested to improve promotion of beneficiation in 
legislation (based on feedback from industry participants interviewed):
(1) The application fees relating to the precious metals beneficiation licence and 
the Jeweller’s Permit should be nominal (R100);
(2) The duration of both the licence and permit should be at least 10 years to 
allow for security of tenure, which in turn will allow for the investment in 
expensive equipment such as casting machines and CAD (computer aided 
design) equipment;
(3) The red tape associated with application for the precious metal beneficiation 
licence and the jeweller’s permit should be eradicated. The licence and the 
permit should be issued within 20 days, not 60. Police Clearance for such a 
licence and permit should be fast-tracked through an alliance between the 
Regulator and SAPS on this matter. 
(4) The requirements for compliance with the Broad-based Socio Economic 
Empowerment Charter should be limited to skills development only or totally 
eliminated for the Precious Metal Beneficiation Licence and the Jeweller’s 
Permit applications. This is because beneficiation is as important an objective 
of the Act, as transformation. These objectives are given equal status in the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005. 
(5) The requirement to submit registers for the Precious Metal Beneficiation 
Licence and the Jeweller’s Permit should be limited to the submission of 
beneficiation statistics only, not buying and selling transactions. 
(6) Gold purchase for the manufacture of jewellery should be VAT-exempt, and 
jewellery manufacturers should enjoy a tax holiday for the first two years at 
least. 
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(7) There should be more incentives to attract jewellers into Industrial 
Development Zones than is currently provided. These should include: 
guaranteed Gold Loans at interest rates of less than 3%; tax holidays; ability 
to hold US dollar accounts; and duty free treatment for all imports (except for 
imports of manufactured jewellery itself).
If one looks at autocatalyst fabrication, the following contribute to higher fabrication:
(1) Incentives in one form or another (such as under the Motor Industry 
Development Programme that existed in South Africa prior to 2013)
(2) Preferential Tax treatment;
(3) No red tape or bureaucracy in accessing platinum-group metals (it is not 
illegal to be in possession of unwrought and semi-fabricated PGMs in other 
countries for example); and 
(4) Favourable Customs infrastructure to enhance autocatalyst manufacture like 
Export Processing Zones. 
Here too, of the factors listed above, only 2, 3 and 4 have something to do with 
legislation; and only factor 3 has relation to the Precious Metals Act, 2005.  
Suggestions made above (1-7) relating to gold to improve promotion of beneficiation 
in legislation are also applicable to PGMs: 
PROPOSAL: “BENEFICIATION CREDITS” COULD BE TRADABLE LIKE CARBON
CREDITS
The Kyoto Protocol established three mechanisms to help Annex 1 Parties (in
Developed Countries) reduce the costs of meeting their emissions targets by taking 
advantage of opportunities to reduce emissions in countries where it costs less than 
it does in their home countries. These mechanisms are known as Emissions Trading, 
Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). While the 
cost of limiting emissions varies considerably from region to region, the benefit to the 
atmosphere is the same, regardless of where the action takes place.
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Emission reduction units (ERUs) generated by JI projects (chiefly in countries with 
economies in transition) can be used by investing Annex 1 Parties to help meet their 
emission targets. Certified Emission Reductions (CERs - tradable internationally) 
generated by CDM projects in developing countries (Non-Annex 1 countries – which 
currently have no emission reduction obligations) can also be used by investing 
Annex1 Parties to help meet their emission targets – with the host country benefiting 
from the investment, and the sustainable-technology transfer. Emissions Trading, the 
third “flexibility mechanism”, allows companies (in Annex 1 countries) that overshoot 
their targets to buy allowances (to emit) from other parties.  These market-based 
mechanisms allow these so-called “carbon credits” and allowances to be a tradable 
commodity.
It is suggested that one can draw parallels between Kyoto’s objective and the South 
African Government’s policy of expanding “beneficiation” – a term it uses to refer to 
the downstream value-addition to minerals and metals: Government wants miners to 
add value to their mineral and metal output. Mining companies, some of them world-
class, argue that they should not be coerced into beneficiation – because what they 
are good at is taking the “stuff” out of the ground. Fabricators in South Africa are in 
many cases under-capitalised and less competitive, and some complain of the lack 
of the raw materials for “beneficiation”.
If “beneficiation credits” were to be made tradable, BEE companies and SMEs that 
undertake domestic fabrication could earn “beneficiation credits”, which they could 
sell to miners that don’t undertake fabrication – thereby helping to finance the BEE 
and SME companies’ enterprises. Miners could buy the “beneficiation credits” as an 
allowance to export a certain percentage of their mineral/metal output in the 
commercial trading form (tariff and/or duty/levy-free). The idea should be to price 
“beneficiation credits” cheap (in terms of percentage of production exportable in the 
commercial trading form), and progressively more expensive as domestic fabrication 
capacity increases.
Miners could also earn credits by selling some of their production for local fabrication 
and investing in domestic “beneficiation” projects, community projects and targeted 
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research and development, which in turn, could be used as an offset against their 
own BEE obligations, mineral royalties or as allowances for the above-mentioned 
purpose. It is cautioned, however, that it should be a requirement that mining 
companies provide evidence that their use of beneficiation credits is supplemental to 
BEE equity. 
DEVELOPMENTAL PRICE FOR GOLD AND PLATINUM
The Department of Mineral Resources proposed a Developmental Price for certain 
minerals and metals including gold and platinum in the first draft of the Mineral & 
Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill, 2012. The draft amendment read:  “(2B) The 
Minister shall from time to time by notice in the Gazette determine such percentage 
per mineral commodity or form of petroleum and the price in respect of such 
percentage of raw mineral as may be required for local beneficiation, after taking into 
consideration national development imperatives” (South African Government Online, 
2012). 
The rationale for such a proposal is to offer beneficiators (fabricators of gold and 
platinum such as jewellers and autocatalyst manufacturers) a competitive 
advantage. This amounts to subsidisation which has been proven not to work in the 
diamond industry in South Africa. While through subsidisation the diamond cutting 
industry employment was increased to over 4 000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
this number began dropping fast to under 1 000 when the subsidy was removed 
(Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 1999). It is further 
argued that this subsidy may also been a contributor to the low productivity 
(Commission of Inquiry into the South African Diamond Industry, 1999) of the South 
African diamond cutting industry relative to other diamond cutting centres.
The big question is: who will pay for the subsidy? If miners are to accept a 
discounted price for their production to be sold to beneficiators, this will affect their 
profitability and marginal mines would close. The gold and platinum mining industries 
are already under severe pressure from rising costs, falling prices, declining grades 
and labour issues.  If government is to use tax payer’s money for the subsidy, the 
Gauteng Toll-roads debacle suggests that South Africans would object strongly. 
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THE IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION (BEE) POLICIES ON THE REGULATION 
OF THE PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH AFRICA
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 also has as one of its key objectives the 
advancement of “the objectives of the broad-based socio-economic empowerment 
charter” contemplated in section 100 of the Mineral & Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 2002 – the so called “Mining Charter” or BEE Charter for the 
Mining Industry. 
BEE PROMOTION IN THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT, 2005
BEE is promoted in the Precious Metals Act 2005 as follows:
(1) “In considering an application for any licence, permit or certificate the 
Regulator must have regard to the “requirements of the broad-based socio-
economic empowerment charter developed in terms of section 100 of the 
Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002”.
This means that the only way in which BEE is promoted in terms of the Act, is 
through the licensing process. An applicant for a licence or permit must either be an 
HDSA (Historically Disadvantaged South African) or commit that during the duration
of the licence or permit, he or she will address the pillars of the Mining Charter, 
which include 26% BEE ownership, employment equity, skills development and 
beneficiation. 
IMPACT OF THIS LEGISLATION ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRECIOUS 
METALS INDUSTRY
Since the implementation of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 there has been a degree 
of positive impact on transformation of the industry (SADPMR, 2013), to the extent 
that there has been a 40% increase in the number of licenses held by HDSAs.  
However, these are usually one-man, or small companies (<5 employees). Their 
contribution to output in South Africa in terms of jewellery fabrication and the 
fabrication of other products is very small <5% (SADPMR, 2013). 
It is important to note that because jewellery manufacturing companies tend to be 
family-owned businesses (mainly Jewish, Indian and European), and jewellery 
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manufacturing skills get passed on in these family businesses from generation to 
generation, it does not lend itself to transformation as easily as some other 
businesses (e.g. in agriculture). 
LESSONS: BENEFICIATION PROMOTION
Legislating for transformation of the precious metals industry has had only a small,
real effect on changing the “face” of the industry in South Africa. It is still dominated
by white-owned jewellery and catalytic converter manufacturing companies. It should 
be noted that these large industries e.g., refining and catalytic converter industries 
are very capital intensive and require huge infrastructure. 
It is proposed, based on feedback from industry players, that the requirements for 
compliance with the Broad-based Socio Economic Empowerment Charter should be 
limited to skills development only or totally eliminated for the precious metal 
beneficiation licence and the Jeweller’s permit applications. This is because 
beneficiation is as important an objective of the Act, as transformation.
CONCLUSIONS ON RESOURCE NATIONALISM AND HOW IT WILL AFFECT 
REGULATION OF THE PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRIES IN SOUTH AFRICA
In general, the discussion above shows that resource nationalism is driven by politics 
and not by economics (cost/benefit analyses). Resource Nationalism measures 
scare away foreign investors and curtail capital investment by mining companies due 
to the uncertainty they face around issues of ownership and expropriation (security 
of tenure). Other conclusions are given below:
(1) It is suggested that the surge in Resource Nationalism in South Africa is 
coming at the wrong time, with the mining industry suffering from high 
production costs, labour issues, declining grades, move towards more 
mechanisation and the current down-cycle in the demand for metals and 
minerals (driven mainly by the decline in demand from China from the heady 
heights of previous years). 
(2) It can be concluded from the above discussion that balancing the divergent 
interests of Producers of precious metals and fabricators of precious metals 
in South Africa would be problematic to achieve.
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(3) It is suggested that South Africa does not have the required expertise or 
infrastructure to monitor the global platinum and palladium markets or to 
manage supply and demand of platinum and palladium to ensure a Producer 
Price for platinum or palladium would have the desired effect.  
(4) The precious metal markets are highly competitive and the world today is 
highly integrated/inter-connected and thus producer prices and trade blocs 
are unlikely to be sustainable. 
(5) Subsidisation of the precious metals industries (inter alia through price 
discounting) is unlikely to be popular in South Africa.
(6) BEE and beneficiation legislation has had little or no effect on the output of 
fabricated precious metal products in South Africa. In fact, output has been 
curtailed in some sectors. 
As a general suggestion, this study suggests that South Africa should avoid 
attempting to legislate the various aspects of resource nationalism discussed 
above. It would serve the country better if we deregulate the precious metals 
industries in South Africa further and look at other non-legislative instruments. In 
particular, tax incentives, reducing red tape, and making information (geological, 
mineral and other related investment information) readily and easily accessible 
online or on mobile platforms will probably be more effective in attracting 
investment in the mining and minerals sectors in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ANALYSIS OF PRECIOUS METALS ACT AND 
COMPARISON TO HALLMARKING LEGISLATION
“Whenever regulation increases, personal freedom decreases”
Alan Wilson
INTRODUCTION
Although a few countries like Russia, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana still have 
precious metals legislation, South Africa & Russia are the only countries in the world 
that strictly regulate all aspects of the gold trade and platinum-group metal trade, i.e., 
the possession, receipt, transfer, buying, selling, transporting, metallurgical 
processing, melting, smelting, extraction, refining, fabrication, use, recycling, export 
and import of all precious metals (except silver in the case of South Africa). It is 
argued that South Africa’s regulation of precious metals (except silver) is the most 
onerous in the world. This is done mainly through the Precious Metals Act, 2005. 
South Africa, however, does not have hallmarking legislation. Hallmarking is 
voluntary, and enforced to some extent only if a jeweller is a member, of the 
Jewellery Council of South Africa (a jewellery trade association). 
Most other countries, especially in the western world have hallmarking legislation 
only. Hallmarking legislation makes it a criminal offence to “under-karat” i.e., mark a 
precious metal product as having a certain purity or caratage of a precious metal, but 
in actual fact it has less than the marked amount of the metal. These countries that 
have hallmarking legislation some of them for over 100 years, do not restrict the 
possession, buying and selling of precious metal. Some did regulate precious metals 
(gold in particular) in the past, but deregulated over the past century (USA for 
example). A few countries do still, however, restrict imports of gold or impose 
disincentives to import gold – where current account deficits are being addressed. 
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It should be noted, though that South Africa deregulated silver in 2007. The reasons 
for this are expounded on, as some inform the way forward for gold regulation in 
South Africa. 
SUMMARY: 
This chapter looks at the pros and cons of both these regulatory regimes, viz., 
comprehensive precious metal trade legislation versus hallmarking legislation as 
stand-alone legislation and will make certain recommendations. This it will do by 
comprehensively analysing the Precious Metals Act, 2005, the challenges in the 
precious metals industry (in particular illegal mining and trade), regulation of gold in 
other countries, experience with deregulation of silver in South Africa and the cost 
benefit of regulation through a Precious Metals Act versus statutory hallmarking on 
its own. 
THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT: CONTROL OF POSSESSION, BUYING AND 
SELLING OF PRECIOUS METALS
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 (Act 37 of 2005) provides as follows:
“Prohibitions relating to acquisition, possession or disposal of unwrought 
precious metal
4. (1) Save as is otherwise provided in this Act, no person may acquire, possess or 
dispose of, either as principal or as agent, any unwrought precious metal, unless-
(a) he or she is the holder of a refining licence and acts in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of his or her licence;
(b) he or she is an authorised dealer;
(c) he or she is a producer who has won or recovered such unwrought precious 
metal;
(d) he or she has obtained a certificate from the Regulator authorising him or her 
to acquire or to dispose of such unwrought precious metal;
(e) such unwrought precious metal does not exceed a prescribed mass and is 
acquired in accordance with a special permit issued by the Regulator for 
scientific or beneficiation purposes or to make jewellery; or he or she is the 
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holder of a precious metal beneficiation licence and acts in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of his or her licence;
(2) The Regulator may only issue a certificate contemplated in subsection (1)(d) to a 
person in consultation with the National Treasury, in the case of gold, and the 
National Commissioner.
(3) No person may have in his or her possession any unwrought precious metal 
unless
he or she is-
(a) a person contemplated in subsection (1); or
(b) in possession of such precious metal in fulfilment of a contract of employment
(5) Only a person contemplated in subsection (1)(a), (c),(e) or (f) may make up, 
smelt
or change the form of any unwrought precious metal in his or her possession in 
terms of that subsection with any person contemplated in subsection (1)”. 
In South Africa, in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005, no person may possess, 
buy (legal language used is “acquire”) or sell (legal language used is dispose of) any 
precious metal (gold and the platinum-group metals in unwrought or semi-fabricated 
form. 
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 defines unwrought precious metal as:
“(a) precious metal that-
(i) is unrefined (including concentrate and matte), or has been
refined to a purity less than 99,9% and has not undergone any 
manufacturing process other than being refined or formed into a
bar (but not a minted bar), an ingot, a button, plate, sponge,
powder, granules, (excluding granules made from precious metal
that has been refined to or beyond 99,9% purity, and carat gold
alloys), solution; or
(ii) is prescribed as any substance, material or product of similar form to 
any such substance, material or product listed in paragraph (a)(i); or
(b) any article or substance containing or consisting of precious metal contemplated 
in paragraph (a),” …
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The Act defines semi-fabricated preciousmetal as follows: 
“means refined precious metal that is in the form of sheet, tube, wire, granule, plate, 
strip, rod, or sponge (including carat gold alloys as prescribed), or such other refined 
precious metal as may be prescribed” 
To be in possession and acquire or sell precious metal, one has to be a refining 
licence holder, authorised dealer (usually banks), a miner producing precious metal 
(which he/she can sell), a precious metal certificate holder, a precious metal permit 
holder or a precious metal beneficiation licence holder. The relevant sections of the 
Act are given below for unwrought precious metal and then for semi-fabricated 
precious metal. 
Prohibitions relating to acquisition, possession or disposal of semi-fabricated 
precious metal
5. (1) Save as is otherwise provided for in this Act, no person may acquire, possess 
or dispose of, either as principal or as agent, any semi-fabricated precious metal, 
unless-
(a) (a)he or she is the holder of a refining licence and acts in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of his or her licence;
(b) he or she is an authorised dealer;
(c) he or she is a producer who has won or recovered the unwrought precious
(d) metal which has been refined and made into such semi-fabricated precious 
metal; he or she has obtained a certificate from the Regulator authorising him 
or her to acquire or to dispose of such semi-fabricated precious metal;
(e) such semi-fabricated precious metal does not exceed a prescribed mass and 
is
(f) acquired in accordance with a special permit issued by the Regulator for  
scientific purposes;
(g) he or she holds a precious metals beneficiation licence; or
(h) he or she holds a jeweller’s permit.
(2) No person may have in his or her possession any semi-fabricated precious metal 
unless he or she is-
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(a) a person contemplated in subsection (1); or
(b) in possession of such precious metal in fulfilment of a contract of employment 
with any person contemplated in subsection (1).
A jeweller’s permit holder may also acquire and possess precious metal, but in semi-
fabricated form and not in unwrought form. 
The licences and permits (except for the mining licences which are issued by the 
Department of Mineral Resources and authorised dealer designations which are 
authorised by the Reserve Bank) are issued by the South African Diamond & 
Precious Metals Regulator (SADPMR or Regulator for short), which administers the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005 and the Diamonds Act, 1986. 
Before any of these licences or permits is issued, the Regulator must consult with 
the South African Police Services (SAPS – Precious Metals Desk of the Organised 
Crime Division) and the Reserve Bank (the latter in the case of gold only) and obtain 
consent for issuance of the licence or permit. The Precious Metals Act, 2005 also 
allows the employees of licence and permit holders to be in possession of and work 
with precious metals, as per their contract of employment, but only at the employer’s 
approved premises.  Moreover to export or import unwrought and semi-fabricated 
precious metal, an export approval or import permit is required. This is also issued 
by the South African Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator. 
The Act also requires that the premises, on which an applicant for a licence or permit 
under the Act will work with any unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal, be 
approved by the Regulator. Once the licence or permit is issued, possession of 
unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal is restricted to the approved premises. 
To transport any such precious metal outside the boundaries of the approved 
premises or outside the mine, prescribed documentation containing particulars of the 
precious metal, and from which licensee it is being transported and to which licensee 
it is destined. 
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Perhaps the most onerous requirement of the Precious metals Act is the requirement 
for licensees and permit holders to keep a register of transactions of any unwrought 
or semi-fabricated precious metal received/bought or dispatched/sold. This has to be 
submitted to the Regulator periodically, usually every quarter. In such registers, the 
parties to the transaction (buyer and seller), the metal/s involved, the price paid, the 
form of the precious metal, the gross mass or fine mass of the metal/s and the purity 
of the precious metal has to be recorded for each and every transaction. 
The Act also provides the Police powers to inspect search and seize precious metal 
where an investigation of a premises is warranted.  Penalties for transgression of 
any provisions of the Act, especially offences relating to possession, acquisition or 
disposal of unwrought precious metals carry are harsh - fines up to R1 million and 
imprisonment of up to 20 years or to both such fine or imprisonment. 
WHY DOES SOUTH AFRICA HAVE SUCH STRICT REGULATION OF PRECIOUS 
METALS?
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 has its origins in Chapter 16 of the Mining Rights Act, 
1967 and the Currency and Exchanges Act, 1933. These give an indication of why 
such stringent controls were necessary in the past. It is the subject of discussion in 
this Chapter whether such stringent controls are still necessary. The historic reasons 
for these controls are given below:
(1) For most of the 1900s, South Africa was the biggest gold producer in the 
world (Department of Mineral Resources, 2006). Legislation thus served to 
protect the authorised mines from illegal miners and theft of gold produced.
In the 1900s, gold was accessible closer to the surface than it is today, which 
was a risk to mineral right holders.
(2) Gold is a monetary asset (a parallel currency) and therefore, legislation was 
in place for exchange control purposes. Exchange Control Regulations made 
in terms of the Currency and Exchanges Act, 1933, prevented the ownership 
of gold by citizens unless there were licensees such as miners, refiners or 
jewellery manufacturers. 
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(3) Gold is priced in US dollars internationally, and hence could not be owned in 
South Africa except in finished, consumer forms such as jewellery and 
Krugerrands, the form of which could not be changed by non-licensees. 
(4) Gold is a portable, concentrated store of value and therefore its trade had to 
be controlled.
(5) Gold was and still is used a reserve asset (World Gold Council, 2003). Until 
1997, the Reserve Bank bought all the gold produced in South Africa, and 
kept some gold as a reserve asset and sold the rest to counterparties 
overseas in return for foreign exchange, in particular US dollars. 
The gold trade in South Africa was virtually non-existent apart from the 
miners and some large jewellers. 
Gold exports were South Africa’s predominant source of foreign exchange in the 
1970s and 1980s (contributed more than 50% to foreign exchange revenue until 
1983). Gold mining also contributed significantly to the macro economy during this 
period; in 1980 it contributed 17% to South Africa’s GDP (Department of Mineral 
Resources, 2006). However, South Africa’s economy is much more diversified now, 
so much so that the entire mining sector contributed only 7.0% to GDP and about 
30% to South Africa’s export revenue (from goods) in 2014. The gold mining industry 
has contracted significantly, but this has been outweighed by growth in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, which is characteristic of a 
progressing economy. Nevertheless, gold still contributes about 9% to export 
earnings (from goods) and a little under 2% to GDP. It currently makes up about a 
fifth of South Africa’s gross reserves.
Platinum mining in South Africa began in earnest in the 1970s. Due to rarity (35 
times rarer than gold), platinum is the most precious of precious metals. Hence its 
price has, except for brief periods, been higher than that of gold.  Like gold, platinum 
was controlled through Chapter 16 of the Mining Rights Act, 1967, but unlike gold, 
platinum is not a reserve asset in South Africa, and it does not have a traditional 
monetary role. However, because of its high price, and because South Africa 
contributes about 75% of world production, platinum together with its associated 
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platinum-group metals (palladium, iridium, rhodium, ruthenium and osmium) is 
controlled in South Africa. This does not happen elsewhere in the world17. 
REGULATION OF GOLD IN OTHER COUNTRIES
The gold market and the diamond market (the latter due to the implementation of the 
Kimberley Process in 2003) are regulated mineral-commodity markets. However 
because of the monetary role that gold plays and the sheer size, complexity, history 
and breadth of the gold market, it is in a class of its own. This complexity is due 
largely to the derivative products in the gold market, which are still a few years off for 
the diamond market. 
Gold possession and gold trading are subject to regulations, controls and taxes in 
many countries (see Table below). However, the deregulation of gold ownership by 
citizens was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s. Singapore was the first to open its 
gold market, which it did in 1969. Hong Kong followed in 1974, the US in 1975, 
Tokyo in 1982, Taiwan in 1986 and Turkey in 1989.
In India, the model for deregulation was based on the following policy:
 Removal of restrictions on import and export of gold, in order to curb 
smuggling and hoarding;
 Development of gold-related financial instruments (forward trading and other 
gold derivatives);
 Development of markets for physical and financial gold; and
 Encouragement of banks and non-banks to operate freely in the domestic 
and international gold markets (offering gold-related savings and loan 
products and interest-bearing physical gold deposit schemes). 
17 There are some controls on PGMs in Russia but not to the extent in South Africa
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Table 4.1: Restrictions on gold possession and buying in various countries
COUNTRY POSSESSION BUYING
Australia No restrictions Consumers can buy gold in bar, coin, wafer or other 
tradable form.  Gold ETF launched in 2003. 
Botswana Gold possession 
restricted to 
Producers (mining 
right holders), and 
jeweller’s permit 
holders 
Gold and silver buying controlled by Unwrought 
Precious Metals Act. Only Permit Holders may buy 
gold and silver. 
Canada No restrictions Consumers can buy bullion bars, bullion coins and 
wafers. Investment options include gold 
futures/options contracts
China Final stages of 
complete 
deregulation
The Shanghai Gold Exchange was set up in 2002. A 
retail gold investment market has opened recently. 
Platinum futures trading began in late 2003. 
Some companies were allowed to import gold 
jewellery since May 2004. 
Ghana Not controlled 
specifically
Precious Minerals Marketing Company -appointed 
Licensed Buyers can buy from small scale miners
India Allowed Gold bars and coins can be imported under Open 
General Licence by government approved Banks 
and Agencies. 
India’s Multi-commodity Exchange was established 
for the trading of gold and silver in October 2003.
Japan No restrictions There are gold bullion shops and banks and direct
marketing by gold mining companies. TOCOM 
offers a physical market and futures. 
Kenya Possession of gold, 
silver and platinum 
restricted to Mining 
Title, licence & 
certificate holders in 
terms of the Trading 
in Unwrought 
Precious Metals Act
Buying and selling controlled in terms of Trading in 
Unwrought Precious Metals Act (Chapter 309).
Russia Gold, silver and PGM 
possession State 
controlled through 
licences for mining, 
refining, and 
jewellery making in 
terms of the Precious 
Metals Law
State has pre-emptive right to purchase gold, silver 
and platinum-group metals from authorised miners 
and refiners for the State Fund in terms of the 
Federal Law on Precious Metals & Stones (Precious 
Metals Law)
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Sources: World Gold Council, 2003;Webber Wentzel, 2014 & Rough-
Polished.com, 2009
As far as legislative controls are concerned, gold market deregulation began in 1990 
with the abolition of the Gold Control Act, which had prohibited the holding of bar 
gold, except by authorised dealers and goldsmiths, and sought to limit the jewellery 
holdings of families. In 1997, Open General Licences was introduced, which allowed 
substantial direct imports by local banks from the international market. 
Manufacturers located in Special Export Zones can import gold tax-free through 
various registered banks under an Export Replenishment scheme.  In 2003, India’s 
Multi-commodity Exchange was established for the trading of gold and silver 
amongst other commodities.
In Turkey, a number of innovative changes to the status quo were introduced. The 
aim was to convert the existing idle gold savings into an active resource for the 
economy by channelling them into investments:
South Africa Possession and 
trading of unwrought 
and semi-fabricated 
gold is restricted.
Only licensees, permit holders and other relevant 
authorisation holders may buy and/or sell unwrought 
gold. South Africans can purchase legal tender 
bullion and proof coins made of gold and silver. 
Platinum coins are not available yet. 
Turkey Allowed Istanbul Gold Exchange offers bullion bars. Dealers 
and jewellers sell coins. 
UAE No restrictions Available at jewellery outlets and bullion dealers. 
Dubai Metals and Commodities Centre was 
established a decade ago. A physical market and 
futures are offered. 
UK No restrictions Bars, wafers and coins are available to consumers. 
Gold ETF launched in December 2003. 
USA No restrictions Bullion bars and coins available. Gold oriented 
Mutual Funds also available. Gold ETFs launched in 
2004/5. 
Zimbabwe Possession of gold 
restricted to Mining 
Authorisation 
Holders; and licence 
or permit holders in 
terms of Gold Trade 
Act
Controlled in terms of the Gold Trade Act (Chapter 
21:03)
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 In 1995, the Istanbul Gold Exchange was opened for the purpose of 
liberalising the Gold Sector in Turkey, integrating it with international markets, 
rationalising gold imports and introducing gold-based financial instruments. 
 In 1997, the Istanbul Gold Exchange Futures and Options Market was 
launched to meet the demand for gold futures. 
 In 1999, silver and platinum trading began on the Istanbul Gold Exchange. 
 In 2000, the Precious Metals Lending market was started on the Exchange 
with the objective of bringing supply and demand into an organised market, 
lowering the jewellery sector’s production cost and facilitating the 
securitisation of gold.
Until recently, the Chinese gold market was tightly controlled by the Chinese 
Government. The World Gold Council assisted the government to devise a 3-step 
programme of deregulation, which was recently implemented: 
 The gold supply system was released through the establishment of the 
Shanghai Gold Exchange (which opened in 2002); 
 The gold usage system was improved by abolishing the gold licensing 
system for jewellery market participants and by liberalising the gold 
investment market by allowing gold bars and bullion coins to be sold to 
consumers and traded by both institutional and individual investors; and
 The liberalisation of gold imports and exports to link freely with the 
international market. 
As part of China’s entry to the WTO, the 40% duty on imported jewellery was 
scrapped. The licensing system for local retail, wholesale and manufacture of gold 
products was abolished and replaced by a registration system in 2001. Most of the 
barriers to gold trade have been removed. Foreign companies may now invest in 
gold jewellery manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing in China, provided the gold if 
it is to be sold locally as jewellery is bought from the local market.
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WHY WAS SILVER DEREGULATED IN SOUTH AFRICA?
Although the Precious Metals Act, 2005 was a disappointment for those campaigning 
for the deregulation of precious metals markets in South Africa, it did have a silver 
lining. The Act provided for the deregulation of the possession of, and dealing in 
silver (silver was excluded from the definition of “precious metals” in the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005.
Those unversed in reading legislation incorrectly interpreted this to mean that silver 
is not a precious metal anymore – that it had suddenly lost its value. This is not the 
case. Silver is still regarded the world over as a precious metal. In fact the silver 
price was at the time of its deregulation in South Africa, at a multi-year high.  The 
deletion of silver from the definition of “precious metal” in the Precious Metals Act 
was a legislative way of deregulating silver. It simply means that silver is not 
regarded as a “precious metal” for the purposes of the Act – which in turn means that 
the provisions that apply to gold and the platinum-group metals do not apply to silver. 
Similarly, if the need arises (say to control copper theft), by including a non-precious 
metal like copper in the definition of “precious metal” the provisions controlling the 
possession, processing, trade, and fabrication of gold and the platinum-group metals 
could be applied to copper. However, regulating a common household metal like 
copper by declaring it a “precious metal” in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005, is 
not considered practical due to intensive and ubiquitous use of the metal in 
households and buildings in general. 
Silver deregulation was long overdue because there are no silver mines in South 
Africa. Silver is a by-product of gold, lead-zinc, copper and platinum mining, and its 
production has also declined significantly. Therefore, unlike gold there is a very small 
security-risk (theft from mines) consideration and exchange control is not an issue as 
silver is not a monetary asset in the modern day. Moreover, silver has only a residual 
precious metal status, as more than two-thirds of the metal is used in industrial 
applications.
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BENEFITS OF DEREGULATION OF SILVER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Deregulating the possession of, and dealing in silver is beneficial to South Africa. 
Deregulation promotes the secondary industry – the recycling of silver, especially 
from used photographic material and electrical/electronic components. It also attracts 
recycling of silver-bearing material from the rest of Africa and has led to the 
expansion of silver refining in South Africa, including third-party or toll-refining. 
Deregulation may yet also result in an increase in retail investment in South Africa, if 
players exploit the opportunity to create instruments to that effect. A Silver Exchange 
Traded Fund (ETF) was launched in the USA in 2006, and a silver ETF could be 
feasible in South Africa. 
The affordable precious metal has become the available precious metal, allowing for 
hobbyists and other non-professionals to make their own jewellery in garages and 
workshops. This is also a boost for rural craft jewellers and other craft fabricators, 
who could increase the intrinsic value of their crafts with the easily workable precious 
metal. Art Clay Silver, introduced recently, could also grow in popularity and use, 
especially amongst these SMMEs. 
The deregulation of silver provides an opportunity to evaluate to some extent what 
impact the deregulation of gold would have in South Africa. However, the market for 
gold and the market for silver are quite different. Silver is more of an industrial metal 
in the modern day. Thus far, the most significant impact of deregulation of silver has 
been the expansion of silver jewellery manufacturing in South Africa. There are 
currently over 2 000 jewellers working exclusively on silver and non-precious metals 
(including over 800 hobbyists and part-time jewellers and other fabricators) and 27
new, preciously disadvantaged South Africans that have entered the silver recycling 
business (Budhai, 2015). 
RE-REGULATING SILVER?
Despite all the positives described above for the de-regulation of silver, there are 
officials in SAPS such as Mahlangu (2014) that think that it was a mistake to 
deregulate silver in South Africa. The Author of this thesis, being the person that was 
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responsible for the deregulation of silver, obviously does not agree. It is believed that 
silver does not satisfy the criteria to justify regulation, especially the regulation of 
possession and trade as with other precious metals: Firstly, South Africa produces 
very little silver (6 tons), with production having declined drastically over the last 
decade, and all of this production is a by-product of lead/silver, gold, copper and 
PGM mining. Secondly, there is no theft of silver from mines as is the problem with 
gold, no illegal mining and it is not a high value commodity (generally less than 2% of 
the price of gold). Moreover, the deregulation of silver has given the jewellery 
industry and small-scale recycling of silver scrap a huge boost in South Africa.
Furthermore, it is argued that wherever it is possible to deregulate possession and 
trade, it should be pursued because this is the case in other countries in the world. 
Regulation must have a purpose, and the regulation of silver in South Africa would 
serve no purpose. In legislative drafting, one is taught that a “mischief” (harm or 
injury caused by something i.e., something causing a problem) leads to legislation 
being drafted to address this mischief. Otherwise, legislation is merely imposing a 
burden – like a tax or a penalty. There is no mischief to address with silver –
certainly with there being no silver mines in South Africa anymore or theft of silver. 
Similarly, imposing a penalty on silver fabricators or recyclers is not warranted. 
These players do not need to be punished but in fact they should be allowed to 
flourish in line with what the market demands. 
THE COST/BENEFIT OF PRECIOUS METAL TRADE REGULATION
One has to measure the costs to implement the Precious Metals Act, 2005 and 
related legislation in South Africa against the benefits to South Africa. However, also 
important is to look at the effectiveness of the implementation of the legislation by 
the South African Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator.
THE COSTS TO IMPLEMENT THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT AND RELATED 
LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
The budget for the Precious Metals Division of the South African Diamond & 
Precious Metals Regulator is in the region of R15 million per annum (SADPMR, 
2013) and is projected to increase to R30 million in the next five years. It is well 
known that the current number of precious metals inspectors employed by the 
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SADPMR is not enough as some provinces are not being serviced adequately. 
These are the Northern Cape and Free State provinces in particular. Furthermore, 
additional ( at least 2) export and import inspectors are required. So, staff will have to 
be increased by at least four and up to eight in the next five years. An inflation rate of 
6% is factored in the projected costs of R30 million. 
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT
The only way to measure the benefits of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 are to total 
the value of precious metal recovered during arrests of people involved with precious 
metal related crime. This figure varies from year to year and range from R2 million to 
R10 million a year (SAPS, 2012). It can be quite erratic and often one bust can 
contribute as much as 60% of the precious metal recovered. It should also be noted 
that often the SAPS have to return precious metal to the person arrested as it is very 
difficult to prove cases of illegally mined metal or stolen/smuggled metal. Metal is 
often mixed and melted down making it difficult to trace the origin of metals.
Also noteworthy, is the fact that SARS claims that VAT fraud associated with 
precious metal dealings runs into 10s of millions a year, but there have been no 
convictions of note to date. VAT fraud is incurred when VAT is claimed from SARS 
for metal that has not attracted VAT. This is mainly through the melting of 
Krugerrands (which is a zero-VAT item) and sales of old jewellery by individuals not 
registered for VAT to second-hand dealers and pawn shops; and then claiming VAT 
for acquiring this metal. 
HALLMARKING AND HOW IT IS CONTROLLED
A hallmark is a mark or number of marks, made on precious metal (gold, silver or 
platinum) jewellery or plate to confirm that its quality is up to the correct legal or 
specified standard (GoldAvenue, 2002). When backed by consumer protection laws, 
a hallmark (or assay or standard mark) is a guarantee than an article contains the 
specified minimum purity of precious metal. Such a control on precious metal content 
is for the protection of both the consumer and the manufacturer. 
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Countries develop their own regulations on precious metals control based on local 
traditions and industrial developments, which determine fineness, sampling, testing, 
marking and technical requirements. Fineness ranges from 333/1000 to 999/1000 (8-
24 carat).  Some countries require compulsory control and hallmarking of every 
article by an independent body, some have a voluntary hallmarking system while 
others only require prescribed marking by the manufacturer (see Table 4.2). In the 
UK hallmarking of articles weighing greater than 1g, at one of four assay offices (in 
London, Birmingham, Sheffield or Edinburgh) is compulsory, while in France all 
articles greater than 3g must be hallmarked in one of 24 offices located throughout 
the country. In Italy the individual manufacturer carries out hallmarking of products. 
INTERNATIONAL HALLMARKING CONVENTION
The different European laws on precious metals and title diversity posed a problem 
in trading jewellery between countries with different systems. This led to the 
Convention on the Control and Marking of Articles of Precious Metals which 
introduced a Common Control Mark (CCM) indicating fineness.
PLATINUM HALLMARKING
In most countries, platinum is identified by the accepted international abbreviations 
of “Pt” or “Plat” either preceded or followed by the fineness number (Johnson 
Matthey, 2002). In the USA, alloys of 950 fineness or greater may be marked with 
the word “platinum”. In the UK, platinum is identified by a 5-sided shape within which 
the fineness number is stamped. 
Table 4.2 – countries with compulsory or voluntary hallmarking systems
COMPULSORY
HALLMARKING
VOLUNTARY
HALLMARKING
Austria Belgium
France Denmark
Ireland Finland
Netherlands Sweden
Portugal Norway
Spain Israel
United Kingdom Morocco
Russian Federation Qatar
Ukraine Japan
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Source: GoldAvenue.com, 2002
China has a national hallmarking standard that covers platinum articles, and this is 
policed by retailers who send incoming goods from manufacturers to approved 
testing centres. In Hong Kong, as in Europe and Japan, the hallmarks Pt850, Pt900, 
Pt950 and Pt990 are used to denote the platinum contents of alloys.
South Africa currently lacks regulations relating to hallmarking of precious metal 
jewellery, plate and minted bars. Some jeweller’s in South Africa, especially those 
who are members of the Jewellery Council of South Africa (Jewellery Council, 2013) 
do practise voluntary hallmarking of their jewellery production. This is part of their 
membership criteria – and according to the Council, serious cases of under-carating 
are dealt with by the Jewellery Council, including expulsion from the Council. 
Kaiser Associates (2002) in their study for the Department of Trade and Industry 
presented as one of their conclusions a recommendation that South Africa should 
develop and internationally recognised hallmarking system. “An internationally 
recognised hallmarking system will help cement South Africa’s reputation as a high 
quality manufacturer with the guarantee factors associated with hallmarking”, the 
consultancy claimed. It added that hallmarking will ease the import/export process 
and reduce paperwork requirements for entry into certain export markets. 
THE COST/BENEFIT OF STATUTORY HALLMARKING: ESTIMATED COST OF A 
STATUTORY HALLMARKING SYSTEM
To implement statutory hallmarking in South Africa, what can be broadly referred to 
as “infrastructure” would be required. These include:
Poland Singapore
Romania
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Hungary
Lithuania
Czech Republic
Algeria
Egypt
Bahrain
Tunisia
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 Legislation enforcing hallmarking
 A hallmarking authority
 Statutory assay offices throughout the country (at least four in the main 
centres: Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth; and 
 Staff and equipment for the hallmarking authority and assay offices. 
The biggest cost component would be the four assay offices in the four centres 
throughout the country. It is estimated that it would take a budget of R10 million to 
set up each one, and each would need an operating budget of at least R5 
million/year. This totals R60 million. This is double the cost of implementing the 
Precious Metals, Act - although there are serious deficiencies in the current 
implementation of the Act and a more effective job can be done with more resources. 
The World Gold Council (2015) in its study done in India found that there should be 
one hallmarking centre for every 30 jewellers suggesting a national network of more 
than a 1000 hallmarking centres in that country. If also suggested that a typical 
hallmarking centre in India would require 7-10 people and cost 6-8 million rupees to 
set up. The WGC estimated that operating costs for each centre would be 6 million 
rupees, including wages and rent, 10% royalties payable to the Bureau of 
International Standards (BIS) and annual licence fees. Nevertheless, it is suggested 
that the estimates for South Africa in the paragraph above are plausible because 
South Africa would require only four hallmarking centres to start with, but each 
hallmarking centre would need to serve about 300 jewellers because of the small 
size of jewellers in South Africa in terms of the amount of metal worked with. 
BENEFITS OF STATUTORY HALLMARKING
The benefits of hallmarking can be summed up as: consumer protection. Statutory 
hallmarking protects the consumer, mainly the jewellery consumer or the 
gold/platinum coin consumer from unscrupulous jewellers/fabricators 
misrepresenting the precious metal content of precious metal consumer goods 
(mainly jewellery and gold coins). In other words, it is designed to protect the 
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consumer against cheating (under-carating) by goldsmiths/platinum smiths in 
general. 
The Bureau of Indian Standards (2011) states that the benefit to the customer is that 
hallmarking provides third party assurance and satisfaction that customer gets the 
right purity of gold, silver or platinum for the given price (value for money); and that 
jewellers benefit as it provides a clear indication of his/her capability, commitment to 
quality and assurance of consistency in purity and quality of gold, silver or platinum 
jewellery. The World Gold Council (2015) which conducted a study on introduction of 
hallmarking in India stated that benefits of hallmarking would include:
 enhancing trust in gold as collateral making gold more productive in the 
economy (by monetising gold lying dormant in households); 
 Indian jewellery being more highly valued, thereby boosting exports; and
 strengthening the gold market which would sustain growth in the gold 
jewellery sector, thereby creating significant employment opportunities. 
The Pakistan Jewellery Development Company (2010) states the following befits of 
hallmarking to the Pakistani Jewellery industry:
 Standardization of  products i.e. guarantee of the purity of precious metals,
 Consumer Protection to get quality product against their best price,
 Promotion of  fair competition,
 Assurance of the gold content, hence the value of purchases,
 Hallmarking will ensure that mixing of other metals in gold will be within the 
permitted limits,
 Hallmarking protects the public against fraud and traders against unfair 
competition,
 Useful in case of resale,
 No inspection will be required for exporting articles to the signatories of 
Vienna Convention thus saves inspection cost,
 Enhance international acceptance of local Jewellery,
 Facilitates the export of the jewellery items with full confidence,
 Facilitates the cross border trade and so help in boosting export, and 
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 Help in brand building
Whether the cost/benefit of hallmarking in South Africa is favourable for its 
introduction, can only be gauged if statistics were available on the prevalence of 
under-carating in South Africa. The Jewellery Council state that it is very difficult to 
determine the magnitude of under-carating in South Africa (Jewellery Council, 2009). 
It claims that under-karating is a common occurrence, especially by jewellers who 
are not members of the Jewellery Council, although it admits that it has dealt with a 
few cases over the years by jewellers who were in fact members of the Council;
these were few and far between. The Jewellery Council however suggest that the 
main problem lies with cheap imports of jewellery from China. These are not 
hallmarked, they claim, as it is not a requirement in South Africa, but there have 
been many complaints from consumers in South Africa, especially over the last five 
years. The Council recommends harsher import duties on jewellery imports and the 
quickening of the pace in setting up statutory hallmarking in South Africa, especially 
the testing of imports of jewellery through OR Tambo International Airport and Cape 
Town International Airport.  
Therefore, anecdotal evidence is the only evidence that can be used currently, and 
this suggests that the benefits of hallmarking, if one had to put a Rand value to it, 
could run into millions of Rands.
LESSONS: WHICH TYPE OF REGULATION IS MORE SUITABLE FOR THE 
MODERN DAY?
Notwithstanding the above discussion it should be noted that putting a Rand value 
cost to the two types of regulation of the Precious Metals Trade, on its own cannot 
be the decider of which is better, especially if estimates or mainly anecdotal 
evidence is used to derive costs. One has to take other factors into consideration, 
which include:
(1) The experience in other countries, and lessons learnt in those countries;
(2) The modern milieu, especially in the context of the Constitution of South 
Africa and the rights of citizens in general;
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(3) Globalisation and the openness of the new South Africa to trade with 
neighbouring African countries and to countries with bi-lateral relations such 
as China;
(4) The decline in the mining industry in South Africa, especially with regard to 
gold mining (see discussion on deregulation of silver in South Africa as it is a 
pointer for gold in the future);
(5) The relaxation of exchange controls in South Africa;
(6) The recent, apparent waning of gold’s “safe haven” status;
(7) The recent trend of reduction in the use of gold as a reserve asset; and 
(8) The processes of recovery/winning of platinum are complex relative to gold 
recovery and winning. 
It was mentioned earlier that most other countries have deregulated precious metals 
trade as much as possible. Although some countries still impose exchange control 
regulations, there is no control on the possession of gold or platinum-group metals in 
western countries. In fact, countries such as Canada (National Resources Canada, 
2002) believe that controlling the possession of precious metals and rough diamonds 
as South Africa does, would be an insult to its citizens and a violation of citizens’ 
basic rights. 
Some commentators in South Africa (example: Cross, 2001) suggest that restrictions 
on the possession of precious metals and rough diamonds in South Africa is 
unconstitutional as it can be viewed as an exclusionary act. However, this has never 
been tested in any constitutional court in South Africa. 
It should also be borne in mind that South Africa is not the biggest gold producing 
country in the world anymore. It lost this status in 2007, and its production continues 
to decline. It is still the world’s largest platinum-group metals producer, but there is 
significant contribution to supply from recycling of scrap and secondary metal in 
other countries
Exchange controls have been relaxed in South Africa, although it will be a while 
before these are totally abolished. To illustrate this we now have the de-regulation of 
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minted gold and platinum bars (bars that are minted like coins with officially 
controlled masses and purities), trading of gold futures contracts on the JSE and the 
trading of gold and platinum exchange traded funds (ETFs) on the JSE.  Moreover, 
since 1997, gold miners are allowed to market their gold production independently –
there is no requirement to sell gold production to the Reserve Bank anymore, as long 
as foreign exchange is repatriated to South Africa as per Exchange Control Rules. 
South Africa has also changed its blend of reserve assets with the US dollar now 
enjoying a higher status as a reserve asset than ever in the past. Other currencies 
such as the relatively new Euro are also used as reserve assets these days, as the 
EuroZone is an important trading partner of South Africa. 
Sibanda (1998) reviewed deregulation of gold in India, China and Turkey and 
expounded on the benefits of gold liberalisation in those countries. He called on the 
gold mining industry of South Africa and other African countries to support such a 
process in their respective countries. He believed that there is great potential for 
increasing gold consumption in Africa if the legislative environment could be 
improved – meaning that there should be deregulation of gold ownership in such 
African countries. He also highlighted the need for reform because the gold mining 
industry in South Africa is “ailing” (high cost structure of South African mining 
companies) and concluded that “we need economic liberalisation and deregulation to 
sweep this part of the world”. 
All these factors point to the fact that in the modern day draconian controls on 
possession and buying of precious metal are out of place, inefficient, ineffective, 
costly and, in general, an outdated allocation of resources. 
A NOTE ON THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 2008
In South Africa, the Consumer Protection Act, 2008 was promulgated in 2009. It can 
be used to prosecute violations such as under-karating of precious metal consumer 
products such as jewellery and gold coins (Mononela, 2012)
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In particular, section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2008 provides for false 
representations, of which under-karating is an example, as an offence. The relevant 
extract from this section of the Act (sourced from: www.info.gov.za, 2013) is given 
below:
“False, misleading or deceptive representations
41. (1) In relation to the marketing of any goods or services, the supplier must not, by 
words or conduct—
(a) directly or indirectly express or imply a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation concerning a material fact to a consumer;
(b) use exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, or fail to 
disclose a material fact if that failure amounts to a deception; or
(c) fail to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of a consumer, 
amounting to a false, misleading or deceptive representation, or permit or 
require any other person to do so on behalf of the supplier.
…
(3)Without limiting the generality of subsections (1) and (2), it is a false, misleading 
or deceptive representation to falsely state or imply, or fail to correct an apparent 
misapprehension on the part of a consumer to the effect, that—
(a) the supplier of any goods or services has any particular status, affiliation, 
connection, sponsorship or approval that they do not have;
(b) any goods or services—
(i) have ingredients, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, 
benefits, qualities, sponsorship or approval that they do not have  are 
of a particular standard, quality, grade, style or model;
(ii) are new or unused, if they are not or if they are reconditioned or 
reclaimed, subject to subsection (4);” 
…
The Act also provides for a penalty of up to R1 million for the offences contemplated 
in section 41 above. However, so far this section has not been used to prosecute 
any under-karating offenders. 
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LOOPHOLES IN IMPLEMENTATION AND IN THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT 
ITSELF
SAPS’ statistics and anecdotal evidence show that crime related to precious metal is 
significant in South Africa. Illegal mining and trading of gold and platinum exceeds 
R5 billion (Institute for Security Studies, 2010). Most of this amount of R5 billion is 
due to illegal mining, which can range from 8 tons to 16 tons a year. However, it 
must be noted that the Precious Metals Act, 2005 was not designed to control mining 
of precious metals. This is done through the Mineral & Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 2002; however, some say the provisions in the Act are not 
adequate to control illegal mining of gold and platinum in South Africa. The 
Department of Mineral Resources, custodian of the Mineral & Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, however counters this by saying that illegal mining like anything 
illegal is a crime, and all crime should be dealt with by the crime fighting agencies 
namely the South African Police Services (SAPS), The Hawks (DPCI, which stands 
for Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation) and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA). 
Nevertheless one can conclude that SAPS, the other law enforcement agencies and 
the SADPMR are behind the curve in fighting crime relating to precious metal. Their 
only saving grace is that it would be a lot worse if there were no controls at all. 
ILLEGAL MINING AND CONTROLS IN THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT AND 
MPRDA
ILLEGAL MINING AND HOW IT OCCURS
Illegal mining, as the name implies, is mining without the required authorisation in 
terms of legislation, which in South Africa means mining without a mining right or 
permit issued in terms of the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
2002. It is regarded as the biggest problem in the South African precious metals 
industry (in particular the gold mining industry) and the problem has existed as long 
as there has been legislation regulating mining in South Africa (1909 – Van der 
Schyff, 2012). 
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It is estimated that between 8 and 15 tons per annum (Chamber of Mines, 2014; 
Institute of Security Studies, 2009; Department of Mineral Resources, 2014, South 
African Police Services, 2014) of gold valued at between R3 billion to R7 billion are 
mined illegally in South Africa. Due to the size of the problem, illegal mining was 
declared a priority crime in South Africa in 2009, joining copper theft which also costs 
the country billions of Rands. 
Illegal mining is driven by poverty, unemployment, and the large numbers of illegal 
immigrants in South Africa. About 70% of all illegal miners arrested are illegal 
immigrants, chiefly from Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Chamber of Mines, 
2014). Illegal miners earn as little as R800 to a R1 000 a month for a few grams of 
illegally mined gold in abandoned mines (Maseko, 2014). However, in the hotspots 
such as in Welkom and the East Rand, the quantities can rise to tens of kilograms 
per month. Most of this illegal gold is melted down into small pieces of gold or 
consolidated into small bars which are then traded by criminal syndicates, and finally 
laundered via refineries (Dixon, 2014). The ultimate beneficiaries of illegally mined 
gold are most often well-organised international criminal syndicates (Dixon, 2014). 
The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (popularly referred to as the Hawks) 
has found that illegal mining has a complex five-tiered crime syndicate hierarchy 
(see figure below; Source: Van Dyk, 2014). 
Figure 4.1: The illegal mining criminal syndicate five-tiered hierarchy
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At the first level is the individual illegal miner which could be an illegal immigrant, a 
former mine employee or an existing mine employee. These are the people who do 
the physical mining. Illegal miners are often heavily armed and possess explosives, 
making them dangerous to confront. Illegal miners use chemicals, commonly
mercury, to crudely refine the product to about 70% purity.  At the second level is the 
group or gang behind the individual illegal miner which sometimes has arrangements 
with shift managers and security guards within the mining company. These gangs 
provide the individual illegal miners with food and water, and exorbitantly-priced 
luxuries which can include cigarettes, alcohol and even prostitutes. At the third level 
is the local criminal syndicate which can include refining licence, beneficiation 
licence or jeweller’s permit holding individuals and companies. Such licences and 
permits are issued by the South African Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator in 
terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005. See note below on why this happens. At the 
fourth level is the exporter of the illegally mined gold, which is often an Export 
Licence -holding company licensed to export by the South African Diamond & 
Precious Metals Regulator. Level five, the top of the pyramid, is occupied by 
international buyers. Levels 3 to 5 rarely handle the product, but are usually involved 
in devising and executing plans to get the product out of the country (Chamber of 
Mines, 2014). These syndicates are well organised and professionally operated. 
Figure 4.2: Illegal miner’s access point via abandoned mine shaft
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Illegal mining takes place in operating mines and abandoned mines. Illegal miners 
gain access to underground mining areas in various ways, including using explosives 
to blast open concrete seals of surface shaft entries, going down ventilation shafts, 
or bribing their way into existing mine entrance (Chamber of Mines, 2014). Usually 
illegal miners spend long periods of time underground due to the difficulty of getting 
there. They are supplied with food and drinks by existing miners who smuggle such 
in exchange for lucrative amounts of money. Illegal miners also steal explosives, 
diesel, copper cables and other equipment from mines. They also make illegal 
electricity connections from the mines electricity infrastructure. Such interruptions to 
the mine’s electricity supply can create significant risks to the mines ventilation 
systems underground and the ability to hoist persons from underground.  Illegal 
mining therefore also endangers the lives of mine employees and illegal miners are 
sometimes trapped underground and have to be rescued by mine rescue services. 
From time to time illegally miners also lose their lives during significant seismic 
events and underground fires. 
Figure 4.3: Illegal miner underground
WHY ARE PRECIOUS METALS TARGETED?
Obviously, precious metals are targeted because of their high value. However, illegal 
mining and theft of PGMs is much lower than that of gold in South Africa. The 
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Institute for Security Studies (2009) estimated illegally mined and stolen PGMs at 
about R50 million per year from the period 1999 to 2004. The main reason for this is 
that there are considerably more abandoned and operating gold mines in vast areas 
in the Witwatersrand, Free State and Barberton. Secondly, gold can be processed to 
a crudely pure form by simple chemistry such as through the use of mercury unlike 
PGMs which require complex chemistry. Gold can also be laundered much more 
easily through the numerous gold refineries in South Africa and internationally. More 
importantly, with PGMs, it is more of a theft problem than an illegal mining problem. 
The theft of platinum-group metals occurs above ground during one of the extraction 
processes (Coetzee and Horn, 2006). 
HOW IS ILLEGAL MINING BEING FOUGHT 
Currently, illegal mining in operating gold and platinum mines is being fought by mine 
security personnel and the South African Police Services. Arrests are made 
frequently, but illegal miners, including illegal immigrants often return to illegal mining 
after release or attempted deportation efforts. In abandoned mines, the DMR is 
involved with sealing of entry points (holes and shaft entries), although as mentioned 
earlier, illegal miners employ explosives to blast open such seals. 
Ghana which also has an illegal mining problem has used three main approaches to 
combat illegal mining: formalisation, military intervention and alterative livelihood 
projects (Banchirigah, 2007). Formalisation is not an option in South Africa, as illegal 
mining is taking place on already operating mines, and in abandoned mines the 
resource is not suitable for formalised mining and it also presents safety and 
environmental risks. The mining companies in South Africa oppose illegal mining on 
their properties. Alternative livelihood projects are possible, but one has to note that 
this is complicated by the fact that most illegal miners are illegal immigrants. Mining 
companies in South Africa, such as AngloGold Ashanti prefer to invest in community 
development (social and economic) projects. Military intervention is the best option 
for South Africa because of the limited resources of the South African Police Service 
and the fact that illegal miners are very well armed and extremely dangerous. It goes 
without saying that more effective control of South Africa’s borders is also required 
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because illegal metal continues to leave and enter South Africa’s borders as do 
illegal immigrants. 
THE LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS: THE MINERAL & PETROLEUM RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT ACT
Illegal Mining is proving difficult to control due to the limited resources at the disposal 
of law enforcement agencies, such as the police, immigration/border control and 
prosecuting authorities. Moreover, it is believed that there are also legislative 
impediments which impact on effectively addressing illegal mining. There are 
omissions and loopholes in legislation that present challenges in implementing 
legislation effectively to combat illegal mining and trading. There is a need to 
strengthen legislation to tackle the problem of illegal mining. There is also a debate 
as to whether there is any legislation that specifically controls illegal precious metal 
mining: Does the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 control 
illegal mining or does the Precious Metals Act, 2005 control everything related to 
precious metals? Do any of these pieces of legislation have adequate controls to 
combat illegal mining?
It is argued that the legislation that deals with mining should be the one that should 
also deal with combatting illegal mining. It is proposed that the problem of illegal 
mining should be controlled at source. Once gold mined illegally gets to 
refiners/traders, it is difficult, although not impossible (but acutely constrained by 
resource implications), to trace its source.  The legislation that controls mining and 
prospecting in South Africa, the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
2002 (MPRDA) should have had as one of its chief objectives the control of illegal 
mining and prospecting. While Section 2 of the MPRDA provides for the objectives of 
the Act, and stipulates equitable access, socio-economic and sustainable 
development issues, it does not include the control of or combating of illegal mining 
and prospecting. This omission is conspicuous despite section 5(4)(b) of the Act 
containing the explicit prohibition that no person may prospect or mine without a 
prospecting right, mining right or mining permit, as the case may be. 
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Section 91 of the MPRDA provides powers to any person (including the Regional 
Manager of the DMR in the various provinces and officers of the DMR) authorised by 
the Minister to conduct inspections and investigation in any area where prospecting 
or mining is taking place, under the authority of a warrant, to ensure that the 
provisions of the Act are not being contravened. This section also provides the 
authorised person powers to obtain evidence, seize any material, document or data 
and take samples of any material for testing and analysis. Therefore “police” powers 
can be given to certain Managers and officials of the DMR to police the provisions of 
the Act including ensuring prospecting and mining is carried out with the relevant 
right or permit and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and conditions of the 
right or permit. A corollary of this is that illegal mining and prospecting should be 
policed by the DMR. For this to happen, there needs to be greater emphasis placed 
on this aspect of regulation of the industry, and the capacity of the DMR needs to be 
strengthened at the provincial level to enable the implementation of sections 91 and 
92 of the MPRDA (sections dealing with inspections to ensure compliance with the 
Act). 
Section 98 of the MPRDA, which deals with offences does include an offence for 
contravening or failure to comply with section 5(4) (which includes prohibition against 
mining or prospecting without the relevant right or permit) and this offence carries the 
maximum penalty of a fine of R100 000 and/or up to two years in imprisonment.  Be 
that as it may, for a few reasons, mainly the lack of capacity and the relevant skills, 
the DMR has not performed the task of combating illegal mining adequately. In fact, 
some senior managers of the DMR have in some fora distanced themselves from 
this function – stating that illegal mining is a crime and is a matter for the police. 
Tseoute (2011), a Manager in the Mine Health & Safety Division of the DMR made 
such a statement for example. 
It is proposed that illegal mining can be controlled, but it requires the DMR's on-the-
ground and daily involvement in enforcing the provisions of the MPRDA together with 
support from the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA). Amendments to the Act and Regulations under the Act, setting out 
more clearly the responsibilities of the DMR especially with a view to practical 
implementation are also necessary. 
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PROVISIONS IN THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT THAT ASSIST IN CONTROLLING 
ILLEGAL MINING AND TRADING
It should be pointed out here that the Precious Metals Act, 2005 does not control 
mining of precious metals. However, there are a few provisions relating to holders of 
mining rights or permits, or Producers as they are referred to in the Act. A Producer 
(miner) is one of the persons that is allowed to be in possession of unwrought or 
semi-fabricated precious metal if such metal was mined by the Producer. A Producer 
is also allowed to sell/transfer unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal mined by 
that Producer. For this reason, Producers are also required in terms of the Act to 
register with the South African Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator (SADPMR) to 
allow for the monitoring of sales and the purchasers of such metal (who need to 
have a licence to buy unwrought precious metal). This is monitoring is done through 
the requirement for Producers to submit a register of transaction of all unwrought 
precious metal sold/transferred on a quarterly basis. 
In addition to the above, there are three main provisions in the Precious Metals Act, 
2005 that assist in controlling illegal mining and trading. The most import of these are 
the provisions that controls possession of unwrought and semi-fabricated precious 
metal. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act restrict possession of unwrought and semi-
fabricated precious metal to a Refining Licence holder, Authorised Dealer, Producer 
(who as mined that precious metal), holder of a Precious Metals Certificate, holder of 
a Special Permit (for scientific purposes), holder of a Beneficiation Licence and 
holder of a Jeweller’s Permit. These provisions relating to possession are used to 
prosecute cases against illegal miners if they are caught in possession of unwrought 
precious metal. Illegal Miners are sometimes not found in possession of unwrought 
precious metal, as they discard any such material before being confronted by the 
police or mine security personnel. 
The second provision in the Precious Metals Act that assist in controlling illegal 
mining, is section 22 of the Act, which provides that any Producer or any person that 
imports precious metal must submit to the Forensics Science Laboratory of the of the 
South African Police Services such specimens of any precious metal produced or 
imported by him or her. The Forensics Science Laboratory is required in terms of this 
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section to create and maintain a geochemical database of the precious metal -
containing specimens from different provenances (different mines, shafts of mines, 
refineries, smelters etc.). This provision in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 is the only 
such known provision in legislation, in the world. It allows for profiling of gold from 
different sources and PGMs from different sources and smelters/refineries, which in 
turn allows for illegal or stolen metal to be identified and returned to the rightful 
owner. This is commonly referred to as fingerprinting of precious metal. Gold and 
PGM profiling has helped the police to convict persons caught with stolen metal, and 
metal has been returned to mine owners (Dixon, 2014). The technique works with a 
90% success rate. If metals from different sources are physically mixed, the different 
metals can be separated out, but if its mixed chemically, such as gold melted 
together, gold from different sources can lose their characteristic fingerprint of origin 
(Dixon, 2014). 
The gold fingerprinting technique utilises laser ablation inductively coupled plasma 
mass spectrometry (LA-ICPMS) in conjunction with a data processing model to 
generate profiles corresponding to minor and trace element distribution in gold
(Grigorova, et.al., 1998). These profiles are unique for each individual source of mine 
gold, which makes provenance discrimination possible. The generation of gold 
fingerprint profiles for about 85% of South African gold mines and larger mines in 
some African countries (including Ghana, Mozambique, Mali, Zimbabwe, Tanzania & 
Zambia) has led to the creation of the South African Gold Bullion Databank 
(Grigorova, et.al., 1998). 
PGM profiling is based on the principal that PGMs from different sources have 
different ratios of Pt, Pd and Rh in particular. In general, PGM mines in South Africa 
(mining the Bushveld Complex) have a high Pt/Pd ratio relative to other sources 
such as Russia, which have high Pd/Pt ratios. 
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Figure 4.4: Platinum-group element ratios plotted on a ternary diagram
Rhodium is also higher in South African mine platinum. Plotting a ternary diagram 
(see Figure above) of the relative concentrations of Pt, Pd, and Rh allows for 
discrimination of the different provenances of PGM beneficiation products 
(Schouwstra, 2014). 
The third provision in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 that assists with combatting 
illegal mining and trading, is the requirement for all holders of licences and permits 
issued in terms of the Act, to submit registers (to the SADMR) of transaction of all 
precious metal bought, sold or worked with. Theoretically this allows for anomalous 
transactions and illegal transactions to be identified by cross-checking of 
transactions between buyer and seller. Such registers have been used as court 
evidence for the prosecution of a number of illegal mining and trading cases. 
Despite these controls in the Precious Metals Act, 2005, illegal trading of precious 
metals does continue to take place. This is because illegal transactions are not 
recorded in registers (or disguised as scrap jewellery), and illegal metal is apparently 
processed secretly - usually after working hours. In addition, although an applicant 
for a licence or permit is required to provide certain documents attesting to being fit 
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and proper (such as police clearance, tax clearance and technical ability), the 
applicant can sometimes be a front for criminals. 
THE PRECIOUS METALS ACT: CONTROLS ON ILLICIT TRADE
The Precious Metals Act, 2005 has a few important provisions to control the illicit 
trade. The most important provisions which also form the crux of the Act are the 
prohibitions relating to acquisition, possession or disposal of unwrought and semi-
fabricated precious metal (sections 4 and 5). Acquisition, possession or disposal of 
unwrought and semi-fabricated precious metal is restricted to:
(a) the holder of a Refining Licence;
(b) an Authorised Dealer;
(c) a Producer (miner who has mined such metal in accordance with a mining 
right or permit);
(d) the holder of a Precious Metals Certificate;
(e) the holder of a Special Permit (for scientific purposes);
(f) the holder of a Precious Metal Beneficiation Licence; and
(g) the holder of a Jeweller’s Permit. 
The prohibition against possession of unwrought/semi-fabricated precious has been 
used to successfully prosecute many cases involving illegal mining or illegal trade 
where the transgressor was caught in possession of such metal.  
Note that all the licences and permits (except the Authorised Dealer and Precious 
Metals Certificate) are to authorise a specific business i.e., refining, scientific or lab 
work, fabrication of products or jewellery making. The Authorised Dealer is 
authorised, not by the SADPMR but by the Reserve Bank to deal in foreign 
exchange, gold or platinum. For this reason it is usually only registered banks that 
can apply to be registered as an Authorised Dealer.  The Precious Metals Certificate 
is not meant for dealing, but for either a once off or temporary (less than 3 month 
period) purchase or sale. One cannot use it for both purchase and sale as it will 
amount to dealing. Dealing in precious metals is restricted to Authorised Dealers 
(Banks) in the Act. No other licensee is allowed to deal. 
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The Precious Metals Act, 2005 also makes provision for an Import Permit to import 
unwrought and semi-fabricated precious metals. This permit, issuable by the 
SADPMR, can only be applied for by an existing holder of a licence or permit such 
as a refiner importing precious metal-bearing material for refining, an Authorised 
Dealer importing for the purpose of bullion dealing, a laboratory importing for 
scientific work or a beneficiator importing metal for fabricating products.  The Act 
makes provision for a member of the South African Police Service or an Inspector of 
the SADPMR to inspect imports. 
The Act makes provision for an Export Approval to export any unwrought or semi-
fabricated precious metal subject to the promotion of equitable access to, and local 
beneficiation of such metals. The Export Approval is issued by the SADPMR after 
consultation with National Treasury. In the case of this Approval too, only an existing 
licence or permit holder (Producer, Authorised Dealer, Refiner or Beneficiator) 
qualifies to apply. 
Section 13 of the Act stipulates that no person may transport or convey any semi-
fabricated or unwrought precious metal outside the boundaries of any mine, works or 
other property or place where such metal is mined, refined or worked with, unless he 
or she is in possession of the prescribed documentation.  The documentation 
includes a waybill with prescribed information such as the sender’s and recipient’s 
details (including licence and contact numbers), the contents of the parcel/shipment, 
invoice number and physical address of both parties. This serves as proof of a 
legitimate transport from licensee to licensee for business purpose for which the 
licensee is authorised. 
Section 15 of the Act makes provision for a register of transactions to be kept and 
submitted periodically by licence and permit holders. The licensee or permit holder is 
required to record immediately upon conclusion of each (purchase or sale) 
transaction –
(a) the date of the transaction;
(b) the names and addresses of the parties to the transaction;
(c) the nature and mass of the material or the mass of the precious metal which 
is the subject of the transaction; and
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(d) the price paid or received. 
These registers must be submitted to the SADPMR every quarter of a year. Their 
purpose is to allow the SADPMR to monitor transactions (cross check between 
buyer and seller) and compile statistics on trade and beneficiation. However because 
of the number and volume of transactions, the SADPMR cannot cope with capturing 
and captures only a small percentage of registers submitted. 
Sections 16 to 18 provide the police with powers to inspect premises of licence 
holders, search such premises and seize any precious metal or documents relating 
to suspected illegal activity in connection with such metals. The Act also makes 
provisions for inspectors of the SADPMR to conduct routine inspections to ensure 
licensees are adhering to licence conditions. 
Section 22 of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 (titled: Database for precious metals) 
provides that any producer (miner) or any person who imports precious metal must 
submit to the Forensics Science Laboratory of the South African Police Services 
specimens of any precious metal produced or imported as prescribed. This allowed 
the Forensics Science Laboratory to create a geochemical fingerprinting database of 
precious metal from the different mines, which in turn allows for the maintenance and 
augmentation of that database. This provision in legislation is the only one of its kind 
in the world and has been used in court cases to successfully prosecute many cases 
involving illegal mining and theft of gold and platinum-group metals from South 
African mines. However, the Act does not require specimens of exports of unwrought 
and semi-fabricated precious metal which is a loophole that is exploited by dishonest 
refiners and criminal elements. 
While the fingerprinting database for precious metals is a valuable tool, the 
Forensics Science Laboratory has a huge backlog of samples that have not yet been 
analysed. Moreover, the organisation also suffers from a lack of human resources 
with the specialised skills to perform the function of analysing these samples for the 
purpose of fingerprinting and provenance determination. 
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CONTROLS RELATING TO PRECIOUS METAL IN SCRAP FORM
The Second-hand Goods Act, 2009 which was implemented in 2011 is the principal 
legislation dealing with second-hand jewellery, jewellery in scrap form and scrap 
precious metal in general. This piece of legislation is administered by the South 
African Police Services, however as soon as the scrap precious metal is melted it 
becomes unwrought precious metal and this is the jurisdiction of the South African 
Diamond & Precious Metals Regulator in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005. 
This overlap in jurisdictions is problematic, especially since some members of SAPS 
are bitter after some of their functions relating to precious metals were taken over by 
the SADPMR when the Precious Metals Act, 2005 was promulgated in 2007. For the 
scrap precious metal industry to be controlled better, the relationship and the co-
ordination between the South African Police Services and the SADPMR need to 
improve as a matter of urgency The lack of co-ordination and the overlaps between 
the two pieces of legislation are being exploited by criminal syndicates. 
Scrap precious metals are also used to camouflage illegally mined metal 
(laundering) when bought by refiners and beneficiators. This occurs by mixing of 
melted scrap precious metal and alloying with illegally mined metal, or simply as a 
metal accounting disguise (with accompanying fraudulent documentation). For this 
reason, holders of both the Refining Licences issued by the SADPMR and Second-
hand Goods Licences issued by the SAPS are high risk and a joint effort in 
monitoring their activities is crucial. 
ARE THERE CONTROLS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING?
Kumar and McTaggart (2014) found that the global gold market is significantly 
vulnerable to money laundering and terror financing risks as the gold market is still 
cash intensive in all its segments and it is easy for organised crime to harvest gold 
from society using cash generated from criminal activity. Such gold is then refined 
into investment quality and retained to build untraceable wealth. Cash for gold 
businesses are targeted by organised crime for this reason. 
Kumar and McTaggart (2014) made the following finings that are of relevance:
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 Gold value can be transferred easily because of concentrated value (small 
volume has large value;
 The relationship between cash and gold is a close one and the levels of 
interaction are high;
 Gold bullion trading is an established money laundering typology because of 
the ease with which the source of illicit funds can be concealed;
 There are significant informal markets for gold in many jurisdictions;
 Due to the global breadth of the gold industry, international gold trade 
provides a natural platform for the movement of the proceeds and 
instruments of crime;
 Mining jurisdictions have significant issues because of illicit sources of gold, 
and
 Other criminal activity is attracted to areas where illegal mining is conducted
South Africa is particularly vulnerable to money laundering through gold because of 
the documented involvement of organised crime in illegal mining and trading. 
Moreover, there has been a surge in cash-for-gold businesses over the last five 
years.  Despite this, there is no anti-money laundering legislation in South Africa 
specific to the diamond and precious metals trades. This is a serious lacuna. The 
main legislation dealing with money-laundering is the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act, 2001. This Act, fails to take into account the role that diamonds and precious 
metals play in money laundering activities. It is opined that the Financial Intelligence 
Centre does not have the knowledge or expertise to deal with money laundering in 
the diamond and precious metals trades. 
Towards the end of 2014, the Department of State Security was tasked to look into 
this matter and develop guidelines to tackle this issue. These guidelines are currently
in the draft and confidential stage and thus cannot be commented on. However, it is 
a start, and it is hoped that in the next few years this loophole in South Africa will be
addressed. 
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SUGGESTED WAY FORWARD FOR REGULATING THE PRECIOUS METAL 
TRADE IN SOUTH AFRICA
Rightly or wrongly, deregulation of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 cannot begin in the 
next few years. This is because of the problem of illegal mining and trading. 
Therefore, it is likely that regulation will have to get tighter in the next few years 
before deregulation can be phased in. It would only be a brave man that would 
suggest that the provisions in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 discussed above, that 
assist in controlling illegal trading, can be done without at this point in time. However, 
deregulation is inevitable. It is proposed that the problem of illegal mining and trading 
be taken more seriously by government to allow for more resources to be devoted to 
eradicating the problem. It is not impossible for the problem to be virtually eradicated 
over the next two decades if a concerted and collaborative effort is made. In the light 
of this statement, the following suggestions and recommendations are made in the 
context of this Chapter:
(1) It is suggested that control of possession of precious metals as provided for 
in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 be phased out over the next ten to fifteen
years (this is the estimated time it would take to bring problems such as 
illegal mining under control). It is outdated, not fitting in a modern world and 
has not been effective in eradicating the illicit precious metal trade in South 
Africa. Moreover, theft of precious metals, illegal trading and mining are 
crimes like any other crime and should be treated and controlled like other 
crimes are. Motaloata (2014), in fact, believes that preventing citizens from 
being in possession of gold in certain unwrought forms (bars for example) is 
unconstitutional – an infringement of a citizen’s rights. He added that there is 
no need in the modern day and is not the case in other countries. 
In the light of this, further deregulation of the precious metals trade should be 
pursued in the medium term.
(2) Self-regulation of the precious metals trade as exemplified by the World Gold 
Council’s Conflict Free Gold Standard is a better instrument to control the 
trade than statutory controls. 
Statutory controls tend to increase transaction costs, and stifle 
entrepreneurship and job creating activities. 
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(3) It is recommended that South Africa, introduce instead statutory hallmarking 
in lieu of controlling the possession, buying and selling of precious metals, 
together with self-regulation initiatives. This can be done in phases over the 
next ten to fifteen years.
142
CHAPTER FIVE:
SUSTAINABILITY AND MATERIALITY
INTRODUCTION
Sustainability is defined as the capacity to endure. Sustainable Development was 
best defined by the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations on March 20, 
1987: “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
Materiality is an auditing term that relates to the significance/relevance the effect of
an event, amount, transaction or discrepancy has on a company’s value. 
In the mining sector, sustainable development is relatively more important compared 
with most other sectors. This is not only because minerals are non-renewable 
resources but also because of the potentially detrimental impact that mining can 
have on surrounding communities. Mining is also essential for economic 
development and growth and improving the living standards of communities in and 
around mining areas.  However, as is well known, the negative impact of mining on 
local communities (the social impact) and on the environment is well publicised. 
Hence, the recent drive towards responsible mining and mineral processing and for 
corporate social responsibility to focus on mitigating these risks in particular. 
Sustainability becomes a materiality issue for companies when there is a significant 
risk relating to availability of energy, water, other resources, where the toxicity of 
products or manufacturing processes present risks in the supply chain, and where 
climate shifts can disrupt the availability of raw materials and threaten the well-being 
of employees and customers (Makover, 2012).  Sustainability reporting is an 
important communication tool for achieving the social licence to operate which 
makes current and future projects possible, thus facilitating the longevity of an 
organisation. 
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The area that has received the most publicity is the disclosure and management of 
climate impacts. David Gardiner & Associates (2012) believe that this area will be 
one of the major materiality issues for many companies in the coming years. The 
consultancy suggests that almost every sector of an economy will face risks from the 
short and long-term effects of climate change. Climate change is not just about the 
carbon footprint of companies but other impacts ranging from worker health, safety 
risks, disruptions in transportation routes to fluctuating commodity prices. With 
regard to mining companies, the materiality issues in order of importance are: Local 
Communities, Health and Safety issues, Climate Change and to a lesser extent 
Corruption.
Quantitative information as opposed to qualitative information is becoming essential 
for sustainability reporting, as it’s the best way for the reader such as an investor to 
understand the full impact and implication of Environmental Social Governance 
(ESG) on the company’s triple bottom line. 
KING III AND SUSTAINABLE REPORTING
The King Report on Corporate Governance is a trailblazing code on corporate 
governance in South Africa developed by the King Committee on Corporate 
Governance. Three reports were issued: in 1994 (King I), 2002 (King II), and 2009 
(King III). Compliance with the King Reports is a requirement for companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The King Report on Corporate Governance can 
be described as a comprehensive summation of the best international practices in 
corporate governance (Institute of Directors, 2014). 
King III advocates that all companies produce an integrated report that reports how 
the company has impacted on social and economic life of the community in which it 
operates.  The King III Code on Governance (2009) defines an integrated report as 
"a holistic and integrated representation of the company’s performance in terms of 
both its finance and its sustainability". In Integrated Reporting, the financial report is 
144
not separated from the qualitative impacts made by an organisation on its 
surroundings, people and the planet.
The King III Code recommends that an Integrated Report contain the following 
characteristics, features or content:
■Be an annual report 
■Statutory financial information and sustainability information should be integrated 
■Should have sufficient information to record how the organisation has affected the 
economic life of the community - positively and negatively 
■Should contain forward-looking information - on how the board feels it can enhance 
the positive aspects and negate the negative aspects
■Integrated reporting requires more than just an add-on of sustainability information -
sustainability reporting should be integrated with other aspects of the business 
process and managed throughout the year. Sustainability should be embedded in 
the organisation. 
■Integrated reporting should focus on substance over form. 
■The board's audit committee must establish a formal process of assurance on 
sustainability reporting. It should recommend to the Board the need to engage an 
external assurance provider to provide assurance over material elements of the 
sustainability part of the integrated report. It should oversee sustainability issues in 
the integrated report; ensure the sustainability information is reliable, and that no 
conflicts or differences arise when compared to the financial results.
In the opinion of Cliffe Dekker, Hofmeyr, (2013), King III's requirements are more 
comprehensive and compiling an integrated report requires substantially more effort 
and cost. The integrated report should contain sufficient information to reflect how 
the company has impacted positively and negatively on the economic life of the 
community and the related environmental, social and governance issues. 
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SUSTAINABILITY AND THE VALUE CREATION LINK IN THE MINING SECTOR
It is a well-known fact that in the modern day, most mining takes place in developing 
countries (such as Chile, Zimbabwe, Peru, Ghana and Mali), and often under land 
that has or is being used for agricultural purposes and in some cases in 
environmentally sensitive areas. This makes for a challenging business environment 
and calls for strong management and performance in the social and environmental 
risk management areas.  Faced with this challenge, mining companies were forced 
to confront the link between sustainability and economic performance. One 
consultancy that has done seminal work in the areas of social and environmental 
impact that are most linked to competitiveness is Sustainalytics. Sustainalytics 
(2011) identified a few areas in which mining companies should be proactive in their 
management efforts and transparent disclosures:
 On the social front mining companies should maintain strong relations with 
communities, as it ensures project-level licence to operate, and strong 
relations with employees, avoids labour stoppages and lowers recruitment 
and retention costs. 
 On the Environmental front: it is crucial that water, tailings and climate 
change impacts are managed responsibly by mining companies as they have 
impacts on multiple business drivers including the leveraging of supply and 
demand trends, maintaining access to natural resources, influencing the 
political and regulatory environment, operational efficiency and reputation. 
Sustainalytics (2011) concluded that when an organisation’s most significant 
environmental and social issues are addressed, business value is created. 
MATERIALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF REPORTING
Materiality became a topical issue recently in the context of integrated reporting for 
companies, including mining and mineral processing companies.  GRI - Global 
Reporting Initiative (2013) recommends that relevant (or “material”) topics for a 
reporting organization should include those topics that have a direct or indirect 
impact on an organization’s ability to create, preserve or erode economic, 
environmental and social value for itself, its stakeholders and society at large.
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The Global Reporting Initiative (2013) asserts that as sustainability impacts create 
both opportunities and risks for an organization, the ability of an organization to 
recognize opportunities and risks, and act effectively in relation to them, will 
determine whether the organization creates, preserves or erodes value. However, 
value must be thought of in financial and non-financial terms. 
In financial reporting, materiality is commonly thought of as a threshold for 
influencing the economic decisions of those using an organization’s financial 
statements, essentially investors. GRI suggest that the concept of a threshold is also 
important in sustainability reporting, but it is concerned with a wider range of impacts 
and stakeholders.
SustainabilitySA (2013) suggests that the material corporate risks and opportunities 
across economic, social and environmental spheres (for example, transformation, 
greenhouse gases, black economic empowerment, the impact of HIV/Aids) should 
guide the basic sustainability content of the integrated report, and that his should be 
augmented by considering broader industry issues as well as those raised by 
material stakeholders, which could be local or global in nature.
THE “NO DIRTY GOLD” CAMPAIGN AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO 
SUSTAINABILITY AND MATERIALITY
NGO’s (non-governmental organisations) mentioned below contend that gold mining 
is one of the most destructive activities in the world, and has been linked to grievous 
environmental, social justice, and human rights violations. "Dirty" gold is a reference
made by lobbyists (mainly NGOs) such as Earthworks and Oxfam USA, who aim to 
promote improvements in social and environmental aspects of gold mining (in other 
words, "Sustainable Development").  One of the major problems that has led to the 
“no dirty gold” campaign is the use, by some mining companies, of cyanide in the 
gold extraction process. With the smaller, mainly artisanal miners, mercury, which is 
a highly hazardous substance, is also used to recover gold. 
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While most of the third-party schemes that mining companies currently participate in 
are open to the corporate sector in general, there has been a trend towards the 
development of industry-specific schemes (Brereton, 2002). The most important of 
these is the international Cyanide Management Code which requires mining 
companies to have all their operations that use cyanide to recover gold audited by an 
independent third party. The operations that meet the Code will be certified as 
compliant. This Code can be applied to acid mine drainage in South Africa as well. 
The gold mining industry (represented by larger players) insists it is taking 
Sustainable Development activities very seriously and that there are strict 
regulations and guidelines for mining of gold, and points to the fact that most mining 
companies, especially the larger ones, have robust environmental, social and ethical 
standards and report on these through their annual reports. However, because of the 
high rewards and the fact that gold can still be mined in the most unsophisticated 
manner artisanally makes the industry difficult to regulate. 
In June 2006, a multi-stakeholder group conducted a dialogue in Vancouver to 
discuss options for developing a system of independent 3rd party assurance for 
mining.  As a result of this dialogue, the "Responsible Mining Assurance Initiative" 
was established by a group of mining companies (including: Newmont and 
AngloGold Ashanti), retailers (e.g. Cartier, Tiffany, WalMart and Signet Group), non-
government organisations (e.g. Earthworks, who helped establish the "dirty" gold 
campaign) and trade associations (e.g. Jewelers of America, ICMM and CRJP) to 
further develop options for independent third-party assurance in the mining sector.  A 
coordinating committee drawn from the group facilitated the process of devising 
responsible mining standards and a governance model for the assurance system. 
The seriousness of the environmental and social problems associated with gold 
production has generated an interest in finding alternatives to gold produced using 
harmful practices. This interest has come not only from environmental, human rights 
and social justice groups, but also from jewellery retailers, electronics producers, and 
individual consumers (See Chapter 2). 
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It is believed that some 100 000 consumers want jewellery retailers to stop “dirty 
gold” and have signed a Gold pledge asking retailers to work to ensure that the gold 
in their products was not produced at the expense of local communities, workers, 
and the environment.  Conscious consumers are calling on jewellery and electronics 
retailers to insist that the gold one is buying or selling is responsibly produced. 
All this pressure has played its role in the Responsible Jewellery Council setting up 
the RJC Code of Practices and RJC Certification based on independent, third party 
auditing of Members’ business practices.  RJC membership and certification are a 
means to credibly demonstrate responsible environmental, social and ethical 
performance, according to Michael Rae, RJC’s CEO. 
THE RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL (RJC)
The Responsible Jewellery Council was established in 2005 with the participation of 
major mining and jewellery companies and associations, including Rio Tinto, Tiffany 
& Co, Zale Corporation, Cartier and BHP Billiton. It has more than 450 member 
companies at present. The RJC asserts that buyers of jewellery today are very 
interested in the origin of their jewellery, while banks, insurance companies and the 
government are turning transparency and conflict-free supply of jewellery raw 
materials into one of the mandatory requirements (RJC, 2013). 
It adds that a company’s ability to demonstrate social responsibility of its business is 
needed as much as its financial statements verified by auditors. The Responsible 
Jewellery Council covers all parts of the jewellery supply chain from mine to store, 
has developed standards and provides certification to confirm the compliance of 
companies with social, environmental and ethical standards.  According to its CEO, 
Michael Rae (2013), the RJC is focused on providing its Members with the capacity 
to demonstrate responsible environmental, social and ethical performance, through 
independent third-party certification against the RJC's Code of Practices (CoP). He 
adds that the RJC also offers a Chain-of-Custody standard, applicable to gold and 
platinum group metals, to assist Members seeking to utilise chain-of-custody as a 
voluntary, complementary element to the RJC Member Certification process. 
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One of the criticisms of the RJC is that although it’s meant to be an international 
trade association, the majority of its members are European and North American 
businesses. That said, the number of its members has in fact increased by 20% over 
the past year.  Michael Rae (2013) attributed the growth in the RJC’s membership to 
the recognition by increasing numbers of companies in the international jewellery 
supply chain of the value of RJC membership and certification as a means to 
credibly demonstrate responsible environmental, social and ethical performance to 
their business partners and other stakeholders, e.g. customers, regulators, financial 
institutions, insurers, local communities and NGOs.
FAIRTRADE-FAIRMINED PRODUCER STANDARDS
Another initiative related to the issue of sustainability is the development of the 
Fairtrade & Fairmined standard, by the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) and 
Fairtrade International (FLO), to create market access for gold products that support 
the social, environmental and economic development of Artisanal and Small-scale 
Mining (ASM) communities. The Standard is known as the Fairtrade and Fairmined 
Standard for gold from Artisanal and Small-Scale mining, including associated 
Precious Metals. 
The Standard’s purpose is to create opportunities for economically disadvantaged 
artisanal miners and their communities. In contrast to the Standard discussed above, 
this one is aimed at smaller operators and is also looking at the demand side for 
production. Its ultimate objective is to provide an incentive for organisation and 
formalisation of artisanal and small scale mining (ASM). 
ACID MINE DRAINAGE AND GOLD MINING
Acid mine drainage (AMD) is the flow, or seepage, of polluted water from old mining 
areas such as on the Witwatersrand, which has been (for more than 120 years) and 
is still a gold mining area. This polluted water results from oxidation of sulphide 
minerals mainly pyrite (FeS2) and the creation of SO2 2-ions, caused by exposing 
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rocks containing such minerals to air and water. AMD caused by mining can occur 
within the mine, in waste rock dumps or in tailing dams. 
The sulphides in waste water react with water to produce sulphuric acid. This 
presents serious health risks and has been linked with skin cancer, tumours, liver 
disease, nerve damage, and growth retardation in children
On the Witwatersrand, acid mine drainage has reached a crisis proportions, as 
apparently some mining companies allow acid mine water to flow into streams, dams 
and sources of  groundwater. 
ACID MINE DRAINAGE AND SUSTAINABILITY AND MATERIALITY
For operating gold mines on the Witwatersrand, Acid Mine Drainage is a 
sustainability and materiality issue, especially for those which have been operating 
for a while and have both closed mines and operating ones with numerous tailings 
deposits and dams. This therefore must be a materiality reporting issue for such 
mining companies. This is being done by mining companies on a voluntary basis in 
their sustainability reports, but it would be fair to say there is room for improvement. 
Acid Mine Drainage relates mainly to water use and treatment.
IS REGULATION OF SUSTAINABILITY AND MATERIALITY NECESSARY?
The above discussion has shown that several self-regulation efforts are underway in 
terms of sustainability reporting. This has resulted from pressure exerted by NGOs in 
particular, on companies, especially those in extractive industries like mining.  
As you would expect, some companies have been creative and even innovative in 
this area. The creativity has been aimed at addressing the company’s environmental 
and social issues whilst at the same time creating value for the company in the 
process. This would be the most sought-after solution as Sustainability departments 
in companies had to be boosted in terms of financial and human resources, and 
therefore shareholders would expect that such allocation of resources should 
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translate to value in terms of the triple bottom line. Consultancy, Sustainalytics 
(2011) also provides an advisory service to organisations relating to this area. This of 
course makes business sense, because no company goes into business to spend a 
huge amount of resources just attending to environmental and social issues.  There 
are also efforts to create standards for materiality reporting, although there are as yet 
no international standards. 
IS SELF-REGULATION ENOUGH?
As with any self-regulation on the part of industry, industry only becomes proactive if 
there is a threat to the company. In this regard, the campaigns by NGOs play a 
significant role in bringing about appropriate responses from industry. The “No dirty 
gold” campaign is an excellent example of this. However, one has to ask the 
question: Is self-regulation enough? The answer is similar to other self-regulation 
measures discussed in other chapters of this study: Only larger, well-resourced 
companies especially those operating in the northern hemisphere implement self-
regulations measures adequately. Smaller companies most often do not. This 
implies that sustainability issues are seen as a luxury by small companies. Unless 
these companies start seeing sustainability as critically linked to longevity, they will 
not embrace self-regulation. 
Self-regulation also means that much of what is done is voluntary. This means if the 
company fails to implement the self-regulation measure adequately, there are no 
penalties as such and the company is not in danger of losing its mining licence (in 
the case of mining companies) if it does not implement the self-regulation measure 
satisfactorily. This is especially so in the new concept of sustainability (and 
materiality) reporting. Some may even view it as a nice to have (to stand a stand of 
winning an award for reporting for example) and not compulsory. 
It is also apparent that some companies just make generic, qualitative statements in 
the sustainability report in certain environmental areas such as water management. 
That is why the development of internationally accepted standards for materiality is a 
step in the right direction. 
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Haufler (2013) believes that voluntarily standards have significant positive influences 
on the behaviour of companies and are more flexible and easier to implement than 
government regulation but the problem with them is the often weak enforcement 
mechanisms. She added that some companies seek sources of low-cost production 
which often means countries with weak regulatory standards. 
Brereton (2002) pointed out that traditionally, the mining industry did little to promote 
improved practices across the sector, but more recently, key players in the industry 
have shown willingness to take collective action to improve standards in the sector 
due to the concern that the public image of mining is shaped chiefly by the actions of 
the worst performers in the industry. 
IS THERE A ROLE FOR LEGISLATION IN ENSURING GOLD IS MINED RESPONSIBLY?
It is suggested that there are many efforts, such as the efforts of the Responsible 
Jewellery Council, Responsible Mining Assurance Initiative and the FairMined 
producer initiative, that are promising as far as ensuring gold is mined, traded and 
used responsibly. These systems are not perfect; as the criticism from NGOs attests, 
but these carry promise of evolution in the right direction. 
IS KING III SUFFICIENT TO ENFORCE SUSTAINABILITY (AND MATERIALITY) 
REPORTING?
King III is applicable to all entities, public, private and non-profit. As mentioned in the 
above discussion, King III recommends that organisations produce an integrated 
report instead of an annual financial report and a separate sustainability report and 
that companies create sustainability reports according to the Global Reporting 
Initiative's Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. More importantly, King III advocates 
that all companies produce an integrated report that reports how the company has 
impacted on social and economic life of the community in which it operates.
However, it is important to note that King III is not law. It is actually a collection of 
best practice and it is a set of recommendations for good corporate governance. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that King III is adequate for regulating the precious 
metals industries in South Africa because the requirements of King III have been 
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incorporated into the listing requirements of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
making compliance mandatory for all listed companies. Obviously, the major 
disadvantage is that non-listed companies fall outside the net of this requirement. 
So, one has to ask, should such requirements be enforced by legislation? 
It is suggested that inserting such provisions in regulations would be too onerous, 
especially as it will have to be applied by small companies as well, who already 
complain about being over-regulated in South Africa through the Mineral & 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (including its provisions for a Social 
and Labour Plan), the Precious Metals Act, 2005, and more red tape in other pieces 
of legislation relating to water, air emissions and waste management (National 
Environmental Management Act, 2008 in particular). It could also be prohibitively 
costly for small companies. 
More important to note is the fact that, much of what is in in King III regarding 
sustainability reporting is also incorporated in the relatively new Companies Act, 
2008 and Regulations made in terms of that Act. 
CONCLUSIONS
(1) At this stage the formal and informal regulation of Sustainability and 
Materiality consists of King III and JSE listing requirements, environmental 
legislation (e.g., NEMA), occupational health and safety legislation, precedent 
where companies have been held liable for environmental and health impact 
(e.g., the asbestosis cases) and self-regulation through RJC, etc. 
(2) It can be noted that it is currently a voluntary practice in most countries in the 
world to publish sustainability reports. However, efforts are underway that will 
render the development of some kind of international materiality standard 
inevitable. 
(3) Although there is room for improvement in sustainability reporting in the 
precious metals sector, mining companies have begun to embrace this as a 
must, and not a nice to have. 
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The gold mining industry claims it is taking Sustainable Development 
activities very seriously and that there are strict regulations and guidelines for 
mining of gold, and points to the fact that most mining companies, especially 
the larger ones, have robust environmental, social and ethical standards and 
report on these through their annual reports.
(4) In South Africa, the King III Report on Corporate Governance and the 
Companies Act, 2008 are at this juncture sufficient to regulate sustainability 
reporting. Therefore, it is suggested that precious metals legislation such as 
the Precious Metals Act, 2005 need not tread in this area of regulation. 
(5) Should it be needed, there is also the possibility for sustainability reporting 
through the requirement for holders of mining rights to submit Social & 
Labour Plans (SLPs) in terms of the MPRDA. 
(6) The only areas that could see Regulation, is the area of climate change 
impacts, although this is not the main materiality area for precious metal 
mining companies. 
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CHAPTER SIX:
CALLS FOR GOLD-BACKED CURRENCY (GOLD 
STANDARD)
“Commodities such as gold have a world market that transcends 
national borders, politics, religion, and race. A person may not like 
someone else’s religion, but he’ll accept his gold.”
Robert Kiyosaki
INTRODUCTION
Steve Forbes (2011), the CEO of Forbes Magazine, suggested in June 2011 that the 
USA should return to a gold-backed currency to prevent further debasement of the 
U.S. dollar. The campaign to preserve the value of the U.S. currency and curb the 
Federal Reserve has long been championed by Republican Ron Paul.  In an article 
published on his website entitled "The Keys to Economic Growth", Ron Paul (2012), 
argued that the U.S. economy was in "terrible shape" and that the trillions of dollars 
borrowed and printed by the U.S. government have done nothing to turn things 
around. According to Ron Paul (2012), the U.S. economy cannot be restored, until 
we "prohibit the Treasury and Federal Reserve from essentially creating money and 
credit from thin air." According to Ron Paul (2012), in order to ensure a sound 
currency, the dollar should have its value legitimatized via gold or commodity 
convertibility. However, it should be noted that most Americans believe his proposal 
has very little chance of succeeding. 
SUMMARY: WHAT IS TO BE EXPLORED IN THIS CHAPTER
In this study the impact of a possible return to a gold-backed currency on the 
regulation of the gold industry in South Africa is speculated on and recommendations 
are made for regulation in South Africa, should such a scenario ever materialise. To 
this end, the pros and cons of a return to a gold-backed currency or gold standard 
are first examined.  Secondly, the new phenomenon of cryptocurrency or digital 
currency is also looked at, with particular emphasis on the impact it could have on 
regulation of the gold industry and currency controls. 
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GOLD STANDARD
A gold standard is a monetary system in which the standard economic unit of 
account is based on a fixed quantity of gold (Bordo, 2008).  Essentially, three types 
can be differentiated: specie, exchange, and bullion. In terms of the gold specie 
standard, the monetary unit is associated with the value of circulating gold coins or 
the monetary unit has the value of a certain circulating gold coin, but other coins may 
be made of less valuable metal (Bordo, 2008).  The gold exchange standard usually 
does not involve the circulation of gold coins and its main feature is that the 
government guarantees a fixed exchange rate to the currency of another country that 
uses a gold standard (specie or bullion), regardless of what type of notes or coins 
are used as a means of exchange (Bordo, 2008). This creates a type of gold 
standard, where the value of the means of exchange has a fixed external value in 
terms of gold that is independent of the inherent value of the means of exchange 
itself (Bordo, 2008). Lastly, the gold bullion standard is a system in which gold coins 
do not circulate, but the government authorities agree to sell gold bullion on demand 
at a fixed price in exchange for currency (Bordo, 2008). 
GOLD-BACKED CURRENCY AND HOW IT WORKED
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, gold played a central role in international 
monetary transactions. Gold was used to back currencies; the value of currency was 
determined by its fixed relationship to gold, and gold was used to settle international 
accounts. The gold standard maintained fixed exchange rates, which was seen as 
advantageous because they reduced the risk when trading with other currencies 
(Dick, 2004). 
Imbalances in international trade were theoretically rectified automatically by the gold 
standard (Bank of England, 2011). A country with a deficit would have depleted gold 
reserves and would therefore have to reduce its money supply (Bank of England, 
2011). The resulting fall in demand would reduce imports and the lowering of prices 
would boost exports – in this way the deficit would be rectified. A country 
experiencing inflation would “lose” gold and therefore would have to decrease the 
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amount of money available to spend (Bank of England, 2011). The decrease in the 
amount of money would in effect act to reduce the inflationary pressure. 
HISTORY OF GOLD-BACKED CURRENCY
As of 2013 no country uses a gold standard as the basis of its monetary system, 
although some hold substantial gold reserves (Encyclopedia.com, 2013). The use of 
gold as money began thousands of years ago in Asia Minor (Ancients.info, 2014). 
The gold specie standard arose from the widespread acceptance of gold as currency 
(Lipsey, 1975). Various commodities have been used as money; typically, the one 
that loses the least value over time becomes the accepted form (Bordo et al, 2003). 
During the early and high Middle Ages, the Byzantine gold Solidus, commonly known 
as the Bezant, was used widely throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. 
However, as the Byzantine Empire's economic influence declined, so too did the use 
of the bezant (Lopez,1951).  In its place, European territories chose silver as its 
currency over gold, leading to the development of silver standards.
Silver pennies based on the Roman Denarius became the staple coin of Mercia in 
Great Britain around the time of King Offa, circa CE 757–796 (Keary, 2005). Similar 
coins, including Italian denari, French deniers, and Spanish dineros circulated in 
Europe. Spanish explorers discovered silver deposits at Potosí in Bolivia (1545) and 
in Mexico (1522) during the 16th century (Rothwell, 1893). International trade came 
to depend on coins such as the Spanish dollar, the Maria Theresa thaler, and later, 
the United States trade dollar (Encyclopedia.com, 2013). 
In modern times, the British West Indies was one of the first regions to adopt a gold 
specie standard (Andrei, 2011). Following Queen Anne's proclamation of 1704, the 
British West Indies gold standard was a de facto gold standard based on the 
Spanish gold doubloon (Andrei, 2011). In the year 1717, the master of the Royal 
Mint Sir Isaac Newton established a new mint ratio between silver and gold that had 
the effect of driving silver out of circulation and putting Britain on a gold standard 
(Andrei, 2011). 
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A formal gold specie standard was first established in 1821, when England adopted 
it following the introduction of the gold sovereign by the new Royal Mint at Tower Hill 
in 1816 (Encyclopedia.com, 2013). The United Province of Canada in 1853, 
Newfoundland in 1865, and the USA and Germany (de jure) in 1873 adopted gold. 
The United States used the Eagle as its unit, Germany introduced the new gold 
mark, while Canada adopted a dual system based on both the American Gold Eagle 
and the British Gold Sovereign (Encyclopedia.com, 2013).
Australia and New Zealand adopted the British gold standard, as did the British West 
Indies, while Newfoundland was the only British Empire territory to introduce its own 
gold coin. Royal Mint branches were established in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth for 
the purpose of minting gold sovereigns from Australia's rich gold deposits 
(Encyclopedia.com, 2013).
The gold specie standard came to an end in the United Kingdom and the rest of the 
British Empire with the outbreak of World War I (Encyclopedia.com, 2013). 
GOLD RESERVES HELD BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES
Most countries still value gold as a reserve asset, and purchases by central banks 
continued in 2013 especially by Asian countries and Russia who view that view gold 
as the chief means of diversifying their reserves. 
Table 6.1 below shows gold and other reserves holdings by a selection of countries. 
It is interesting to note in the Table that South Africa only holds about 125 tons of 
gold and this figure has been static for a few years (GFMS, 2012). It would seem 
therefore hat South Africa is not buying gold in the open market or in South Africa 
(from gold mines) these days, and is apparently accumulating US dollars and Euros 
as reserves. 
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Table 6.1- Gold and other reserves held by certain countries as at end of 2013
Source: IMF, 2014
ADVANTAGES OF A GOLD-STANDARD / GOLD BACKED CURRENCY
The last country to back its money with gold was Switzerland (40% of its value until 
1999). There are several advantages of gold to back up a currency. These include 
the following:
(1) As early as the Byzantine Empire gold was used to support fiat currencies.
(2) Gold was used as the world reserve currency through most of the 20th
century. The United States of America, in fact, used it until 1971 when 
President Nixon discontinued it.
(3) One of the advantages of its use, is that it limits the amount of money nations 
are allowed to print – due to the limited gold holdings. The gold advocates 
suggest that a gold standard would prevent a government from being 
unreasonable in its budget, and would not run up large deficits and increase 
a national debt – thereby providing economic stability and growth. 
(4) Gold’s greatest advantage over paper money is its intrinsic value created in 
human society and traditions over thousands of years. 
(5) Gold is and was used to hedge against inflation due to its inherent value and 
due to the fact that it has retained its value over time better than most 
currencies. 
(6) Countries like South Africa that export gold and have significant gold 
reserves see currency strength when the gold price rises. An increase in the 
gold price can thus create a trade surplus. 
COUNTRY
GOLD RESERVES
(tons)
TOTAL RESERVES
(US$ bn)
%
Held in Gold
United States 8 134 448.51 70.2%
Germany 3 387 198.54 66.1%
IMF 2 814 Na na
Italy 2 452 145.74 65.1%
France 2 435 145.16 65.0%
China, PR 1 054 3 880.37 11.0%
South Africa 125 45.0 11%
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(7) Gold prices are sometimes used to measure the value of a local currency.
(8) There is still a strong correlation between the value and strength of certain 
currencies traded on foreign exchanges and the value of gold (Bank of 
England, 2011). Gold will continue to play an integral role in foreign exchange 
markets. Its market is followed by analysts because it can be an indicator of 
the health of international economies. 
(9) Gold was used as a medium of exchange throughout history together or in 
lieu of other minerals, such as silver, salt, and copper (Encyclopedia.com, 
2013). At the beginning of World War I, the warring nations went onto a 
fractional gold standard, inflating their currencies to finance the war effort. 
After World War II, gold was replaced by a system of convertible currency 
with the advent of the Bretton Woods system discussed below 
(Encyclopedia.com, 2013). 
DISADVANTAGES OF A GOLD-STANDARD / GOLD BACKED CURRENCY
The price of gold would have to rise about 25 times in order for the US and British 
governments’ gold assets to equal the supply of gold in circulation. There is therefore 
not enough gold in circulation for a return to the Gold Standard or a gold-backed 
currency. Beside this practical issue, there are other disadvantages of the gold 
standard or a gold-backed currency:
(1) Opponents of the gold standard argue that it would create economic 
instability, induce economic deflation and contraction, and hinder a 
government’s ability to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment 
during recessions and financial crises. 
(2) Gold is a weighty commodity and is far less portable than money.
(3) Gold has to be stored in vaults, and its movement across borders is a 
considerable security and logistical issue 
(4) Many metals can be made to look like gold to the naked eye. These include 
tungsten, lead painted gold in colour or plated with gold.
(5) The purity of gold can be varied by alloying with other metals such as copper. 
(6) Gold does not earn interest like money does.
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(7) The purity of gold has to be tested in a lab or by an instrument like a portable 
XRF analyser, and therefore cannot be verified as simply as checking the 
authenticity of a bank note.
(8) Gold is a commodity and is used in jewellery and industrial applications, thus 
complicating its use as money. 
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
The Bretton Woods system was a landmark system for monetary and exchange rate 
management established in July 1944 through an agreement developed at the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire (Investopedia, 2014). The main goal of the system was to achieve 
exchange rate stability. 
The major outcomes of the Bretton Woods conference included the formation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Most relevant to this study, it also led to the introduction of an 
adjustable pegged foreign exchange rate system. Its rationale was a regulated 
market with tight controls in which currencies were pegged to gold and the IMF was 
given the authority to intervene when an imbalance of payments arose
(Investopedia, 2014). One of the most important proposals of the Bretton Woods 
conference was that currencies should be convertible for trade and other current 
account transactions (Investopedia, 2014). 
After the end of World War II in 1945, Europe and the rest of the world embarked on 
an extensive period of reconstruction and economic development to recover from the 
destruction caused by the war. Although gold initially served as the base reserve 
currency, the US dollar gained momentum as an international reserve currency that 
was linked to the price of gold. 
The US dollar was in fact better than gold as it earned interest and it was more 
flexible than gold. It thus became what is known today as the “reserve currency”. 
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Other countries would peg their currencies to the US dollar to restore convertibility; 
buy and sell US dollars to keep market exchange rates within 1% of parity 
(Prestowitz, 2003). In this way the US dollar took over the role that gold played under 
the gold standard in the international financial system. 
Bretton Woods established a system of payments based on the US dollar, in which 
all currencies were defined in relation to the dollar, itself convertible into gold, and 
“as good as gold”. The Bretton Woods system (1944-1971) came to an end when the 
United States stopped allowing dollars to be converted into gold. The “gold window” 
was shut in 1971 and foreign governments could no longer trade dollars for gold at 
$35/ounce.  The US dollar then became a fiat currency and the world currency, the 
standard, to which every other currency was pegged. Most international transactions 
in the modern day are denominated in US dollars. 
NOTE ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAND
In the South Africa of the 19th century, gold was actually money (Becker, 2014). 
During the period of the Gold Standard from 1814 to 1914, the pound sterling was by 
legal definition, a certain quantity of gold (a little over seven grams of gold). It was an 
actual coin with gold content (Becker, 2014). In 1817, the sovereign was introduced. 
Struck in 22-carat gold, it contained 7.3g of gold and was equivalent to one British 
pound (Becker, 2014). 
The South African pound was equal to the British pound, which equalled 7.3g of gold 
or 113.1g of silver. For over a century, money was a certain weight of gold.  Banks in 
South Africa issued South African pounds freely to the extent they had gold in their 
vaults to make good on their “Promise to pay” the equivalent grams of gold or silver. 
The South African Reserve Bank was established in 1921, and it also introduced 
bank notes that were a claim on the pound sterling (Becker, 2014).  The South 
African pound endured from 1825 to 1961, linked to the value of the pound sterling 
which in turn was lined to a certain weight of gold or silver. The current South African 
currency, the Rand, was introduced in 1961 (Reserve Bank, 2014). After 1961, the 
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Reserve Bank could print as much Rands as it thought appropriate and the amount 
of Rands in circulation increased steadily. 
Figure 6.1: “Promise to pay the bearer on demand at their office in Durban, 
ten shillings."
(Source: banknotes.com, 2014)
An ounce of gold was worth 4.50 South African pounds from 1821 to 1914 (Becker, 
2014), and following the debasement of paper money by central banks during World 
War I and II, the South African price of gold was fixed at about R30 in 1971. Since 
the delinking of bank notes from gold in 1971, money printing became the order of 
the day (see image of an old South African bank note above). 
The link to gold was phased out and the South African Rand became a fully-fledged 
fiat money. In 1997, the Reserve Bank saw no need to buy all gold mined in the 
country, and from 1998 allowed gold miners to market their gold privately, either 
though the Rand Refinery or independently. 
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COUNTRIES OR STATES USING OR CONTEMPLATING INTRODUCING GOLD 
AS LEGAL TENDER
Despite the disadvantages of gold as money or legal tender, some countries and 
states still have legal tender gold coins while some states have even introduced 
legislation that allows gold to be used as money. These are discussed below by 
country and/or state. 
Oklahoma City, Arizona, and Utah in the USA
In March 2014, the Oklahoma State Senate passed a Bill (Senate Bill 862 – SB862) 
that would legalise gold and silver as legal tender. Currently, gold and silver coins 
issued by the US government are legal tender in the State of Oklahoma, but a 
person may not compel another person to tender or accept such gold or silver coins, 
except as agreed upon by contract (Greene, 2014). If the Bill ever becomes law, 
Oklahoma could become another State to recognise gold and silver as legal tender 
authorised for payments, following the Arizona senate which passed a similar Bill in 
2013 (Greene 2014) and Utah in early 2014. In 2014, the governor of Utah signed a 
Bill that made gold bullion and silver bullion legal tender. The Utah Sound Money Act 
was designed to take on the fiat money system, which is the printed money such as 
the US dollar, backed only by the promise of the government (Utahsoundmoney.org, 
2014). While US States are not allowed to create their own currency under the US 
Constitution, they are allowed to use gold bullion and silver bullion as legal tender.  
The Utah law states that gold bullion and silver bullion coins issued by the US Mint 
can be used as payment with any merchant in the state of Utah for the purchase of 
all goods and services.  
These Bills in the US were the result of the massive debt crisis and general 
economic problem in the US, in 201318. Conservative politicians in States such as 
Arizona feared that the US was headed for financial ruin and that the US economy 
was going to collapse resulting in the debasement of the US dollar. Distrust in 
government-backed money by conservatives drove the move towards using “real 
18 Since elections much of this talk for gold as money has subsided. The debt crisis has been averted 
for now
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money” i.e., gold and silver, as legal tender. As is well known, when the US dollar 
declines, gold prices rise. 
Australia
The Australian Constitution, section 115(4) states: “A State shall not coin money, nor 
make anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts”. Under 
this provision, the Perth Mint still produces gold and silver coins. 
Figure 6.2: Australian gold nugget one ounce coin
(Source: Australian Mint, 2014)
In Australia, the Australian Gold Nugget gold coin (see image above) and the 
Australian Silver Kookaburra silver coin enjoy legal tender status but are almost 
never circulated or used in the payment of debts. 
South African gold coins
Through the Reserve Bank Act, 1990, gold coins such as Krugerrands (see image 
below) and the Protea and Natura series are declared as legal tender but these are 
never used to buy goods and services. The amounts printed on the face of the coins 
are in fact nominal values (R2 or R5) and are a fraction of the intrinsic (gold) value of 
the coin. 
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Figure 6.3: Krugerrand gold coin
(Source: RandRefiney.com, 2014)
Figure 6.4: Protea series gold and silver coins
(Source: SAMint.co.za, 2014)
BITCOIN
What is bitcoin?
Bitcoin is referred to as a cryptocurrency or digital currency (Joyner, 2014), although 
governments, especially the United States and China, refuse to accept it as a 
currency. In layman’s terms it can be described as a virtual currency, with 
acceptance by some, especially tech-savvy persons or those that are simply anti-
establishment (see image of Bitcoin logo below). It is in a sense an internet protocol. 
There are many users of Bitcoin in the United States despite the government there 
not accepting its currency status. 
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Kostakis and Giotitsas (2014) define Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer payment system 
introduced as open-source software in 2009 by developer Satoshi Nakamoto. The 
payments in the system are recorded in a public ledger using its own unit of account, 
which is also called Bitcoin. The Bitcoin system has no central repository and no 
single administrator. As bitcoins can be transferred directly from one person to 
another they are sometimes described as digital cash (Murphy, 2013). 
Figure 6.5: Bitcoin logo on a sign for its acceptance
(Source: Bitcoin.com, 2014)
Bitcoin Mining is the process of adding transaction records to Bitcoin's public ledger 
of past transactions which is called the block chain (Kroll et al, 2013). The block 
chain serves to confirm transactions to the rest of the network as having occurred. 
Bitcoin nodes use the block chain to distinguish legitimate Bitcoin transactions from 
attempts to re-spend coins that have already been spent elsewhere.
Bitcoin mining is deliberately designed to be resource-intensive and difficult so that 
the number of blocks found each day by miners remains steady (Kroll et al, 2013). 
Individual blocks must contain a proof of work to be considered valid, and this proof 
of work is verified by other Bitcoin nodes each time they receive a block. Bitcoin uses 
what is known as the “hashcash” proof-of-work function (Kroll et al, 2013).
The main purpose of Bitcoin mining is to allow Bitcoin nodes to reach a secure, 
tamper-resistant consensus. It is also the mechanism used to introduce Bitcoins into 
the system: Miners are paid any transaction fees as well as a "subsidy" of newly 
created coins (Kroll et al, 2013). This serves both the purpose of disseminating new 
coins in a decentralized manner as well as motivating people to provide security for 
the system.
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Besides through “mining”, bitcoins can be obtained in exchange for fiat (paper) 
money, products and services. Users can send and receive bitcoins electronically for 
an optional transaction fee using wallet software on a personal computer or mobile 
device (Kroll, et al, 2013). 
Bitcoin as a form of payment has grown in recent years, because it is digital, and 
fees are lower (The Economist, 2014). Fundamentally, however, it does not conform 
to the widely used definition of money, which is a thing that is a store of value, a 
medium of exchange, and a unit of account. It can qualify as a medium of exchange 
(albeit limited) however, because of its significant volatility it does not pass as a store 
of value. Lastly, although it’s a unit of account in the block chain, it is not used as a 
unit of account outside it (The Economist, 2014). 
Should Bitcoin be backed by gold?
Some commentators, including Jim Rickards (2013) propose that Bitcoin should be 
backed by gold, so that it is backed by something tangible. Others believe this would 
be defeating its purpose, because Bitcoin is supposed to be the digital equivalent of 
gold and backing it with anything tangible would serve to centralize it, which is 
against the protocol of the Bitcoin.  This therefore seems unlikely at present, but this 
could change in future if the Bitcoin starts to falter by becoming unsustainably 
volatile.
E-GOLD: NoFiatCoin
E-gold is a cryptocurrency that takes the Bitcoin concept a step further by being 
backed with gold, and addresses the main concern of not being backed by anything 
“real”. 
NoFiatCoin (XNF) is a digital currency backed by gold and silver bullion. The 
rationale for it is to combine the benefits of digital currency with the accepted security 
of gold and silver. 
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Figure 6.6: E-Gold logo
(Source: e-gold.com, 2014)
About a third of every batch of XNF released into the market is backed by gold and 
silver coins (E-gold.com, 2014). Transactions occur through Ripple – an open 
payment system. One can create a Ripple wallet and buy XNF with US dollars 
through Bitstamp, or exchange Bitcoins for XNF through Ripple (XNFTrading.com, 
2014). 
Advantages of E-gold and its potential impact
E-gold also has an advantage because it is easier to transfer than the commodity 
gold itself. It also addresses the store of value concern of the Bitcoin but it is facing 
legal issues, so has not achieved appeal sufficiently yet.
If E-gold was to succeed, it will obviously be good for gold, as it will create demand 
for gold which will have to be stored in an allocated account to back the currency. 
This will be good for gold miners, as it will lead to rising prices and a new demand 
component within the investment sector. 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE GOLD STANDARD AND A GOLD-BACKED 
CURRENCY
The above discussion shows that calls for a return to the Gold Standard, especially 
in the United States, arose during the time when the debt crisis in the United States 
reached a stage where government in the US actually shut down. No agreement 
could be reached at that time on raising the debt ceiling which stood at a staggering 
$17 trillion in early 2013. 
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When an agreement was reached on raising the debt ceiling in the US, such calls 
subsided. However, in 2012 and 2013 several States in the US had introduced bills 
in the Senate or were debating the introduction of such legislation. It was apparent 
that the States that did managed to do this because of impetus from certain 
conservative politicians in those States. These conservative politicians believed that 
the US economy would collapse, and the US dollar would eventually lose its value.  
Of course this has not happened thus far, but it is an almost certainty that the calls 
for a return to a Gold Standard would re-emerge if US debt spirals out of control. 
It is also clear from the discussion above that a return to the Gold Standard would 
not be practical due to the limited amount of gold in circulation. However a gold-
backed currency is not impossible in the future if the US economy weakens 
significantly to affect the US dollar. This would lead to dramatic rise in the price of 
gold which has been capped by the success of the US dollar as a reserve currency. 
It can also be concluded from the discussion above that world wars were good for 
gold and it is quite probable that a third world war, if such ever occurs, could return 
the World to a Gold Standard or gold-backed currency. As the old adage goes;
“history often repeats itself”. 
IMPACT OF A HYPOTHETICAL GOLD-BACKED CURRENCY ON THE 
REGULATION OF THE GOLD INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA
If there was any move towards a gold-backed currency whether in South Africa or in 
a major economy in the world, the price of gold would increase considerably. This 
would benefit a significant gold-mining and gold-reserves hosting country like South 
Africa.  In this scenario, history would repeat itself in terms of legislation. South 
Africa would return to the strong exchange controls of the 1960s as far as gold 
possession, export and import are concerned. The Reserve Bank would probably 
become the sole purchaser of gold mined in the country as it was until 1997. 
Effectively, the export of gold would be banned, and all gold would be sold to the 
Reserve Bank which would manage how much gold it kept as reserves and how 
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much gold it would use for financial transactions in lieu of transactions in foreign 
currencies such as the US dollar. Gold reserves would thus climb upward in-step 
with mine production increases. 
Gold ownership by ordinary South Africans would be outlawed, and there would be 
strict controls as in the past on the use of gold by manufacturing jewellers.  Only one 
or two designated refiners of gold would be permitted in South Africa, like the Rand 
Refinery was pre-1997.  Investment products such as minted gold bars and 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and certain gold coins would be struck out from 
legislation and the gold in circulation would eventually be bought back by the 
Reserve Bank. 
The import of gold would probably also be banned, except by the Reserve Bank 
itself. The only imports that would be allowed would be for refining purposes at the 
designated refiners.  The rise in the gold price would make marginal or sub-
economic mines very profitable again and South Africa’s gold production could triple 
or quadruple in a short space of time. South Africa has the reserves but its cost of 
production at the current gold price makes much of the reserves uneconomic to 
mine. 
Perhaps one of the most peculiar advantages of this scenario will be the total 
eradication of illegal gold mining. If gold is money of the country, it would be in the 
interest of the State to invest vast resources to ensure mines are protected, mined 
gold is transported securely and only persons of very high calibre and competence 
are involved in gold mining and the gold trade. Any illegal trade would be swiftly dealt 
with as it was in the days when gold contributed more than 50% of foreign exchange 
revenue. We could see the re-introduction of the Gold & Diamond Branch of the 
South African Police, or the Gold component of it at least. Such controls would be 
comparable to the current controls and security on the printing of bank notes as is 
currently in place at the South African Bank Note Company – a subsidiary of the 
Reserve Bank. 
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Commercial banks would have to cease their activity in gold markets as buyers or 
sellers of physical gold. Most gold would be converted into bullion bars and stored by 
the Reserve Bank, in any case.  Recycling of gold-bearing products would also be 
restricted, probably to the one or two designated refiners. This will allow for the 
control needed.  Assaying by the private sector would not be allowed, and only 
designated official assayers would be allowed in such a system. This also happens 
in certain countries like Zimbabwe currently where gold is a crucial reserve asset and 
in Russia. 
With the gold price rising significantly, the Rand would strengthen and perhaps be on 
par with other foreign currencies. This correlation has been prevalent in general 
throughout history of the Rand and gold mining in South Africa. 
Legal tender gold and platinum coins
Although there are legal tender gold coins in South Africa, these are used currently 
as an investment product only, and is one of only three avenues for gold ownership 
in South Africa (the other two being gold jewellery and the recently deregulated 
minted gold bars). These are not used to buy or pay for goods and services due to 
their nominal face value and most importantly due to currency controls in existence 
in South Africa for decades. 
Personal communication with a Reserve Bank official who declined to be named in 
this work, suggests that it is unlikely that gold either in the form of coins or as bullion 
will be allowed to pay for or buy goods and services in South Africa. It would take a 
very dramatic shift in policy for the Reserve Bank to ever change its stance on this 
matter. 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF GOLD-BACKED DIGITAL CURRENCY ON 
REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
It can also be deduced from the discussion above that if a gold-backed, digital 
currency like e-gold were to succeed, it would have a powerful impact on demand for 
gold and, consequently, a hugely positive impact on gold mining in South Africa. 
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In terms of regulations, such a currency would prompt the amendment of legislation 
such as the Precious Metals Act, 2005 and the Currency & Exchanges Act, 1933. 
In terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005, there would be prohibitions on trading of 
precious metals within South Africa, and tighter export and import controls.  In terms 
of the Currency & Exchanges Act, 1933, stronger Exchange Controls would be 
introduced as far as gold is concerned and there would be consequential 
amendments to legislation dealing with electronic transactions, such as the 
Electronic Communications & Transactions Act, 2002. 
However, firstly, such a currency would have to be allowed by the Reserve Bank in
South Africa. History and its conservative nature would suggest that the Reserve 
Bank would be reluctant to allow a digital currency to flourish in South Africa. The 
Reserve Bank would most probably amend the Reserve Bank Act, 1989 to 
specifically prohibit the use of digital currency in South Africa, even though it would 
be good for the gold mining industry in South Africa which is on a declining trend. 
The failure of the Reserve Bank to intervene in the gold crisis of the period from 
1997 to 2002, and the platinum crisis in 2013 probably suggests that the Reserve 
Bank’s policy is not to intervene in commodity markets because of their notoriously 
cyclical nature. 
So far, digital currency use by South Africans is negligible and limited to a few 
Internet geniuses – more as a novelty than anything else. This is most likely the only 
reason, the Reserve Bank has not moved on this matter yet. It is quite probable that 
decision-makers at the Reserve Bank think that this is a fad that will be fleeting and 
would probably end in disaster for those heavily invested in digital currency.  
Attempts to obtain an official view from the Reserve Bank were unsuccessful. 
174
CHAPTER SEVEN:
NEW MINING FRONTIERS: URBAN MINING AND 
MINING THE SEA
INTRODUCTION
The general upward trend in gold prices from 2002 to 2012 has had an impact, inter 
alia, allowing for new frontiers to be explored. Of these, Urban Mining and the sea 
are the most noteworthy in the context of this research. 
Perhaps the ultimate new frontier is extra-terrestrial mining, but it’s a long way off 
and is quite literally unchartered territory as far as regulation is concerned. Therefore 
only brief comments are made in this chapter, whereas the focus will be on urban 
mining and sea mining. 
URBAN MINING (MINING E-WASTE)
Urban mining is defined as the process of reclaiming compounds and elements from 
products, buildings and waste (Urbanmining.org, 2011). It is a new global industry 
that encompasses essentially any metal or other material that is recyclable. 
As far as precious metals are concerned, urban areas represent rich “veins”, richer 
than natural deposits because of the amount of precious metal contained in 
consumer electronics and electrical contacts in buildings. Cell phones in particular 
are a source of gold, palladium and silver in economically significant amounts. Other 
electronics contain platinum and iridium as well. It is believed that there is fifty times 
more gold per ton of waste cell phones lying in dumps in South Africa and elsewhere 
than there is on average in gold mines in South Africa (Erdmann, 2014). Gold is 
used in the circuit boards of cell phones because gold conducts electricity much 
better than copper. 
175
Areas in a city that can actually be mined are city garbage dumps or landfills where 
garbage was burned or buried for many years. An estimated 85% of the developed 
world’s e-waste ends up in dumps or landfills but only about 15% of the world’s e-
waste is recycled each year (Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
India, 2014).
E-WASTE
E-Waste, or Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), is the term used to 
describe old, end-of-life (obsolete) or discarded appliances using electricity 
(ewasteguide.info, 2014). It includes computers, mobile phones, other consumer 
electronics, household appliances etc., which have been disposed of by their original 
users.
Figure 7.1: Example of an e-waste dump in South Africa 
(Source: ITWeb Africa, 2013)
The term is used as a generic term embracing all types of waste containing 
electrically powered components. Importantly, e-Waste contains both valuable 
materials as well as hazardous materials which require special handling and 
recycling methods (ewasteguide.info, 2014). 
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E-waste is regarded as the fastest growing solid waste stream in the world 
(Shegerian, 2011) and urban mining is a viable solution to the problem.  It is 
estimated that over 60 million tons of e-waste is generated in the world each year 
(Mining Weekly, 2013), and with the fast growing use of technology in our daily lives, 
this amount will increase annually in the foreseeable future. 
As environmentally responsible waste management is highly technological and 
highly capital intensive, there is currently a significant amount of trans-boundary, 
sometimes illegal, movement of e-waste into developing countries.  The United 
Nation’s Economic Commission for Africa (2010) suggested that most African 
countries require policies and infrastructure to implement efficient and sustainable 
recovery systems for secondary materials from e-waste as a new market and job 
creation opportunity. 
This Chapter will look at the potential / economics of urban mining and new policies 
and technologies that are making it viable. However, e-waste is classified as 
hazardous (about 40% of heavy metals found in landfills comes from electronic 
waste) and as such health and environmental issues must be incorporated into its 
regulation. 
SUMMARY OF THIS SUB-CHAPTER: 
If this new mining frontier is pursued in South Africa, it will affect regulation of the 
precious metal mining, recovery and recycling in South Africa. The impact on 
regulation of the industries is studied and recommendations are made in this 
Chapter.
CURRENT STATUS AND POTENTIAL (GOLD, PLATINUM)
URBAN GOLD MINING
Urban gold mining in its literal sense is not taking place in South Africa at present, 
i.e., there is at present no mining of city landfills and dumps to recover metals. 
However, the potential is there for such mining to take place in the future, because 
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as mentioned above, most of our e-waste is discarded and ends up in city dumps 
and landfills. 
However, there are concerted efforts especially under the auspices of the E-waste 
Association of South Africa (EWASA) to manage the establishment of a sustainable, 
environmentally-sound e-waste management system for the country. Of relevance to 
this study is the system being established for the collection of e-waste from 
businesses, government departments, hospitals, schools etc. EWASA has also been 
endorsed by the Department of Environmental Affairs and the Department of Trade 
& Industry as best-placed to manage the E-waste Take-back system under the 
Extended Producer Responsibility requirement in the National Environmental 
Management: Waste Act, 2008. 
Another development, which occurred in November 2013, is worth mentioning in the 
context of this chapter: EWASA and Mintek announced a partnership to jointly tackle 
the growing challenges of e-waste which is the fastest growing waste stream in the 
world and to unlock potential for the creation of local “Green” jobs as well as provide 
sustainable solutions in support of SMMEs and the Youth. Makhafola (2013) stated 
that the collaboration with EWASA will allow the two parties to develop technologies
that will not only change the way e-waste is collected and treated in South Africa, but 
the technology developed could be exported to Africa and the world. 
One of the main outcomes of this joint Urban Mining Project is to create a mobile 
solution that is locally developed and that can be deployed to urban as well as rural 
areas to treat waste on site. This will provide employment opportunities, training and 
education and sustainability (Anderson, K., 2013). 
URBAN PLATINUM-GROUP METAL MINING
Computer hard disks are also a source of platinum and ruthenium and hence urban 
mining is also a way of recovering platinum. However, platinum and ruthenium are 
less abundant in landfills and dumps because they are present mainly in computer 
hard drives while gold is used in electronic and electrical circuit boards and wires 
much more intensively because of its better electrical conductivity and ease of use 
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(its softer and gold is the most malleable and ductile of all known metals and less 
expensive). The quantity of platinum and ruthenium used in each hard disk is also 
quite small (less than 0.1g). It would be fair to say then that platinum and ruthenium 
would be by-products of urban mining. 
The single largest application for palladium is as an electrode material in the 
electronics sector - in multi-layer ceramic capacitors (MLCC) for computers, mobile 
phones and automotive electronic components. However, palladium would also be a 
by-product due to its lower intensity of use in the electronics sector, mixing will silver 
in electrodes and in some cases displacement by cheaper alternatives such as 
nickel. 
THE VIABILITY OF URBAN (PRECIOUS METAL) MINING
The mining of landfills and waste dumps for precious metals is not taking place in 
South Africa at present, because the viability of such an operation is influenced by 
economies of scale and the availability of alternatives. Mine dumps, which are the 
result of over 100 years of mining in and around Johannesburg, present a more 
attractive mining option in terms of economics. 
It should also be added that the hundreds of abandoned and closed mines are also 
being mined, albeit illegally in South Africa. These illegal mines, as discussed in 
other chapters provide up to 16 tons of gold in one form or another. Such economics 
and scale cannot be matched by urban mining at present. However, with time the 
prognosis for urban mining, in its literal sense, in South Africa will improve as 
electronic waste generation increases exponentially. 
CURRENT REGULATION (GOLD AND PLATINUM)
MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2002 (MPRDA)
To answer the question of whether current minerals legislation, in particular the 
Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, caters for Urban Mining in 
its true sense (i.e., the mining of urban dumps or landfills in which metal containing 
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material has been dumped or buried) one must pose the question: If a person 
applied for a mining permit in terms of the MPRDA, would such a permit be granted?
Pieter Alberts (2014), Chief Director of Legal services at the Department of Mineral 
Resources opined that the answer would be “no”. The reason for this he said was 
that city dumps or landfills are in most cases privately owned, or the owner will at 
least be traceable; therefore, to “mine” or “recover” minerals from such sites, the 
permission of the owner would be a prerequisite, but not the issuing of a mining right 
or permit. He added that the activity would however, not be unregulated, and would 
probably be subject to the National Environmental Management Act, 2008  and other 
national and subordinate legislation. 
It is clear from the above that the MPRDA does not currently apply to Urban Mining 
in its true sense. In fact, the MPRDA does not apply to any dump material, even that 
resulting from mining or prospecting activity pre-MPRDA. The terms used in the 
MPRDA for dumps are residue stockpiles or residue deposits (depending on whether 
the operation has terminated or not). “Historic dumps” or pre-MPRDA dumps, are not 
included in the definition of residue deposit or residue stockpile as per the MPRDA, 
because the definition only relates to a residue stockpile or deposits created by 
virtue of a “prospecting right” or “mining right” which are defined as a right in terms of 
sections 17 and 23 of the MPRDA (Alberts, 2014). Thus it does not apply to dumps 
resulting from mining or prospecting authorisations under the Minerals Act, 1991 or 
earlier minerals or mining legislation. 
Authority for the above is found in the court judgment of De Beers Consolidated 
Mines vs Ataqua Mining (Pty) Limited, DMR and Others (Orange Free State 
Provincial Division, 13 December 2007), where it was held that such pre-MPRDA 
dumps are movable property which is subject to private ownership (Bloemfontein 
High Court, judges: Kruger, A and Beckley, AP, 2007). 
PRECIOUS METALS ACT, 2005
To answer the question of whether the Precious Metals Act, 2005 as it currently 
stands caters for urban mining in its true sense (mining of urban dumps or landfills in 
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which metal containing material has been dumped or buried) the definition of 
precious metals needs to be examined:
Definition of unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal
Precious Metal contained in e-waste in city dumps and landfills does not fall easily 
within the definition of either unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal in the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005. Such metal is not “unwrought” (within the definition of the 
Act) because it cannot be classified as ore, concentrate, matte, a bar, granule, ingot, 
a button, plate, sponge or powder; nor is such metal “semi-fabricated” because it 
cannot be classified as sheet, tube, wire, strip, rod or sponge. 
Such precious metal is in fact waste and waste is not included in the definition of 
either unwrought or semi-fabricated precious metal. However, as discussed above 
this waste does contain precious metal in not insignificant quantities, which means 
that the Precious Metals Act, 2005 would need to be amended to cater for urban 
mining in the near future. Recommendations in this regard are made below.
WASTE ACT, 2008
The National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 (Act No. 59 of 2008) 
seeks to regulate waste management in order to protect health and the environment. 
It inter alia provides for the licensing and control of waste management activities and 
the remediation of contaminated land. It is important to note that the Act classifies e-
waste as hazardous waste because it contains inorganic and organic elements or 
compounds that can have a detrimental impact on health and the environment. 
In terms of the Act, the Minister of Environmental Affairs is the licensing authority for 
Waste Management Activities such as the storage, treatment or disposal of 
hazardous waste; whereas, the MEC of the province in which the waste
management activity is to be carried out, is the licensing authority for other waste 
management activities in that province. 
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PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF URBAN MINING (GOLD AND 
PLATINUM)
MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2002 (MPRDA)
Before one can make proposals regarding the future regulation of urban mining, one 
has to consider whether it would it be a good idea for the MPRDA to also regulate 
Urban Mining? This question boils down to whether the MPRDA should regulate the 
recycling of substances, materials or solutions. Presently it does not, and 
considering the legal debate regarding dumps created from mining activities, this 
would further complicate the Act. More importantly one has to look at the scope of 
the MPRDA. In this regard, one definition is instructive: that of the term “mineral”. 
The definition in the Act is as follows:
“mineral”: means any substance, whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, occurring 
naturally in or on the earth or in or under water and which was formed by or 
subjected to a geological process, and includes sand, stone, rock, gravel, clay, soil 
and any mineral occurring in residue stockpiles or in residue deposits, but excludes
a) water, other than water taken from land or sea for the extraction of any mineral 
from such water; …
So the MPRDA refers to a “mineral” as something occurring naturally in or on the 
earth and which was formed by or subjected to a geological process. This therefore 
excludes metals found in e-waste in city dumps or landfills because their occurrence 
is not natural and they are certainly not formed by a geological process. In layman’s 
terms, the MPRDA is not concerned with waste unless it is beneficiation plant waste, 
waste rock, slimes, derived from or incidental to a mining operation for a mineral as 
defined (see definition of residue stockpile, MPRDA, 2002). 
The definition of the term “mine” also reinforces the fact that the Act’s scope is the 
mining of “minerals” as defined. 
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“mine” means, when used as a verb, is the mining of any mineral, in or under the 
earth, water or any residue deposit, whether by underground or open working or 
otherwise and includes any operation or activity incidental thereto, in, on or under the 
relevant mining area”
Due to the complexity it will cause, it is not recommended that Urban Mining be 
included for regulation under the MPRDA. In fact, the term urban mining is 
misleading in the context of the MPRDA because it is actually the recycling of e-
waste but would in the literal sense involve excavation of the earth to recover metals, 
but not “minerals” as defined. 
PRECIOUS METALS ACT, 2005
As mentioned above, waste is not included in the definition of either unwrought or 
semi-fabricated precious metal in the Precious Metals Act, 2005, but e-waste does 
contain precious metal. However, it is proposed that if the definition of “unwrought 
precious metal” is amended to cover waste-containing precious metals, the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005 is the appropriate legislative instrument to regulate Urban Mining in 
the literal sense (mining of urban dumps or landfills in which metal containing 
material has been dumped or buried for many years). 
Therefore, it is a relatively simple matter to include urban mining under the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005. Amendment of the definition of “unwrought precious metal” would 
allow a refining licence (provided for in the Act) to be used for urban mining in terms 
of the following entitlement of such licence: “to extract precious metal from any 
material, substance or solution in his or her lawful possession and to dispose of such 
precious metal…”
It is proposed further that compliance measures, in terms of the refining licence, 
relating to health and the environment, would need to be augmented to cater for the 
fact that we are dealing with a hazardous substance and in locales that are close to 
cities or within city precincts. It is suggested that a Compliance Certificate in terms of 
the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 2008 should be a prerequisite 
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to apply for a refining licence to conduct urban mining. An Environmental Impact 
Assessment should be an essential item to obtain such a Compliance Certificate. To 
ensure that the Urban Miner stays compliant after licence issue, it would be 
necessary to conduct periodic inspections and for the Certificate to be valid for 6-
months to a year only, and therefore renewable semi-annually. 
In terms of health and safety, inspections would need to include health and safety 
checks similar to those in a mining environment but with emphasis on how toxic 
elements and compounds are handled, transported and disposed of. 
MINING GOLD FROM THE OCEAN / SEAWATER
As the gold grades of the older, larger land deposits continue to decline to low levels, 
the seas which comprise 70% of the Earth’s surface become the object of 
exploration and research into gold reserves.  Concentrations of gold are much higher 
where rivers have carried significant quantities of gold into the sea after eroding 
continental rocks along the way over thousands or millions of years. Significant 
quantities of gold have been commercially mined from ocean beach placer deposits 
and estuaries near the mouths of rivers. 
Gold ores have also been located along the mid-oceanic ridges of the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans. The gold ores in such locations are associated with sulphide 
deposits formed by hydrothermal vents. These vents occur when the spreading 
seafloor allows water to percolate down into the crustal rocks and reach hot regions 
deep beneath the seafloor (Hertzig, 1991). The heated seawater dissolves minerals 
(such as sulphur, copper, iron and a little gold and silver) in much higher 
concentrations relative to the normally cold water. 
Some scientists believe that certain bacteria have been involved in the precipitation 
of gold out of dilute hydrothermal solutions in the creation of certain known gold 
deposits. McNulty, (1994) proposed that a possible avenue for commercially viable 
gold recovery from seawater might involve such a bacterium, or a specifically 
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engineered microbe.  In 2006, Nautilus Minerals Inc. became the first company to 
commercially exploit the ocean floor for gold and copper sulphide deposits in waters 
off Papua New Guinea.
However, the greatest accessible reserve is the ocean itself (Goldfever.com, 2011). 
Seawater contains vast amounts of dissolved gold, worth many billions of dollars, 
although in dilute concentrations. It was S. Sonstadt in 1872 that was first to 
establish the presence of gold in solution in seawater (McNulty, 1994), but the 
precise measurement of its concentration is still controversial because of extreme 
dilution. Values for the concentration of gold in seawater typically range from 5 to 50 
parts per trillion (ppt), and average around 13 ppt (Lucas, 1985). Burk (1989) 
estimated that seawater of the Earth’s oceans contain about 800 000 tons of gold. 
SUMMARY OF THIS SUB-CHAPTER: 
In this section, gold exploration in the oceans is reviewed and analysed and an 
assessment is made as to whether this will be a viable mining environment in the 
coming decades, and if so how this will affect regulation of gold mining and recovery 
in South Africa. Recommendations are also made for the eventuality that this 
becomes viable in South African waters.
GOLD EXPLORATION IN THE OCEANS
Along the coast of South Africa and Namibia, diamonds have been mined for over 
twenty years, in particular by De Beers Marine. Great advances in mining technology 
from existing offshore industries have made mining the seafloor possible. It is, 
however, only since the year 2001 that deep sea mining for copper and gold, which 
occur in a rocky ore deposit on the sea floor called seafloor massive sulphides 
(SMS), has attracted interest. 
Seafloor massive sulphides deposits are located around 1.2 km under the sea and 
appear like giant rock formations some 200m long and wide and tons of metres thick 
and contain high concentrations of the valuable metals copper and gold together with 
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zinc, lead, silver and sulphur (Mining-technology.com, 2014). The deposits are found 
in under-seawater volcanic areas around the world and are created by hydrothermal 
plumes known as “black smokers”. Mining Technology (2014) explains how these 
are created as follows: When seawater seeps through into the porous seabed, the 
water is heated deep below and is then ejected back up into the ocean through the 
black smokers. The fluids ejected by these deep-sea vents like geysers are rich in 
metals and very hot (between 300 to 500 °C), therefore when the fluids hit the icy 
cold water, the metals precipitate and form chimneys around the plumes. Over time, 
these chimneys collapse and form the polymetallic sulphide deposits that can be 
mined today. It is believed that these deposits or seams can yield as much as ten 
times the precious minerals than a seam that’s mined on land (National Geographic, 
2014). 
Figure 7.2: Metal rich black smoker 
(Source: Nautilus Minerals, 2010)
The International Seabed Authority, which regulates the use of the seafloor in 
international waters pursuant to the United National Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, has granted twelve exploratory permits to various governments, including India, 
France, Japan, Russia, China, Korea and Germany. In terms of exploration with a 
view to SMS mining, two companies are well advanced. These are Nautilus Minerals 
from Canada and Neptune Minerals from Australia. Nautilus’ flag ship project is an 
SMS mine in Papua New Guinea called Solwara 1, while Neptune’s main project is 
Kermadec in the northern waters of New Zealand. 
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Nautilus (2013) plans to use three remote-controlled construction tools that resemble 
underwater lawn mowers to cut the hard mineral ore from the seafloor and pump it 
over a kilometre up to a surface vessel. The vessel would be equipped with 
machinery that removes excess water and rock and return it to the mining area via 
pipeline to avoid contaminating surface waters with residual particles as much as 
possible. The ore mined will then be shipped to a concentrator facility for processing. 
Figure 7.3: Illustration of seafloor mining tool deployment from mining 
vessel
(Source: Nautilus Minerals, 2010)
Exploring and Mining in the deep sea comes with environmental issues. Therefore 
companies intending to mine there must work with marine research institutions to 
assess environmental conditions of the mining area to ensure that impact on 
ecosystems is, or will be, minimised. In doing this, they have to also deal with the 
concerns of conservationists, fishers and coastal residents. Deep Sea Mining 
Campaign, an activist group in Australia that is campaigning against mining the 
Solwara 1 site, is concerned about the impacts of toxic heavy metals from the mining 
activity on local communities and fish. 
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Nevertheless, indications are that mining will begin within 1 to 3 years. Nautilus has 
since been granted its environmental permit for the Solwara 1 site. The company 
reported recently that assembly of its seafloor mining tools is close to completion and 
will soon be ready for acceptance testing (Nautilus, 2014)
Neptune Minerals, Inc. was founded in 2011 to explore and develop Seafloor 
Massive Sulphide deposits. The company is currently busy with exploration in its 
tenements in New Zealand, with the goal of identifying and validating future mining 
deposits (Neptune Minerals, 2014). Exploration entails inter alia the use of Remotely 
Operated Vehicles, Acoustic Multibeam mapping, spot sampling using hydraulic 
grabs and robotic drills that sit on the seafloor. The company is seemingly still at 
least 5 years away from commercial mining. 
VIABILITY OF MINING GOLD FROM THE OCEAN / SEAWATER
It is currently not commercially viable to mine gold from seawater, but given the 
affinity that certain bacteria have for concentrating gold, it might be feasible in the 
future to employ such a bacterium or one specifically engineered for the task, to 
scavenge gold directly from the dilute concentrations in seawater. Innovation in 
artificially promoting or enhancing the scavenging abilities of such bacteria will be 
required to make recovery of gold from seawater economically viable. 
CURRENT REGULATION (GOLD AND PLATINUM)
MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2002 (MPRDA)
The following definitions in the MPRDA indicate that sea mining was considered in 
the drafting of the Act:
“mineral”: means any substance, whether in solid, liquid or gaseous form, occurring 
naturally in or on the earth or in or under water and which was formed by or 
subjected to a geological process, and includes sand, stone, rock, gravel, clay, soil 
and any mineral occurring in residue stockpiles or in residue deposits, but excludes
a) water, other than water taken from land or sea for the extraction of any mineral
from such water; …
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The definition of “mineral” includes minerals occurring in water and under water and 
covers the forms of sea mining described above.
The definition of mine (below) includes excavation under the sea or under other 
water, and is also cognizant of sea mining. 
"mine": means, when-
a) used as a noun-
i) any excavation in the earth, including any portion under the sea or 
under other water or in any residue deposit, as well as any borehole, 
whether being worked or not, made for the purpose of searching for or 
winning a mineral; 
ii) …
b) used as a verb, in the mining of any mineral, in or under the earth, water or 
any residue deposit, whether by underground or open working or otherwise 
and includes any operation or activity incidental thereto, in, on or under the 
relevant mining area
It is interesting to note that the owner of “the sea”, as defined below, in terms of the 
law, is the State. See definition of owner below:
"owner": in relation to -
a) land -
i) means the person in whose name the land is registered; or 
ii) if it is land owned by the State, means the State together with the 
occupant thereof; or 
b) the sea, means the State
The definition of “prospecting” in the MPRDA is also inclusive of prospecting in the 
sea environment and seawater itself.  
"prospecting": means intentionally searching for any mineral by means of any 
method -
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a) which disturbs the surface or subsurface of the earth, including any portion 
of the earth that is under the sea or under other water or 
b) …
c) in the sea or other water on land
The definition of “the sea” also caters for sea mining and prospecting, except for 
mining Seafloor Massive Sulphide deposits which are in international waters and 
controlled by the International Seabed Authority - pursuant to the United National 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
“the sea": means the water of the sea, as well as the bed of the sea and the subsoil 
thereof below the low-water mark as defined in the Seashore Act, 1935 (Act No.21 of 
1935), and within -
1) the territorial waters as contemplated in section 4 of the Maritime Zones 
Act, 1994 (Act No. 15 of 1994), of the Republic, including the water and 
the bed of any tidal river and of any tidal lagoon; 
2) the exclusive economic zone as contemplated in section 7 of the Maritime 
Zones Act, 1994 (Act No. 15 of 1994); and 
3) the continental shelf as contemplated in section 8 of the Maritime Zones 
Act, 1994 (Act No. 15 of 1994); 
PRECIOUS METALS ACT, 2005
As the MPRDA is essentially an upstream Act, and the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
more of a downstream Act, mining – including sea mining is not the jurisdiction of the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005. 
PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE REGULATION OF SEA MINING (GOLD AND 
PLATINUM)
Unlike with Urban Mining, sea mining is considered adequately in the MPRDA. This 
is due to the fact that mining for diamonds along the west coast of South Africa has 
been taking place for more than two decades and thus predates the MPRDA. De 
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Beers, a South African company in the Anglo American fold is a world class marine 
prospector and miner.
Aurimar, an AngloGold Ashanti company, explored for gold off the west coast of 
South Africa from 2011 to 2013. Vaughan Chamberlain (2014), Senior Vice 
President at AngloGold said that the process of obtaining prospecting licences was 
not onerous and the company was assisted by its joint venture partner De Beers, 
which has extensive experience in securing licences for diamond exploration and 
mining off the West Coast. However, the company did not progress to mining as it 
shut down operations in 2014. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that there is room for improvement in the 
environmental regulation aspect of sea mining. Due to the fact that deep sea mining 
is a relatively new field, the complete consequences of full-scale mining operations 
are still not known (Halfar, J. and Fujita, R.M; 2010). More work needs to be done in 
this area. Halfar, J. and Fujita, R.M (2007) in their paper “Dangers of Deep Sea 
Mining” published in Science Magazine, elaborate on the dangers posed by mining 
to the benthic layer of the sea floor, increased toxicity of the water, sediment plumes 
and corrosion. 
It is proposed that environmental regulations under the MPRDA specific to 
prospecting and mining in the deep sea environment would be required for better 
environmental control of deep sea mining off the coast of South Africa.  As far as the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005 is concerned, there is no need for additional legislation to 
support sea mining, due to the fact it is an upstream activity which is not within the 
jurisdiction of the Precious Metals Act, 2005.
MINING IN SPACE – THE ULTIMATE MINING FRONTIER
Mining in extra-terrestrial environments, i.e., in space, is the ultimate of mining 
frontiers. The landing of the Philae Lander on Comet 67P in November 2014, took 
the prospect of space mining from science fiction to the realms of possibility. It’s just 
a matter of time for technology to advance sufficiently to allow for mining in space. 
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It is well known that certain meteorites and asteroids for example contain high 
concentrations of platinum-group metals especially, and some gold. In fact, some 
scientists believe that all the gold, osmium, palladium, platinum, rhenium, rhodium 
and ruthenium mined from Earth's crust, came originally from the rain of asteroids 
that hit Earth after the crust cooled (University of Toronto, 2009). However, it is a 
very long way off for commercial mining to take place in space as it costs billions of 
dollars to put machines and men in space and is thus not viable at present. 
Nevertheless, some work in the area of considering how policy and legislation will 
evolve has been done, most significantly by Ricky Lee in his book: Law and 
Regulation of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space. In this book he 
discusses and makes proposals on balancing policy interests within existing treaty 
frameworks. The author discusses at length the content of “the common heritage of 
mankind doctrine”. 
Since commercial space mining is perhaps some hundred years away, it is beyond
of the scope of this study. 
Figure 7.4: Philae Lander on the comet
(Source: European Space Agency, 2014)
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CHAPTER 8:
CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PROPOSALS
In this study over twenty topical issues, developments and proposals impacting on
the precious metals industries were explained, commented on, discussed, analysed,
or debated. In this, the concluding chapter, closing remarks and/or conclusions are
made on these issues and developments. To end this work, recommendations or
proposals are made for the future regulation of the South African precious metals
industries.
CONTROLLING ILLEGAL MINING BETTER?
One of the biggest, if not the biggest problem facing the South African precious 
metals industries (in particular the gold mining industry) is illegal mining. Between 8 
and 15 tons are mined illegally mainly by illegal immigrants and sold to illegal and 
legal refineries - which launder the illegal metal. 
It was argued in this study that the problem of illegal mining should be controlled at 
source. Once gold mined illegally gets to refiners/traders, it is difficult to trace its 
source. The legislation that controls mining and prospecting in South Africa, the 
Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA) should have had 
as one of its chief objectives the control of illegal mining and prospecting. 
It is proposed that illegal mining can be controlled, but it requires the DMR's on-the-
ground and daily involvement in enforcing the provisions of the MPRDA together with 
support from the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA). Amendments to the Act and Regulations under the Act, setting out 
more clearly the responsibilities of the DMR especially with a view to practical 
implementation are also necessary. 
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It is proposed further that illegal mining in certain hot spots (such as Welkom) is so 
serious that military intervention is warranted. The army should get involved together 
with a dedicated team from the South African Police Services and the NPA. The 
Gold and Diamond Branch of SAPS that existed prior to 2002 was very effective 
because it was focussed on illegal gold, platinum and diamond trading and was 
staffed by experienced officials. It is time to revive such a unit of the SAPS which
together with the army could play a huge role in combatting illegal mining and illegal 
trade in precious metals. Training would be needed for the combating of illegal 
mining in the underground environment. Such expertise is currently with mine rescue 
personnel on the mines, but it could be transferred to army personnel and the 
proposed new Gold and Platinum Branch of the SAPS. 
COMBATTING PRECIOUS METAL ILLICIT TRADE AND SMUGGLING
This study has found that the Precious Metals Act, 2005 has two very important 
provisions to control the illicit trade: Firstly, the prohibition of the possession of 
unwrought precious metal and secondly, the provision for the geochemical 
fingerprinting of unwrought precious metal mine production and imports. 
The prohibition against possession of unwrought precious metal (unwrought precious 
metal can only be possessed by a licence, permit or certificate holder) has been 
used to successfully prosecute many cases involving illegal mining or illegal trade 
where the transgressor was caught in possession of such metal. For this reason, the 
provision and indeed the Precious Metals Act, 2005 itself in some form or other will 
remain in the short to medium term. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that the Forensics Science Laboratory has a huge 
backlog of samples yet to be analysed. The organisation also suffers from a lack of 
human resources with the specialised skills to perform the function of analysing 
these samples for the purpose of fingerprinting and provenance determination. It is 
therefore suggested that the gold and PGM miners fund a specialised Laboratory for 
the Fingerprinting of precious metals. It is in the interest of the industry to have illegal 
mining and the illicit trade controlled and it was argued in this study that industry
would be prepared to take over the funding of this facility. Such funding would attract 
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the skills and expertise required to make this a world class tool in the fight against 
illegal mining and theft of precious metals from mines. Secondment of staff from 
mining companies to the Forensics Science Lab may also be an option. As chain-of-
custody is important for analysis of such samples, appointing such staff as police 
reservists may also be required. The author believes that this suggestion would be 
realistically implementable. 
It is also suggested that it would be in the country’s interest to have assay facilities at 
the ports of entry/exit. This will allow Customs officers and SAPS official to have 
samples of exports and imports assayed to determine precious metal content. 
Anecdotal evidence from SARS (2009 – 2012) suggest there is some precious metal 
that is being illegally exported or imported under the steel and copper customs tariff 
codes; often mixed with such metals. The Assay facility will also allow for quick 
identification of precious metal, because in certain forms precious metal does not 
look like precious metal at all. It is further proposed that there is a role for the unit of 
the South African Bureau of Standards dealing with testing services at ports of 
entry/exit. 
Training of Customs and SAPS official who operate at the border posts and ports of 
entry/exit is essential especially in matters such as identification of precious metals, 
use of portable XRF analysers and other assay equipment. It is suggested that as
minimum each border post or port of entry should have at least one portable XRF for 
quick identification of metals. 
It should also be noted that South Africa is attracting illicit trade and smuggling of 
precious metals from other African countries in particular. This may seem at odds 
with the fact that South Africa has such stringent controls on precious metals. 
However, paradoxically it would seem that the fact that South Africa has such 
stringent controls means that illicit metal brought into the country can be “legitimised”
for legal export by licensed exporters. It seems that once illicit metal is brought into 
the formal system in South Africa i.e., legitimised, the stringent controls (on 
possession in particular) seem to insulate it. 
It is further proposed that if the capturing of transactions of buying, selling, import 
and export of unwrought precious metal, which are submitted by licensees and 
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permit holders (in prescribed registers quarterly in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 
2005) is outsourced to a data management company, such registers could be a 
powerful tool in monitoring the precious metals trade in South Africa. A computer 
programme can be used to cross-check between buyer and supplier transactions in 
their respective registers (a licensed seller would record in his/her register that, for 
example, he sold 10kg of gold in granule form to a licensed buyer on a certain date, 
while the licensed buyer should also record that he bought 10kg of gold granule from 
that seller on that same date). If transactions are not “balanced off” in this way, then 
it’s an anomaly that has to be investigated. The organisation that it should be 
outsourced to must have expertise in metal accounting. The South African Diamond 
and Precious Metals Regulator (SADPMR) does not have the human resource 
capacity to capture the thousands of transactions contained in registers of the some 
2 000 licence and permit holders. The SADPMR can however, play the leading role 
in investigating anomalies. 
CONTROLLING THE SCRAP PRECIOUS METAL INDUSTRY BETTER
It was discussed in this work that the relationship and the co-ordination between the 
South African Police Services and the SADPMR need to improve as a matter of 
urgency for the scrap precious metal industry to be controlled better. It was found 
that this lack of co-ordination and the overlaps between the two pieces of legislation 
are being exploited by criminal syndicates. To deal with this, the two organisations
should be conducting joint inspections, especially of refiners and beneficiation 
licence holders on a monthly basis. There should also be a mechanism (including 
the outsourcing of data capture mentioned above) that would allow the registers 
submitted by holders of licences under the Second-hand Goods Act, 2009 and those 
under the Precious Metals Act, 2005 to be reconciled and anomalies investigated by 
inspectors of the SADPMR and the SAPS. 
The matter of statistics: capturing of the transactions in registers, cross-checking of 
buyer and seller transactions, metal accounting and reconciliation has been
mentioned a few times in this work. It is suggested that this begs for computer 
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programme developers to develop a programme that can automate this process and 
allow for the monitoring of the trade and follow-up on anomalies. 
It was also discussed in this study that scrap precious metals are used to 
camouflage illegally mined metal (laundering) when bought by refiners and 
beneficiators. This occurs by mixing of melted scrap precious metal and alloying with 
illegally mined metal, or simply as a metal accounting disguise (with accompanying 
fraudulent documentation). 
It is suggested that there could be merit in the clear and physical separation of 
refining of scrap precious metal from primary precious metal (newly-mined precious 
metal) refining. If the two are allowed to mix, it complicates control. If a person 
wishes to be engaged in both, he or she has to be compelled to have separate 
licensing for each and a physical separation of the refineries/smelters using primary 
metal as feedstock from that using scrap precious metal as feedstock. The melting 
and refining of scrap precious metal should be restricted to accredited refineries 
only. These accredited refineries should be accredited by an organisation such as 
the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) and accredited refineries should be 
subject to periodic testing of metal feedstock, metal in process and metal to be sold. 
These accredited refineries should also abide by a code of conduct and acceptable 
“good delivery” guidelines similar to those enforced by the LBMA for the London 
Market. It should be a requirement that such accredited refineries should only 
purchase metal in original scrap form (such as old jewellery, broken jewellery, spent 
auto-catalysts etc.). This is because once melted, tracing source as scrap or illegally 
mined metal becomes difficult. Coupled with this, there should be a ban on exports 
of scrap metal in original form, melted scrap metal bars or as refined bars by any 
person except an accredited refiner.  There could be merit also in banning exports of 
scrap platinum-group metals to encourage recycling of platinum-group metals in 
South Africa. 
THE WORLD GOLD COUNCIL’S CONFLICT-FREE GOLD STANDARD
The World Gold Council’s Conflict-free Gold Standard discussed in Chapter 2 of this 
study is one of the most important developments in the precious metals industry in 
recent years. From the discussion in Chapter 2, several lessons were learnt and 
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allowed for some recommendations to be formulated for the future regulation of the 
South African precious metals industries. 
Lessons of note from the Conflict-Free Gold Standard include the following:
 The Conflict-free Gold Standard provides some practical guidance on a way 
to work responsibly in conflict-affected and high risk environments.
 There is definitely a place for self-regulation by industry. When regulation is 
voluntary, companies embrace it as part of business and essential to good 
business knowing that ultimately it will translate to consumer confidence in 
the product that the company produces. A system of such voluntary self-
regulation by industry does contribute to an effective internal control system.
 The use of voluntary and market mechanisms to achieve greater levels of 
governance and accountability are progressing operating standards and 
transparency significantly (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2012). Legal 
compliance requirements still have a role to play, nevertheless (PWC, 2012). 
 Self-regulation if implemented by all players in the value chain can close 
loopholes in a government-implemented certification scheme. 
 The Conflict-free Gold Standard also shows that external assurance from an 
independent third party provides a measure of confidence in such a system. 
These lessons from the Conflict-free Gold Standard suggest that three different
approaches can be used in dealing with conflict minerals like gold and diamonds: 
(1) Government Regulation backed by industry self-regulation (co-regulation with 
government as lead);
(2) Industry self-regulation (including self-certification), backed by government 
oversight (co-regulation with industry as lead); or the more free-market 
approach:
(3) Deregulation, because no system is perfect, and well-resourced criminal 
syndicates will exploit weaknesses. 
In South Africa, the trend is towards more regulation, judging from government’s 
approach in the last two decades, and therefore deregulation is unlikely in the short 
term. In this study, Government regulation backed by self-regulation was explored to 
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gauge its feasibility and then to make proposals for the future regulation of the gold 
industry in South Africa.
CONTROLLING MONEY LAUNDERING
In Chapter 4 it was stated that there is no anti-money laundering legislation in South 
Africa specific to the diamond and precious metals trades and that this is a worrying 
lacuna (loophole). The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 fails to take into 
account the role that diamonds and precious metals play in money laundering 
activities. It is also opined in this study that the Financial Intelligence Centre does not 
have the knowledge or expertise to deal with money laundering in the diamond and 
precious metals trades. 
Realising this gap, the Department of State Security was recently tasked to look into 
this matter and develop guidelines to tackle the issue. In 2015, these guidelines were 
still in the draft and confidential stage. It is hoped, however, that this effort will 
eventually culminate in this loophole in South Africa being addressed. 
HALLMARKING
This study found that there are significant benefits to introducing a statutory 
hallmarking system in South Africa. The chief benefit of hallmarking is consumer 
protection against misrepresentation of the precious metal content of products such 
as jewellery. An internally recognised hallmarking system would boost South Africa’s 
reputation as a high quality manufacturer with the guarantee factor associated with 
hallmarking. It also reduces red tape associated with the import/export process and 
requirements for entry into certain export markets. 
However, hallmarking requires significant infrastructure, the biggest cost-component 
of which would be assay offices in the main centres throughout the country and the 
human resources and equipment to run them (which would cost in excess of R10 
million per centre). It was therefore concluded in the study that although beneficial, 
statutory hallmarking should be delayed by perhaps a decade, during which more 
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fundamental problems in the industry must be dealt with. Voluntary hallmarking 
administered by the Jewellery Council should continue in the interim. 
PRODUCER PRICE FOR GOLD, PLATINUM
It was concluded in this study that a Producer Price for gold would not be favourable
for South Africa in terms of cost/benefit and would actually serve no economic
purpose. This is especially so because South Africa is no longer the largest producer 
of the metal, not even in the top 5 and we are minnows when it comes to fabrication 
of gold. The above-ground stocks of gold and the fact that arbitrage opportunities will 
nullify any South African price were also factors considered in coming to this 
conclusion.
With platinum, the difference is that South Africa is by far the largest producer in the 
world, so technically a South African producer price for platinum is possible. 
However, the biggest disadvantage would be that the cost/benefit analysis of 
establishing such a price would hardly be compelling. It requires supply/demand 
management, producers to want to buy into the concept (and some don’t see the 
benefit) and balancing the interests of all producers and fabricators of precious 
metals in South Africa. Producers want a high price, fabricators a low price. It should 
also be noted that smaller players would be reluctant to cut production in times of 
low demand. It was also noted that South Africa earns far more in revenue from 
mining and exporting precious metals than it does from manufacturing products from 
them and exporting these. The main markets for platinum-group metals are outside 
the country, so a producer-determined price would affect relationships with end-
users in Europe, Japan and the USA. The high labour cost component of South 
African mine production cost and the power of labour unions in South Africa would
also complicate a price setting mechanism in South Africa. It was also argued in this 
study that price determination by the producers in a country would be seen as 
collusion and anti-competitive by anti-trust authorities in South Africa, the EU and the 
USA. 
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It is also contended that government involvement in the pricing of metals is in 
contravention of the South Africa’s Mineral Policy. The Minerals and Mining Policy 
for South Africa states the following as government policy: 
i) “The marketing of South African minerals will be determined by market 
forces. State intervention will generally be limited to addressing market 
failures. 
ii) Barriers, economic and otherwise, to mineral exports will be identified and 
appropriate strategies for their removal will be devised. All measures 
which restrict the sale of South African minerals on foreign markets will be 
opposed.
iii) Government will encourage and support market development by 
producers.”
Paragraph i) states clearly that the marketing of South Africa’s minerals will be 
determined by market forces. State Intervention can only be justified by market 
failures, but neither the gold market nor the platinum market has suffered a market 
failure. Markets and prices are cyclical as is the nature of such metal markets.
PRECIOUS METALS EXCHANGE
It was argued in this study that in its favour, South Africa has the legal infrastructure 
that can support a precious metals exchange, well established and functioning credit 
systems, good financial regulation, sufficient financial resources and banking skills, 
and in the Rand Refinery, a world-class gold depository (Virtual Metals, 2005; 
Damarupurshad, 2005). However, against the country, are its limited cash markets in 
gold and platinum, capital controls, and the lack of first-mover advantage. Virtual 
Metals (2005) found that strong metals production is not a particular advantage for 
establishing a precious metals exchange because a small percentage of futures 
contracts (the overwhelming bulk of an Exchange’s business) come to physical 
delivery. Most importantly, the bulk of South Africa’s production of precious metals is 
exported and thus crucially there is very little metal circulating in local markets 
whence a physical market could develop into a derivatives one. Access to, and 
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association with, secure and reliable warehousing and safe transportation to and 
from warehousing, which are found in terminal markets, are absent in South Africa. 
GEM & PRECIOUS METAL BOURSE PROPOSAL
It was argued in Chapter 3 that while the Diamond Exchange and Export Centre 
enjoys some degree of success because it is the only facility through which rough 
diamonds can be exported – its extension to semi-precious stones and precious 
metals would not enjoy success (according to 95% of people interviewed). This is 
mainly because South Africa does not produce sufficient semi-precious stones to 
sustain an exchange; much of the production of semi-precious stones (such as 
sugilite, tiger’s-eye, rose quartz, amethyst and agate) in South Africa is illegal and 
the bulk of this production is smuggled out of the country to China and India. 
It was argued that successful bourses are created by association of commercial 
traders who form such a bourse because of a market need for a trading platform. 
There is no need for a trading platform for gold and platinum in South Africa because 
producers have established their own marketing arrangements directly or via agents 
such as Rand Refinery. There is therefore no market need for a State Bourse trading 
precious metals or semi-precious stones based on the views of the overwhelming 
majority of people interviewed. 
OPEC FOR PLATINUM?
At a BRICS meeting held in South Africa in 2013, South Africa and Russia 
announced that they plan to set up an OPEC-type trading bloc to coordinate exports 
of platinum and palladium. It was argued in this work that although feasible (see 
Chapter 3), this would create a cartel and could break international trade law and bi-
lateral agreements and fall foul of competition authorities in chief-market regions 
such as Europe and the USA. In addition, this, like the Producer Price for Platinum 
concept requires supply and demand management that South Africa does not have 
expertise or experience in. 
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STATE PLATINUM TRADER 
It was concluded in this study that a State Platinum Trader (in the mould of the State 
Diamond Trader, which is mandated by legislation to buy 10% of production and sell 
this to beneficiators) is technically feasible, but its major obstacles would be safe and 
secure warehousing of a much bulkier commodity, lack of systems for global 
supply/demand monitoring and the lack of expertise and experience in the logistics 
of transport, insurance and distribution. However, it is proposed that it would not be 
necessary to have a State Platinum Trader. Creating a middleman between the 
miner and the fabricator is not warranted. Supply of platinum to autocatalyst 
fabricators is not a problem in South Africa. It should also be noted that the State 
Diamond Trader model has failed if promotion of beneficiation (its major objective) is 
to be used as a metric, because beneficiation of diamonds in South Africa has 
declined over the last seven years. State intervention in the supply of platinum to 
autocatalyst fabricators is not necessary
RE-REGULATING SILVER?
It was opined by Mahlangu (2014) that it was a mistake to deregulate silver in South 
Africa. In this study, this notion was rebuffed because silver does not satisfy the 
criteria to justify regulation, especially the regulation of possession and trade as with 
other precious metals: Firstly, South Africa produces very little silver (6 tons), with 
production having declined drastically over the last decade, and all of this production 
is a by-product of lead/silver, gold, copper and PGM mining. Secondly, there is no 
theft of silver from mines as is the problem with gold, no illegal mining and it is not a
high value commodity (generally less than 2% of the price of gold). Moreover, the 
deregulation of silver has given the jewellery industry and small-scale recycling of 
silver scrap a huge boost in South Africa. 
PLATINUM RECYCLING AS A GROWING SOURCE OF PLATINUM SUPPLY
Statistics discussed in this study have shown that recycling of platinum and 
palladium is on the rise, so much so that recycling is the second largest contributor 
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(20-25%% of total supply), after Anglo Platinum, to the supply of platinum annually. 
This together with a drop in demand has resulted in the platinum market being in 
surplus putting downward pressure on platinum. In fact, the platinum price has spent 
2015 (to date) below the gold price (ranging from $1 050/ozt to $1 180/ozt). It is 
proposed that South African refiners be incentivised (tax incentive for example) to 
increase platinum recycling or extend their operations to platinum scrap (in particular 
spent autocatalyst) recycling. This would serve to increase the country’s dominance 
in platinum supply. 
Currently platinum recycling is correlated with prices (i.e., recycling is price elastic) 
but this trend could change if any controls on supply (discussed in Chapter 3) are 
instituted by South Africa. 
PLATINUM COIN CONCEPT
It was discussed in Chapter 4 that although South Africa dominates world production 
of platinum and has for many years; and despite the overwhelming success of the 
Krugerrand, South Africa has never issued a legal tender platinum coin. It is 
proposed in this study that a legal tender platinum coin, in the mould of the 
Krugerrand, is long overdue in South Africa and should have been launched during 
the FIFA Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010, which was the best marketing 
opportunity the country has ever had. A legal tender coin would have the benefit of 
being VAT-free, and the same restrictions as to export of Krugerrands could apply 
for exchange control purposes. In the current market conditions of excess supply 
and low demand, a platinum coin could provide a new demand sector and reduce 
the excess supply in the market and stockpiles held by producers. 
CONCLUSION ON GOLD-BACKED DIGITAL CURRENCY
It was concluded in Chapter 6, that if a gold-backed digital currency like e-gold were 
to succeed, it would have a positive impact on demand for gold and consequently 
gold mining in South Africa. In terms of its impact on regulation of the gold industry in 
South Africa, it is likely that success of a gold-backed digital currency will be the 
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same as the impact any gold-backed currency in South Africa would have: greater 
control on gold possession, restriction on local trading, tighter export, import and 
exchange controls. 
However, it was pointed out that the Reserve Bank of South Africa would most 
probably be reluctant to allow a digital currency to take root in South Africa, based on 
the conservative nature of the central bank and its actions over the past 60 years. 
To date, the use of digital currency in South Africa is negligible – limited to a few 
Internet-savvy “computer geeks” and more for its novelty appeal. 
RESIDUE STOCKPILES AND RESIDUE DEPOSITS: HISTORICAL DUMPS 
The judgment in the De Beers Consolidated Mines versus Ataqua Mining and Others
case in relation to tailings dumps has had a major impact on the implementation of 
the MPRDA since it was delivered in December 2007. In short, the judgment was as 
follows: Firstly, tailings dumps are movables (movable assets); Secondly, the 
diamonds occurring in them (the sought mineral in this case) do not occur “naturally 
in or on the Earth” and therefore does not fall under the definition of mineral in the 
MPRDA; and thirdly, the MPRDA does not regulate tailings dumps created before 
implementation of the MPRDA because “residue stockpile” (which tailings are) is 
defined in the MPRDA as follows: “any debris, discard, tailings, slimes, screening, 
slurry, waste rock, foundry sand, beneficiation plant waste, ash or any other product 
derived from or incidental to a mining operation and which is stockpiled, stored or 
accumulated for potential re-use, or which is disposed of, by the holder of a mining
right, mining permit or production right”. This meant in simple terms that the MPRDA 
does not regulate tailings dumps that predate the implementation of the MPRDA 
(May 2004). 
ADVANCING BENEFICIATION BETTER IN LEGISLATION?
It was concluded in Chapter 3 that legislating for local beneficiation of precious 
metals has not had a positive effect on beneficiation of precious metals in South 
Africa because it has not addressed the factors that prospective beneficiators 
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consider before investing in large scale fabrication projects, which are lowering the 
cost of production, market development and markets access. 
It is suggested that promoting beneficiation by legislation is not a simple task and 
sometimes legislation actually has the opposite effect. This is especially in the case 
of precious metals where it is a known fact that there is no clear advantage of the 
beneficiation taking place in proximity to mine production (i.e., in a producing 
country).
It was also argued in Chapter 3 that the Broad-based Socio Economic Charter 
(Mining Charter) was not designed and should not be applicable to the downstream 
industry but to the mining industry in particular. The downstream industry (which the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005 regulates) involves trading and manufacturing and the 
players in these sectors were not involved in the negotiation of the Mining Charter in 
2001-2002. 
BEE & TRANSFORMATION IN LEGISLATION 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is promoted in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
in the same way as beneficiation: “In considering an application for any licence, 
permit or certificate the Regulator must have regard to the requirements of the 
broad-based socio-economic empowerment charter developed in terms of section 
100 of the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002”. 
It was concluded in Chapter 3, that the above legislation for BEE or transformation of 
the precious metals industry has had only a small effect on transforming the industry 
in South Africa, however, it has had a negative impact on beneficiation (especially in 
the family-business dominated jewellery industry). It is therefore proposed, based on 
feedback by industry plyers interviewed, that the requirements for compliance with 
the Broad-based Socio Economic Empowerment Charter should be limited to skills 
development only or totally eliminated for the Precious Metal Beneficiation Licence 
and the Jeweller’s Permit applications (the only two of six precious metals licences 
actually related to downstream beneficiation). This is because beneficiation is as 
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important an objective of the Act as transformation. As mentioned above, the two 
objectives are given equal status in the Precious Metals Act, 2005.
DEVELOPMENTAL PRICE FOR GOLD AND PLATINUM
In Chapter 3 the proposed Developmental Price for certain minerals and metals 
including gold and platinum was discussed. The rationale for such a proposal is to 
offer beneficiators (fabricators of gold and platinum such as jewellers and 
autocatalyst manufacturers) a competitive advantage. 
It was argued in the Chapter that this amounts to subsidisation which has been 
proven not to work in the diamond industry in South Africa. It was also questioned in 
the Chapter: who will pay for the subsidy? If miners are to accept a discounted price 
for their production to be sold to beneficiators, this will affect their profitability and 
marginal mines would close. If government is to use tax payer’s money for the 
subsidy, the Gauteng Toll-roads debacle suggests that South Africans would object 
strongly. However, there may be merit as suggested in Chapter 3 in beneficiation 
credits to be used to offset royalty payments and other taxes. 
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PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE REGULATION
The hypothesis at the start of this study was that the Precious Metals Industry in 
South Africa was over-regulated – “draconian” according to many industry players, 
and should in a phased approach, be deregulated in line with most other countries in 
the world. In the discussions in Chapters 2 to 7 of this study, there were arguments 
against and for deregulation. It was shown in those chapters that while the 
prohibition of possession of unwrought and semi-fabricated precious metal allows for 
better control (including exchange control) and has led to successful convictions 
related to illegal mining and trading, this level of control was also seen by some as 
an infringement of a citizen’s rights and not in keeping with the trend in the rest of the 
world. 
In the light of this, it is proposed that while deregulation is inevitable in future, it will 
have to be only after the fundamental problems are dealt with. These problems in 
South Africa include illegal gold mining, theft of precious metals from mines, illegal 
trade and smuggling of precious metals and exchange control considerations. These 
problems could take 10 to 15 years to resolve or to cease being relevant. It is 
therefore proposed that complete deregulation of the industry is about 15 years 
away, from a feasibility point of view. 
It is recommended that it is worth monitoring the progress of relatively new initiatives 
such as The World Gold Council’s Conflict-Free Gold Standard. The implementation 
of this Standard shows that there is a place for self-regulation by industry and that 
when regulation is voluntary, companies embrace it as part of business and essential 
to good business believing that it will translate to consumer confidence in the 
products that the companies produce (PWC, 2012). A system of such voluntary self-
regulation (including self-certification) contributes to an effective internal control 
system. 
It is proposed that self-regulation measures in the precious metals industries 
complement the Precious Metals Act, 2005, until phased deregulation of the industry
can begin in the 10 to 15 year timeframe cited earlier. Thereafter, it may become 
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feasible for self-regulation (including aspects such as self-certification with external 
audit) to substitute regulation by government in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 
2005. 
It is also proposed that elements of the Conflict-Free Gold Standard in conjunction 
with other such initiatives in the gold value chain can also be applied to tackle the 
copper theft problem in South Africa with the objective of ensuring a company 
excludes stolen and illicit copper from the company’s supply chain. These elements 
or measures include appropriate management systems, policies and skills in place; 
Know-Your-Client systems; appropriate processes/internal controls and a chain of 
warranties across the whole supply chain. 
It is also proposed, from this study, that the elements and measures mentioned 
above for copper can be applied to rough diamonds better, due to the smaller size of 
the industry and due to the fact that there are Conflict-Affected and High Risk 
countries and areas associated with rough diamonds. It is recommended that the 
Kimberley Process examine how these can be applied to the Kimberley Process 
Certification System to plug the loopholes a government-implemented certification 
scheme cannot. 
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF THE PRECIOUS METALS TRADE IN 
THE SHORT TERM
Before deregulation of the precious metals industry in South Africa can begin in an 
estimated ten years, it is recommended that the following proposals be considered 
as they could assist in controlling illegal mining and trade (see Table 8.1).  Firstly, 
the legislation that controls mining and prospecting in South Africa, the Mineral & 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 (MPRDA) should be amended to 
include the control of illegal mining and prospecting as one of its key objectives 
(section 2). Amendments to the Act and Regulations under the Act should also 
include setting out more clearly the responsibilities of the DMR especially with a view 
to practical implementation of sections 91 and 92. Sections 91 & 92 of the MPRDA 
provide powers to any person (including the Regional Manager of the DMR in the 
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various provinces and officers of the DMR) authorised by the Minister to conduct 
inspections and investigation in any area where prospecting or mining is taking 
place, under the authority of a warrant, to ensure that the provisions of the Act are 
not being contravened. Section 91 also provides the authorised person powers to 
obtain evidence, seize any material, document or data and take samples of any 
material for testing and analysis. Therefore “police” powers can be given to certain 
Managers and officials of the DMR to police the provisions of the Act including 
ensuring prospecting and mining is carried out with the relevant right or permit and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act and conditions of the right or permit. A 
corollary of this is that illegal mining and prospecting should be policed by the DMR. 
For this to happen, there needs to be greater emphasis placed on this aspect of 
regulation of the industry, and the capacity of the DMR needs to be strengthened at 
the provincial level to enable the implementation of sections 91 and 92 of the 
MPRDA (sections dealing with inspections to ensure compliance with the Act).
With respect to the Precious Metals Act, 2005, it is suggested that the inclusion of 
the regulation of access to mercury under the Precious Metals Act, 2005 should be 
considered in the short-term. This is because illegal miners are using mercury to 
process gold. If possession, purchase, import and sale of mercury are tightly 
controlled, it will allow for another weapon to be used in the fight against illegal 
mining. Currently mercury is meant to be controlled under the Hazardous 
Substances Act, 1973 but implementation by the Department of Health is ineffective.
It is also suggested that the provision for geochemical fingerprinting and the 
resources allocated thereto be strengthened. Section 22 of the Precious Metals Act, 
2005 (titled: Database for precious metals) provides that any producer (miner) or any 
person who imports precious metal must submit to the Forensics Science Laboratory 
of the South African Police Services specimens of any precious metal produced or 
imported as prescribed. It is proposed that this provision be extended to specimens 
of exports of unwrought and semi-fabricated precious metal. It has been found in this 
study that not requesting specimens of exports of unwrought precious metal 
especially, is a loophole that allows for stolen and illegally mined metal to leave the 
country apparently through holders of legitimate export licences. It is also suggested 
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that the requirement to submit specimens periodically be extended to refiners 
(holders of refining licences) some of whom it is believed buy illegally mined and 
illicit precious metal.
Furthermore, it is suggested that provision be made for industry-self regulation in the 
current Precious Metals Act, 2005. The provision would entail recognition in the 
Precious Metals Act, 2005 of self-regulation by holders of precious metal licences 
(mining licences, refining licences and beneficiation licences). It is also a relatively 
simple to insert such a provision in precious metals legislation and require that 
holders of precious metals licences perform due diligence to ensure the integrity of 
the person they are sourcing precious metal from. It can be made compulsory that 
holders of precious metals licences satisfy themselves with reasonable certainty that 
their clients have not associated themselves with conflict or illicit gold.  There are 
some measures already in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 that speak to a paper audit 
trail. In particular, holders of precious metals licences must record transactions of 
precious metals purchases and sales in registers prescribed by regulation. There are 
however, no assurances given to the next party in the chain that the gold was 
purchased or handled in a manner that is “conflict-free” or human-rights-abuse free.  
This can be addressed in current precious metals legislation by inserting a provision 
requiring invoices of sales and exports to contain a conflict-free or human-rights-
abuse free statement. Moreover, current precious metals legislation can be 
improved by requiring that assurances of the conflict-free and human rights abuse –
free nature of gold or gold-bearing material being exported or imported is declared in 
writing on invoices and export/import documents.
In this study, the proposal for re-regulation of silver was rebuffed because silver does 
not satisfy the criteria to justify regulation. The proposal to declare copper a 
“precious metal” to allow for greater control – with the intention to control theft was 
also not favoured due to the metals’ intensity of use in households and buildings in 
general which would make regulation cumbersome and costly. In terms of platinum, 
it is proposed that South African refiners be incentivised (tax incentive for example) 
to increase platinum recycling or extend their operations to platinum scrap (in 
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particular spent autocatalyst) recycling. This will serve to increase South Africa’s 
dominance of platinum supply. 
It was deduced in the study that the Mineral & Petroleum Resources Development 
Act, 2002 (MPRDA) has no jurisdiction over urban (e-waste) mining because metals 
such as precious metals found in city dumps and landfills do not fall under the 
definition of “mineral” or “mine” in the MPRDA. It is proposed that if the definition of 
“unwrought precious metal” is amended to cover waste containing precious metals, 
the Precious Metals Act, 2005 would be the appropriate legislative instrument to 
regulate Urban Mining in the literal sense (i.e., mining of urban dumps or landfills in 
which metal containing material has been dumped or buried for many years). Such 
an amendment would allow for a refining licence provided for in the Act, to be used 
for the purpose of urban mining. Regulations under the Precious metals Act would 
need to be augmented to strengthen health and safety (as we are dealing with a 
hazardous substance) and environmental compliance (A Compliance Certificate in 
terms of the National Environmental Management Waste Act, 2008 and an EIA 
should be a pre-requisite). 
The judgment in the De Beers Consolidated Mines versus Ataqua Mining and Others 
case in relation to tailings dumps (that pre-date the implementation of the MPRDA) 
has opened the flood gates for both the legal and illegal removal without a mining 
authorisation of tailings dumps or any material that could be passed off as tailings 
dump material. This has resulted in most of this material (legal and illegal) being sold 
to holders of refining licences issued in terms of the Precious Metals Act, 2005 for 
processing. This has complicated the regulation of compliance by these refiners, as 
this material is being received by refiners from persons not in possession of a mining 
right or mining permit. It is proposed that to ensure that the exploitation of tailings 
dumps is regulated, a specific licencing provision for this activity be created under 
the Second-hand Goods Act, 2009
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Table 8.1- Summary of issues and proposed solutions (pre-deregulation)
ISSUE PROPOSAL/S FOR REGULATION
Illegal gold mining
1. The MPRDA should be amended to include the control 
of illegal mining and prospecting as one of its key 
objectives (section 2 of the Act). 
2. Amendments to the MPRDA & Regulations under the 
Act setting out more clearly the responsibilities of the 
DMR, especially with a view to practical 
implementation of sections 91 and 92 of the Act are 
also necessary. Theses sections deal with powers of 
any person (including the Regional Manager of the 
DMR in the various provinces and officers of the DMR) 
authorised by the Minister to conduct inspections and 
investigations in any area where prospecting or mining 
is taking place. In short, illegal mining and prospecting 
should be policed by the DMR.
3. The Regulation of possession, acquisition and transfer 
of mercury should be included under the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005. This is because illegal miners are 
using mercury to process gold. 
Illicit trade and 
smuggling
1. The Precious Metals Act, 2005 should be amended to 
allow for specimens of exports of unwrought precious 
metal to be provided to the Forensics Science Lab of 
the SAPS.
2. The requirement to submit specimens periodically 
should be extended to the various products of refining 
licence holders.
213
ISSUE PROPOSAL/S FOR REGULATION
Scrap precious metal 
control
1. Provision should be made for joint inspections by 
SAPS and the SADPMR with regard to scrap precious 
metal in terms of both the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
and the Second-hand Goods Act, 2009.
2. The melting of jewellery by holders of refining and 
beneficiation licensees into dorè bars or any bars 
should be specifically prohibited. A new licence with 
the necessary controls should be provided specifically 
for this to prevent laundering of illegally mined metal. 
Money laundering (using 
gold)
1. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 should 
provide for specific measures to prevent the use of 
gold in money laundering activities. 
Platinum Recycling
1. There should be a levy (duty) on the export of platinum 
and palladium -containing secondary materials 
including scrap, and incentives for the import of the 
same to promote recycling of these metals in South 
Africa. 
Residue 
Stockpiles/Deposits 
(Historical Dumps)
1. There should be controls on the mining of residue 
stockpiles/deposits in the Precious Metals Act, 2005 
and the Waste Act, 2008. 
Co-regulation
1. There should be provision for self-regulation by 
industry in the Precious Metals Act, 2005. This could 
allow for closing of loopholes in the Act. 
Beneficiation
1. VAT on gold and platinum purchases for fabrication 
should be 0-rated. 
2. Red tape in fabricators accessing gold and platinum 
should be eradicated
3. Export Processing Zones should be introduced
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ISSUE PROPOSAL/S FOR REGULATION
BEE
1. Applicability of the Mining Charter to the 
downstream manufacturing industry should be 
reviewed. 
DEREGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY IN THE MEDIUM TERM
When the fundamental problems relating to precious metal illegal mining and trade 
are under control, it is proposed that phased deregulation of the industry can begin. 
It is recommended that statutory hallmarking be implemented at that point in lieu of 
strict control of possession to bring the industry in line with countries such as the UK 
(see Table 8.2). 
Self-regulation by industry should also be encouraged in the post-deregulation 
phase. In addition, in the post-deregulation phase, with supply side and “stick” 
approach legislative controls out of the way, non-legislative instruments to promote 
beneficiation should be strengthened (see Table 8.2). Lastly, deregulation will also 
allow for investment product innovation without the (current) barriers of possession 
control and capital controls. 
Table 8.2- Summary of proposals (deregulation phase)
ISSUE PROPOSAL
Hallmarking
Statutory Hallmarking should be introduced in lieu of the Precious 
Metals Act, 2005 after the deregulation phase
Self-regulation
Self-regulation by industry should complement Hallmarking after the 
deregulation phase
Beneficiation
Non-legislative measures to promote beneficiation should be 
enhanced (such as metal loan schemes, market development, 
market access, incentives and skills development in design, 
manufacturing and marketing). More emphasis can be placed on 
demand-side measures and programmes in this phase. 
Investment products Deregulation will allow for innovation in investment products
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RESOURCE NATIONALISM -MOTIVATED PROPOSALS 
As discussed above, except for the platinum coin concept, none of the resource 
nationalism -motivated proposals (inter alia Producer Price for Precious Metals, 
OPEC-type Trade Bloc for Platinum and State Platinum Trader) were supported in 
this study. Therefore, no regulatory proposals are made in this regard for the future 
regulation of the precious metals industry. Nevertheless, it was a useful exercise to 
analyse these as such analyses can be informative to policy makers. 
As far as beneficiation promotion is concerned, it is suggested that non-legislative 
instruments and initiatives including lowering the cost of production (such as metal 
financing schemes), market development and markets access be considered. This is 
mainly due to the fact that supply-side provisions in legislation have not proven to be 
successful in growing beneficiation in South Africa. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
It is recommended that further work on the optimal framework for self-regulation and 
a dual system of co-regulation be investigated as this study did not get into the detail 
of such proposals. 
It would also be worth investigating the various reasons that contribute to 
commodity-specific legislation (like the Precious Metals Act, 2005) punishing the 
legal entities and individuals but allowing for criminal syndicates to exploit loopholes 
and thrive - especially in developing countries. 
Lastly, should any of the resource nationalism -related proposals ever be introduced 
in draft legislation in the future, a thorough Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) 
must be done by an independent body, before it progresses to a Bill to be introduced 
in parliament. 
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